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ABSTRACT
Academicians and regulators have become increasingly concerned 
during the last decade with the emergence and development of the multi­
bank holding company form of organization. This dissertation examines 
the performance of multibank holding company subsidiary banks versus 
comparable independent banks in Texas at the end of 1975, using both 
univariate and multivariate statistical techniques, including principal 
components factor analysis and multivariate discriminant analysis.
The objective is to determine if differences in performance exist 
between the two groups of banks, and if differences exist, to find the 
factors that account for the differences. The scope and methodology of 
this study are outlined in Chapter I.
Chapter II considers the growth and development of the multibank 
holding company movement both nationally and in Texas. This growth is 
examined in the context of changes in the legal environment affecting 
bank holding companies as well as the alleged economic advantages of 
holding company affiliation.
The third chapter is devoted to a brief examination of the 
relevant literature on bank holding company performance with particular 
attention given to the test procedures, both univariate and multi­
variate, and the research findings. These studies reflect the 
desirability and necessity of the present study as a logical extension 
of that literature.
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The design of the research sample and subsequent univariate tests 
on the sample are contained in Chapter IV. Eighty independent banks, 
each between $5 million and $100 million in deposit size, are paired 
with eighty multibank holding company subsidiary banks of comparable 
size and banking markets. The sample is then divided into an "original" 
sample of forty pairs of banks and a "validation" sample, likewise 
with forty pairs of banks. Thirty bank performance ratios are calcu­
lated for each bank. Univariate "t-tests" on the original sample 
found statistically significant differences for six of the thirty 
variables. Independent banks were found to have a higher loan to 
deposit and loan to asset ratio than subsidiary banks while holding 
a smaller proportion of U.S. government and municipal securities to 
total assets than subsidiaries. Furthermore, independent banks had a 
higher ratio of time and savings deposits to total deposits and a 
lower ratio of trust department income to total operating income.
Chapter V develops the analytical framework for the multi­
variate factor and discriminant techniques including an explanation 
of many technical details. Chapter VI applies alternative factor 
analytic techniques (including Varimax, Equamax, Quartimax and 
Promax rotations) to reduce the thirty original performance variables 
into four factors: Profitability, Loans, Operating Efficiency and
Capital Adequacy. Using the basic variable approach, these factors 
were introduced into a multivariate discriminant model, which detected 
statistically significant group differences between subsidiary and 
Independent banks. These differences again indicated that independent
banks outperformed subsidiary banks. Both the original sample and the 
validation sample were used to judge the classificatory accuracy of 
the discriminant model. In addition the relative importance of indi­
vidual variables was determined using alternative methods.
An "encroachment" explanation of bank behavior is offered in 
Chapter VII along with a reconciliation of both univariate and multi­
variate results. The "encroachment hypothesis" postulates that 
independent banks react to holding company entry, at least initially, 
by extending a higher proportion of loans to customers than subsidiary 
banks while increasing competition for time and savings deposits and 
reducing holdings of government and municipal securities.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of multibank holding companies in Texas in
recent years has raised serious questions with respect to both the
structure of the Texas banking market and the performance of the
multibank holding company within this market.
The emergence of the multibank holding company phenomenon
in Texas has occurred primarily in this decade. In 1970 there were
four multibank holding companies in Texas with fourteen subsidiary
banks. These banks controlled approximately 7 percent of total
bank deposits within the State.'*' As of July 1, 1976, there were
38 multibank holding companies operating in Texas with 234 sub- 
2sidiaries. An additional 23 subsidiaries are pending approval. 
Subsidiaries that currently have formal approval control 53.5 per­
cent of total deposits in the State (based on December 31, 1975,
John R. Stodden, "Multibank Holding Companies: Development
in Texas Changes in Recent Years," Business Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, (December, 1974), !•
2Unpublished data; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
1
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deposits); inclusion of subsidiaries currently pending approval
3increases the total to 57 percent of total State deposits.
Purpose of the Study 
The immediate goal of this investigation is to determine 
whether significant differences exist in the operating performance 
of affiliate banks of multibank holding companies in Texas when 
compared to independent (non-affiliated) banks of comparable size 
operating in the same banking market. Much of the empirical litera­
ture relating to bank holding company performance has utilized 
univariate statistical analysis, comparing affiliate and independent 
banks on the basis of a number of financial and operating variables, 
examining each variable in isolation. The effect of such studies 
is to avoid a simultaneous, overall evaluation of these variables.
As an extension of existing empirical work, this study (1) 
uses univariate tests of selected performance variables applied to 
a sample of affiliated and non-affiliated banks in Texas, (2) 
systematically reduces the number of performance variables retained 
for further study by using factor analysis, (3) develops a multiple 
discriminant model for testing differences in group performance 
of affiliated versus non-affiliated banks, and (4) classifies both 
the initial sample and a validation sample using the discriminant 
model.
3 Ibid.
Scope of the Study
For purposes of this study a multibank holding company is
an organization controlling at least 25 percent of the stock of two 
4or more banks. Affiliate or subsidiary banks are banks controlled 
by the multibank holding company."*
This study is confined to the Texas banking market for two 
reasons. First, in terms of banking structure, Texas is a unit 
banking state. In a sense, unit banking is the raison d* etre for 
the multibank holding company in Texas. This stems from the pro­
hibition of branch banking in the Texas banking code which states:
No state, national, or private bank shall engage in 
business in more than one place, maintain any branch 
office, or cash checks^or receive deposits except in 
its own banking house.
In the absence of branch banking, multibank holding companies 
have provided a vehicle for expanding banking markets. The unit 
banking system does allow the researcher the advantage of studying
4The Federal Reserve can regulate a holding company with less 
than 25 percent of the stock of a bank if (1) the company holds at 
least 5 percent of the shares of a bank and (2) through other inter­
locking relationships, such as stock held by directors, the total 
shares held 25 percent or more. See Peter S. Rose, "Bank Holding 
Companies in Texas: Benefits and Problems," Baylor Business Studies, 
(May, June, July, 1973), 41.
"*A more detailed discussion of the development of multibank 
holding company legislation is presented in Chapter II.
^Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 342-903, Supp. (1975).
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the performance of holding company affiliates without confronting 
the complications arising from branch operations.
Second, the Texas banking market provides sufficient data 
for meaningful statistical analysis. In addition to the large number 
of commercial banks contained within the State, both holding company 
and independent, Texas also has the advantage of being totally 
contained within the Eleventh Federal Reserve district. This 
promotes homogeneity in the sample by permitting the collection of 
consistent, uniform data without imposing the additional difficulty 
of aggregating data from two or more Federal Reserve districts 
influenced by differing state banking laws.
The study is confined to banks that meet two criteria. First, 
affiliate holding company banks must meet the requirement of Federal 
Reserve approval on or before January 1, 1974. The study is based on 
data for banks as of December 31, 1975. Therefore a minimum lag of 
two years exists between approval and the test date for performance. 
This two year minimum post acquisition interval permits time for 
adjustment to holding company affiliation to take place.
The second constraint is based on bank size. Banks holding 
between $5 million and $100 million in deposits are included in 
the analysis. Large banks ($100 million in deposits and over) are 
excluded because of the difficulty of finding both affiliate and 
independent banks in the same market of the same size. For example, 
in metropolitan areas such as Houston or Dallas one might find an
5
$800 million holding company bank, but the difficulty is that 
independent banks that represent potential "partners" are either 
significantly different in size or nonexistent. Virtually all 
large banks in the sample are already affiliated with holding companies, 
leaving few, if any, independent banks for comparison.^
In addition, many of the large banks tend to be the "lead" 
banks in their respective holding companies. These are frequently 
the original banks in the holding company. As such, the policies 
of these banks tend to influence activities of subsidiaries. Piper 
excluded lead banks in his study of bank holding companies because 
lead banks were "so 'atypical' of the entire acquisition movement
g
as to make their inclusion in the study distortive." Lead bank 
behavior is examined further in the empirical studies summarized in 
Chapter II.
Methodology
The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the 
performance of affiliate banks of multibank holding companies in 
Texas differs significantly from the performance of independent
^Several other elements related to the selection of the data 
sample are examined in Chapter IV.
g
Thomas R. Piper, The Economics of Bank Acquisitions by 
Registered Bank Holding Companies (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, 1971), p. 9.
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banks. This task will be accomplished through both univariate and 
multivariate statistical analysis.
Each of the forty pairs of affiliate and independent banks will 
initially be analyzed on the basis of thirty bank performance ratios. 
These ratios are representative of the variables considered to be 
important in the empirical literature relating to bank performance. 
These variables include (but are not limited to) the following general 
categories: (1) asset composition, (2) profitability, (3) costs,
(4) pricing policy, (5) extension of loans, and (6) capital adequacy.
As with many earlier studies of holding company performance, 
univariate analysis will be applied. The "t-test" for statistical 
significance will be computed for each variable in order to indicate 
whether affiliate banks differ from independent banks based on these 
thirty variables. At this point the study will have reached the 
level where many earlier studies terminated. Conclusions in earlier 
studies, reached by evaluating how many variables indicated signi­
ficant differences, were largely subjective, however, because no 
a priori justification existed for assigning greater relative 
weights to some variables vis £ vis others. Moreover, these studies 
neglected the possibility of interaction between variables that 
could lead to results different than those obtained by analyzing 
each variable in isolation.
In a sense the univariate analysis is merely a preliminary 
that accomplishes two objectives: (1) it serves as a basis for
comparison with other studies and (2) it represents a logical
7
starting point for subsequent multivariate analysis. The first 
step of that multivariate analysis is a factor analysis.
Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is a statistical technique that is useful in
reducing the dimensionality of a set of variables while retaining
9the underlying structure of the original set of data. This result 
relies on the intercorrelation of variables which allows the same 
information to be obtained with fewer variables. These new factors 
or components that are created can be further refined by statistical 
"rotation" procedures. These procedures are elaborated in Chapter V. 
The post-rotational factors can then be used as inputs into a 
multiple discriminant model. One might expect, a. priori, that of the 
thirty original variables in this study, only four or five factors 
would be carried forward for investigation and development of the 
discriminant model.
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis
As indicated earlier, one of the major problems of studies 
concerned with bank holding company performance is the question of 
how to interpret significance tests involving univariate analysis 
of individual performance measures when, in reality, these measures 
interact on one another. Fraser, Phillips and Rose have recently noted
gRichard I. Harris, A Primer on Multivariate Statistics, 
(New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 23.
I
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The performance of commercial banks should not be measured 
by a single proxy variable, such as the loan rate or bank 
profits, but by a set of variables which are jointly 
determined by market structure, demand and other factors.
The specifications of the model should not rest upon a jungle 
measure of bank performance but should be multivariate.
Johnson and Meinster have proposed use of the multivariate
discriminant technique in bank holding company analysis. They
suggest:
A set of performance measures could be specified and the 
MDA algorithm could be used to derive a coefficient for 
each measure such that the resulting final function 
maximally d||criminates, or distinguishes between the 
two groups.
Multivariate analysis has been used extensively in the past
in psychological research. Increasingly in recent years, discriminant
analysis has been applied to a wide range of topics in economics and 
12finance. The method appears ideally suited for distinguishing 
between holding company and independent bank performance. A detailed
Donald R. Fraser, Wallace Phillips, Jr., and Peter S. Rose, 
"A Canonical Analysis of Bank Performance," Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, (March, 1974), 287.
"^Rodney D. Johnson and David Meinster, "An Analysis of 
Bank Holding Company Acquisitions: Some Methodological Issues,"
Journal of Bank Research, (Spring, 1974), 60. In a subsequent 
article in the Journal of Business, Johnson and Meinster followed 
their own lead and applied discriminant analysis to bank holding 
company performance. That study, and the deficiencies therein, 
are discussed in both Chapter III and Chapter V.
The development of discriminant analysis is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter V.
9
technical explanation of the multivariate discriminant technique 
is contained in Chapter V.
Limitations on Research Effort 
This study, as with any research study, must operate within 
restricted boundaries and must recognize that it is not possible 
to deal with every ancilliary issue of a central topic. At the 
outset several limitations should be recognized. These limitations 
are noted below:
1. Non-banking activities of multibank holding companies are not 
explicitly considered in evaluating performance although some 
reference is made to these activities in Chapter II. Non­
banking activities could constitute a complete study in 
itself. In addition, particularly difficult problems arise 
in acquiring data on these activities.
2. Concentration within the banking structure is not considered 
per se. Obviously, concentration of bank deposits and assets 
has increased with the widespread emergence of bank holding 
companies in Texas. This occurrence may affect measures of 
banking performance, such as the pricing variables. However, 
this study makes no attempt to devise explicit measures of 
deposit or asset concentration.
3. One-bank holding companies are not considered. Again this 
could be an investigation itself. The instant case is concerned 
only with the multibank holding company form of organization.
10
4. All banks are not considered, but rather a stratified random 
sample is utilized. Independent banks are paired with 
holding company affiliates by size and geographical location 
for the reasons indicated earlier.
Organization of the Study 
A brief description of the salient features of the remaining 
chapters is given below.
Chapter II traces the growth of the multibank holding company 
movement with special attention devoted to the economic and legal 
rationale for its development.
Chapter III considers the development of the empirical litera­
ture relating to bank holding company performance. This discussion 
serves as a backdrop for the current study.
Chapter IV details the design of the experiment including 
data collection. The constraints of the sample are discussed in 
depth. Univariate analysis is applied in the form of "t-tests" on 
the performance variables for the initial sample. These results 
allow comparisons with earlier studies and serve as a beginning 
point for multivariate analysis.
Chapter V traces the development of factor analysis and 
multivariate discriminant analysis in the literature. Particular 
attention is paid to the application of these techniques to the 
present study. A formal hypothesis is stated and methods for testing 
this hypothesis are discussed.
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Chapter VI contains a statistical analysis of the thirty 
performance variables using factor and multivariate discriminant 
analyses. These variables are reduced into a small number of 
factors which are entered into a discriminant model. The results 
are tested for statistical significance and are subsequently tested 
for classificatory accuracy.
Chapter VII contains conclusions arising from tests of the 
hypothesis. It also contains interpretation of the results and 
implications of the research findings for policy decisions. 
Recommendations of areas for further research will be provided.
CHAPTER II
THE GROWTH OF MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANIES:
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC RATIONALE
Multibank holding companies have grown and developed in 
response to a changing legal and economic environment. Federal 
legislation regulating bank holding companies has been enacted on 
three occasions in the last twenty years. Instead of restricting hold­
ing company development, however, these regulations have led to an 
increase in multibank holding company activities.
In addition, proponents have supported holding company growth, 
citing "banking factors" and "convenience and needs factors" as economic 
justification. Regardless of whether the rationale for the existence 
of holding companies has been primarily legal, economic, or some 
combination of both, multibank holding companies have grown rapidly 
in Texas since 1970, closely paralleling national trends.
Growth of Multibank Holding Companies 
in the United States
Multibank holding companies in the United States have experienced 
three general stages of growth during the last twenty years. Boczar, 
in a study of multibank holding company growth from 1956 to 1973, found 
periods of slow growth from 1956 to 1965, moderate growth from 1965
12
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to 1970 and rapid growth from 1970 to 1973.^ This rapid growth continued 
in 1974. These trends are confirmed by the data in Table II.1.
At the end of 1965, multibank holding companies controlled only 
8.3 percent of total deposits in United States banks. This represented 
less than a one percentage point increase from 1956. The number of 
multibank holding companies remained virtually unchanged during this 
time period.
Total multibank holding company deposits increased as a percent­
age of total U.S. deposits by only 8 percentage points from 1965 to 
the beginning of 1970, reflecting only moderate growth. From the end 
of 1970 to the end of 1974, however, the percentage of total deposits 
held by multibank holding companies more than doubled, increasing from 
16.2 percent to 38.4 percent. During the period of rapid growth from 
1970 to 1974, the number of multibank holding companies increased from 
111 to 276 while the number of subsidiary banks increased from 895 to 
2,122.
After experiencing annual rates of growth from 1970 to 1974 in 
excess of twenty percent in both holding company organizations and 
subsidiary banks, the rate of increase slowed to less than ten percent 
annually during 1975 as the rush to acquire subsidiary banks prompted 
by the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act subsided. (See 
Table II.2). In addition, the Federal Reserve authorities began a
1Gregory E. Boczar, The Growth of Multibank Holding Companies: 
1956-1973, Staff Economic Study, No. 85, (Washington: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1975), p. 5.
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TABLE II. 1
MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES
1956-1975










% of U.S. Total
1956 49 428 14,843 7.5
1960 42 426 18,274 8.0
1965 48 468 27,560 8.3
1966 58 561 41,081 11.6
1967 65 603 49,827 12.6
1968 71 629 57,634 13.2
1969 86 723 62,574 14.3
1970 111 895 78,064 16.2
1971 138 1,106 129,492 24.0
1972 181 1,401 192,448 31.2
1973 218 1,726 233,291 34.2
1974 276 2,122 287,381 38.4
1975 289 2,264 297,472 37.8
Source: Gregory E. Boczar, The Growth of Multibank Holding Companies:
1956-1973, Staff Economic Study No. 85, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 1975, p. 5; Annual Statistical 
Digest, 1971-1975, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1976, p. 280.
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TABLE II.2
RATES OF CHANGE IN GROWTH OF MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
AND SUBSIDIARY BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES 
1971-1975
Percentage Change in Percentage Change in





1975 4.7% 6.7 %
Source: Calculated from data in Table II.1.
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reassessment of the effects of approval of proposed acquisitions on 
aggregate market concentration and subsequently adopted a more cautious 
policy in granting approval to holding company acquisitions.
One might raise the question of the uniformity of these trends 
among individual states. Boczar's study, which ends with 1973, is 
useful for making interstate comparisons. In Texas, the focus of 
this study, the first year of rapid, sustained expansion was 1970, 
the "takeoff" year. This coincided with the passage of amendments 
to the Bank Holding Company Act. Table II.3, which contains data 
on the most active holding company states, permits comparison of 
holding company deposit growth in Texas with other active states.
In most cases growth proceeded at a faster rate in the period 
after 1970. In two instances, Florida and Maine, "takeoff" occurred 
in 1967. In these cases, the states' largest banks (First National 
Bank of Miami and Depositors Trust Company of Augusta, respectively) 
formed multibank organizations which precipitated earlier growth 
activities than experienced in other states.^ in general, the 
behavior of multibank holding companies in Texas, beginning in 1970, 
was typical of the trends developing in other parts of the nation.
As a basis for comparison, Table II.4 is included to indicate the 
status of multibank holding companies on December 31, 1975, the 
date used in this study for data analysis.
^Ibid., pp. 16-17. Boczar identified the takeoff years for the 
following states: Alabama (1971), Florida (1967), Maine (1967),Massa­
chusetts (1973), Michigan (1971), Missouri (1968), New Jersey (1970), 
New Mexico (1969), Tennessee (1971), Texas (1970), and Virginia (1962).
TABLE II.3
MOST ACTIVE HOLDING COMPANY STATES 
1965-1973
Percentage Point Increase in Multibank 
Rank State Holding Company Share of State Deposits
1965-1973 1965-1970 1970-1973
1 New York 70.4 17.7 52.7
2 Florida 63.3 38.5 24.8
3 Maine 62.2 41.2 21.0
4 Massachusetts 55.2 2.1 53.1
5 Alabama 52.1 0.0 52.1
6 Virginia 52.0 21.1 30.9
7 Missouri 49.7 23.7 26.0
8 Tennessee 45.8 5.7 40.1
9 Texas 37.4 6.9 30.5
10 New Mexico 37.5 6.9 30.6
11 Colorado 36.9 29.2 7.7
12 New Jersey 33.5 16.8 16.7
13 Ohio 26.6 11.5 15.1
14 Connecticut 24.2 3.5 20.7
15 Maryland 23.7 7.5 16.2
Source: Gregory E. Boczar, The Growth of Multibank Holding Companies
1956-1973, Staff Economic Study No. 85, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 1975, p. 11.
TABLE II.5
MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY COMPARISONS BY STATE
December 31, 1975
Number of Multibank Subsidiary Assets Deposits Branching
State Holding Companies Banks Branches (Millions) (Millions) Type
Alabama 8 63 308 6,572 5,432 Limited
Alaska — -- -- --- Statewide
Arizona 1 1 142 2,234 1,870 Statewide
Arkansas 2 5 21 680 570 Unit
California 7 14 500 10,996 8,474 Statewide
Colorado 10 93 32 5,983 4,943 Unit
Connecticut 4 10 172 2,750 2,216 Statewide
Delaware — --- -- ------ ------ Statewide
District of Columbia 1 1 19 490 429 Statewide
Florida 32 450 133 21,305 18,289 Unit
Georgia 5 19 205 5,603 3,925 Limited
Hawaii — --- --- ------ ------ Statewide
Idaho 2 2 92 1,209 1,031 Statewide
Illinois 2 5 -- 184 162 Unit
Indiana 1 2 8 242 211 Limited
Iowa 10 60 97 3,302 2,800 Unit
Kansas 4 8 8 562 450 Unit
Kentucky 1 2 46 1,102 856 Limited
Louisiana 1 3 2 75 65 Limited
Maine 5 25 201 1,547 1,332 Statewide
Maryland 3 18 187 2,337 2,007 Statewide
Massachusetts 13 55 597 14,983 11,910 Limited
Michigan 21 96 738 21,959 18,299 Limited
Minnesota 7 138 23 10,860 8,577 Unit
Mississippi — --- -- ------ ----- Limited
Missouri 25 193 148 13,326 10,304 Unit
TABLE II.5 (continued)
MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY COMPARISONS BY STATE 
December 31, 1975
State










Montana 4 37 8 1,693 1,449 Unit
Nebraska 1 5 8 583 495 Unit
Nevada 1 2 53 1,160 1,029 Statewide
New Hampshire 2 12 32 495 416 Limited
New Jersey 21 58 717 10,361 8,746 Statewide
New Mexico 4 24 94 1,690 1,480 Limited
New York 20 108 2,485 133,368 103,776 Limited
North Carolina 1 4 66 463 402 Statewide
North Dakota 3 32 27 1,203 1,047 Unit
Ohio 19 132 883 23,583 18,804 Limited
Oklahoma 2 4 2 174 152 Unit
Oregon 1 1 142 3,048 2,309 Statewide
Pennsylvania 2 4 2 61 53 Limited
Rhode Island — -- -- ------ ----- Statewide
South Carolina 1 2 61 319 279 Statewide
South Dakota 3 16 58 1,430 1,265 Statewide
Tennessee 11 66 338 7,678 6,383 Limited
Texas 31 209 42 29,847 23,649 Unit
Utah 5 17 152 2,910 2,501 Statewide
Vermont — --- -- ------ ----- Statewide
Virginia 12 120 919 12,300 10,395 Statewide
Washington 3 7 142 1,888 1,561 Statewide
West Virginia 1 2 2 24 20 Unit
Wisconsin 21 119 94 8,090 6,596 Limited
Wyoming 5 24 --- 797 687 Unit
Source: Annual Statistical Digest, 1971-1975, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1976,
pp. 281-283.
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At the end of 1975 Texas ranked second to Florida in both the 
total number of multibank holding company organizations, with 32, 
and in number of subsidiary banks, with 209. Texas ranked second to 
New York in total assets and total deposits with $29,847,000 and 
$23,649,000, respectively. Since New York has limited branching laws, 
Texas represents the largest unit banking state in terms of multibank 
holding company assets and deposits.
Growth of Multibank Holding Companies in Texas
Prior to 1970, multibank holding companies represented a 
relatively unimportant segment of the Texas banking market with only 
three companies in existence, located in Dallas, Fort Worth, and 
Houston. However, changes in banking laws relating to bank holding 
company activities were enacted in 1970, creating a stimulus for multi­
bank holding company expansion in Texas. These changes will be 
discussed shortly. Table II.5 traces the status of Texas multibank 
holding companies from 1957 through 1976.
At the end of 1971 multibank holding company subsidiaries in 
Texas controlled 13 percent of total state deposits. From 1971 
through the end of 1974, holding company expansion proceeded rapidly. 
Many of the early acquisitions during this period represented 
formalization of existing chain banking arrangements. Chain banking 
refers to the informal control of two or more banks by an individual
TABLE II.5
MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY ORGANIZATIONS IN TEXAS
1957-1976
Year Ending December 31 1957 1966 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Total Multibank Holding
Companies 3 3 3 3 4 7 15 24 26 37
Total Subsidiary Banks 8 14 13 13 14 41 71 140 189 226
Subsidiary deposits as 
a percentage of total





Source: Adopted from R. Charles Moyer, "Multiple Bank Holding Companies in Texas: Growth and Prospects,”
Baylor Business Studies, (February, March, April 1973, 8); Additional data supplied by Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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or group of individuals; multibank holding companies by contrast 
are organized through a formal corporate structure.-*
At the end of 1974 the rate of holding company expansion slowed. 
Whereas the percent of subsidiary deposits to total state deposits 
increased by 18.6 percent in 1972 and 12.3 percent in 1974, the two 
years of most rapid growth, the growth rate in 1975 was 1.5 percentage 
points; in 1976 the growth rate was 2.2 percentage points. This 
followed the national trends discussed earlier. During this period 
the Board of Governors, through a series of decisions, expressed 
concern over increasing concentration in the Texas market.^ 
Consequently, several holding company applications were denied.
The Legal Rationale
Having briefly discussed the growth of multibank holding 
companies nationally and in Texas, we will now examine the legal and 
economic rationale for multibank holding companies. Banking holding 
company legislation dates back to 1933.-* The early legislation did
-*William H. Kelly, "Consolidation of Banks Reshaping Texas 
Markets," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, (January, 
1972), 2.
4John R. Stodden, "Multibank Holding Companies— Development 
in Texas Changes in Recent Years," Business Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, (December, 1974), 4-10.
^"The Changing Structure of Bank Holding Companies," Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, (April, 1969), 5.
23
little to control the formation or expansion of bank holding companies.
Instead, it focused on registration of holding companies with the
Federal Reserve System when a holding company owned 50 percent or
more stock of a bank or if the holding company wanted to vote the
stock of its affiliates.
Twenty three years later Congress passed the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 with an intention
To control the creation and expansion of bank holding 
companies; to separate their business of managing and 
controlling banks from unrelated businesses; and 
generally to maintain competition among banks and to 
minimize the danger inherent in concentration of 
economic power through centralized control of banks; 
and to subject the business and affairs of bank 
holding companies to the same type of examination and 
regulation as the banks which they control.^
The 1956 Act defined a registered bank holding company as a 
corporation that owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 25 per­
cent or more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks or 
which, by determination of the Board of Governors, exerts a "controll­
ing influence over the management or policies of two or more banks.
In addition, in the 1956 Act, the Board was required to 
consider five factors in approving or denying an application:
(1) financial history and condition of the holding company and 
banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of their
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, Hearings, before a 
subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of 




management; (A) the convenience, needs and welfare of the areas 
concerned; and (5) whether the effect of the transaction would 
expand the size or extent of the holding company system beyond 
limits consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public interest,
Oand the preservation of banking competition. In 1966 the Act was 
amended to close certain special interest "loopholes" that existed 
in the earlier legislation.^
In 1970 the Bank Holding Company Act was again amended. This 
time the amendments sought to control one-bank holding companies 
and companies that own less than 25 percent of a bank's voting stock, 
but that, nevertheless, exercise c o n t r o l . U n d e r  Section 4(c)(8) 
of the Act, the Board is required to consider whether the activities 
of the proposed non-bank subsidiary is "so closely related to banking
®Joe W. McLeary, "Bank Holding Companies: Their Growth and
Performance," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
(October, 1968), reprinted in Bank Structure and Economic Change in 
the Southeast, Readings in Southern Finance, (Atlanta: Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, October, 1973), 35-36.
%.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, To 
Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Hearings, before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, on 52353, 
53418 and H.R. 7371, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, 27.
•^Charles D. Salley, "What Is 'Closely Related to Banking?': 
1970 Bank Holding Company Amendments," Monthly Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, (June, 1971), 98.
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or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. 
Because the amended Act in 1970 brought one-bank holding companies 
under the control of the Board of Governors, an incentive was created 
to extend into the area of multibank holding companies. Banks that 
were previously one-bank holding companies to avoid Federal Reserve 
regulation suddenly found it advantageous to become multibank hold­
ing companies. The combined effects of the regulation of one-bank 
holding companies and the ability to enter into closely related non-bank 
activities led to an increase in the number of multibank holding 
company acquisitions in the post-1970 period.
In unit banking states such as Texas, a third incentive was 
created. With the advantage of non-registration of one-bank holding 
companies eliminated by the 1970 amendments, multibank holding 
companies became a means of market expansion. In Texas, where 
branch banking in any form is expressly prohibited by law, multibank 
holding became a means of jde facto statewide branching. Holding 
companies in metropolitan areas found it possible to expand their 
sphere of influence both within their market area and well beyond, 
often to areas that were hundreds of miles away.
•^Alfred Hayes, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
examined the "public benefits test" required of the Board in consider­
ing non-bank acquisitions under Section 4(c)(8). See Alfred Hayes, "The 
1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act: Opportunities to 
Diversify," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (February, 
1971), 23-27. In a subsequent analysis, the effects of the activities 
of non-bank subsidiaries on their relationship with the parent holding 
company are considered. See Robert J. Lawrence, Operating Policies 
of Bank Holding Companies - Part II: Non-Bank Subsidiaries, Staff 




Although the legal environment in recent years has created
a condition conducive to holding company expansion, such expansion
would be unlikely to occur in the absence of economic incentives.
Although some empirical evidence to be considered shortly suggests
these reasons may be more imaginary than real, holding company
proponents nevertheless adhere to several arguments in justifying
increased holding company activities.
The economic justification for bank holding companies has been
12well documented in the literature. These economic arguments may 
be dichotomized into "banking factors" and "convenience and needs 
factors." In considering whether or not to approve a proposed 
multibank holding company acquisition, the Board of Governors has 
devoted substantial attention to these factors. In an analysis of 
Board decisions concerning the acquisition of either bank or non­
bank affiliates of multibank holding companies from 1971 to 1974,
■^Among the better surveys of these arguments are: (1) Robert
J. Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, (Washington: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1967); (2) Peter S. 
Rose and Donald R. Fraser, "The Impact of Holding Company Acquisitions 
on Bank Performance," The Bankers Magazine, (Spring, 1973), 85-91;
(3) Samuel B. Chase, Jr. and John J. Mingo, "The Regulation of Bank 
Holding Companies," Journal of Finance, (May, 1975), 281-292; and
(4) Robert J. Lawrence and Samuel H. Talley, :,An Assessment of Bank 
Holding Companies," Federal Reserve Bulletin, (January, 1976),
15-21.
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13Jessee and Seelig found a number of public benefits. These include 
three benefits which may be considered banking factors: (1) improved
operational efficiency, (2) expanded financial resources and (3) 
improved management. The remaining factors are "convenience and need 
factors." These include: (4) community benefits and (5) increased
competition.^ These categories will be used as a framework for 
examining the literature relating to holding company benefits.
Improved Operational Efficiency
Holding company proponents have argued that affiliation with 
bank holding companies allows the affiliate to enjoy certain economies 
of scale. The subsequent decreases in unit cost, ceteris paribus, 
leads to an increase in bank profitability. Economies of scale in 
banking have been studied on a number of occasions.^ Lawrence and
^Michael A. Jessee and Steven A. Seelig, "An Analysis of the 
Public Benefits Test of the Bank Holding Company Act," Monthly 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (June, 1974), 151-162.
14Ibid., 151-152.
15The list of such studies is quite lengthy. A representative 
sample would include: (1) Lyle E. Gramley, Scale Economies in Banking, 
(Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1962), pp. 1-60;
(2) George J. Benston, "Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in Bank­
ing Operations," reprinted in Studies in Banking Competition and the 
Bank Structure, (Washington: United States Treasury, Administrator of 
National Banks, 1966), pp. 355-597; (3) Frederick W. Bell and Neil B. 
Murphy, Costs in Commercial Banking, Research Report No. 41, (Boston: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1968), pp. 1-331; and (4) Neil B.
Murphy, "The Implications of Econometric Analysis of Bank Cost Functions 
for Bank Planning," Journal of Bank Research, (Autumn, 1973), 203-206.
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Talley in a study for the Board of Governors concluded:
The early studies of economies of scale in 
banking suggested that significant economies existed for 
banks whose deposit size was up to about $25 million or 
$50 million in deposit size. Later studies, however, 
indicate that economies of scale have been disappearing 
over time. The over-all conclusion from such studies 
is that economies of large size are not important in 
banking. If they exist at all, it is in the smaller 
size ranges, probably for banks with less than $50 
million in deposits.
A semantic problem has arisen in discussions related to bank
holding company efficiency. The term "economies of scale" has been
used to describe a condition that more accurately should be called
"economies of holding company affiliation." Ferguson noted
As the size of plant and the scale of operation become 
larger, considering expansion from the smallest possible 
plant, certain economies of scale are usually realized.
That is, after adjusting all inputs optimally the unit 
cost of production can be reduced by increasing the size 
of plant.
As Lawrence has suggested
Economies of scale are not the relevant consideration here, 
for if economies of scale exist in the production of bank­
ing services, they will exist for the larger correspondent 
bank as well as for the lead bank of a holding company or 
non-banking subsidiary.-*-®
*-®Robert J. Lawrence and Samuel H. Talley, "An Assessment of 
Bank Holding Companies," 17.
-^C.E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory, rev. ed., (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), pp. 210-211.
1 8Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, pp. 5-6. 
Lawrence has referred to "economies of holding company affiliation" 
by the alternate term "economies of vertical integration."
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Little empirical attention has been given to the efficiency 
gains from holding company affiliation.-^ One notable exception is 
Schweitzer's 1972 study.^0 Schweitzer derived a cost function that 
included independent variables measuring, among other things, lending 
output, and the effects of affiliation with large and small bank 
holding companies. (Lending output includes revenue from both loans 
and securities.) The latter two variables are treated as dummy 
variables.
Using 1964 data for FDIC-insured Ninth District (Minneapolis) 
banks with assets under $100 million, Schweitzer considered four sub­
samples of banks. Group A included banks with $10,000-$150,000 in 
lending output ($0.4 million to $3,5 million in assets); Group B 
included $150,000-$450,000 lending output ($3.5 million to $10.0 
million); Group C included lending output from $450,000 to $1.1 
million ($10.0 million to $25.0 million in assets); Group D contained 
$1.1 million to $3.9 million lending output ($25.0 million to $95.4 
million in assets).
Groups B and C displayed coefficients indicating constant 
returns to scale. Group D had a calculated output coefficient that was 
consistent with decreasing returns to scale. Only Group A, with 
assets less than $3.5 million and lending output less than $150,000, 
showed significant economies of scale.
l^Chase and Mingo, 285.
^Stuart A. Schweitzer, "Economies of Scale and Holding Company 
Affiliation," Southern Economic Journal, (October, 1972), 258-266.
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The coefficients for the small bank holding company dummy 
variable were statistically insignificant for all four groups.
Affiliation with large holding companies proved significant for 
Groups B and C which include banks from $3.5 million to $25.0 million 
in assets. The holding company variables are capturing the total 
effects of affiliation, including improved management, pooling of 
supplies, and sharing of computer facilities. This is in sharp 
contrast to the economies of scale variable which relates costs to 
changes in size.
Economies of holding company affiliation may be expected through 
coordination of activities and services between the holding company and 
its affiliates. Computer services, transit services, investment services 
and portfolio management, and advertising are a few of the activities 
that are alleged to become less expensive through affiliation.^ Rose 
and Fraser have argued that it is possible that holding company affilia­
tion may lead to higher costs if holding companies "impose unreason­
able management fees, or levy unreasonable charges for data processing
22or other services." Additional work on the issue of economies of 
holding company affiliation is needed before the issue can be resolved.
Expanded Financial Resources
It has been suggested that affiliation with multibank holding 
companies allows affiliate banks to expand their financial resources.
^Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, p. 5.
2 2Rose and Fraser, 87.
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This may be accomplished through (1) strengthening the affiliates
capital position, (2) broadening the market for sale of bank securities,
(3) diversifying the bank's portfolio and (4) lowering the overall
cost of capital by increasing bank leverage.
Regulatory authorities consider adequate capital to be necessary
in counteracting operating losses, emergency asset liquidation, and 
23loan defaults. The rather conservative requirements on capital
adequacy imposed by the regulatory authorities hamper the efforts
of many banks to maintain their capital position, especially in growing
markets. The independent bank is particularly hampered by "thin"
markets for bank capital and by lack of access to the larger national
capital markets. It is argued that holding company affiliation allows
affiliate banks access to national or regional capital markets and
therefore permits them to increase their level of equity capital.
Heggestad and Mingo tested the hypothesis that banks affiliated
with holding companies maintain a lower equity capital position,
25ceteris paribus, than independent banks. Using a multiple regression 
model applied to a sample of 365 large banks across the United States
23Ronald D. Watson, "Insuring Some Progress in the Bank Capital 
Hassel," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
(July, August, 1974), 15.
24Robert J. Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies,
pp. 6-7.
25Arnold A. Heggestad and John J. Mingo, "Capital Management by 
Holding Company Banks," Journal of Business, (October, 1975), 500.
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during 1970-1972, they concluded that the evidence indicates that the
26bank's capital position declines after holding company affiliation. 
This results from the fact that the optimal capital level for holding 
company subsidiaries is less than for comparable independent banks. 
Subsidiaries pass dividends upward to the parent holding company 
where the funds may be invested in activities with greater returns 
than those available to independent banks. The parent company, 
however, stands ready to transfer capital back to the subsidiary 
should the need arise, thus obviating the necessity of maintaining 
large amounts of capital in the subsidiary.
In addition to the capital adequacy question, holding company 
proponents argue that greater portfolio diversification is achieved 
through holding company affiliation. This occurs because holding 
companies can take advantage of permissible non-bank activities and 
can in some cases spread their holdings of assets across a wider
26In a related study Mingo applied multiple regression analysis 
to a cross section of 167 banks in eight unit banking states in 1967. 
He concluded from the evidence shown in the study that "holding 
company affiliation does result in changes in bank capital and 
profitability— and that holding companies pay 'premiums' for their 
acquisitions in anticipation of such changes." See John J. Mingo, 
"Capital Management and Profitability of Prospective Holding Company 
Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (June, 1975),
200.
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77geographical area. ' The evidence on this particular issue is rather
 ̂Qweak and inconclusive. °
Finally, holding company proponents assert that affiliation 
lowers the overall cost of capital to the subsidiary bank. The 
cost of capital is expected to decline for two reasons. First, 
there is a broader market for securities and greater diversifica­
tion, as discussed previously. Second, the increase in leverage 
through use of relatively less expensive holding company debentures, 
certificates of deposit, and holding company commercial paper reduces 
the overall weighted average cost of capital. If a holding company 
is operating at less than the optimal degree of leverage, increases 
in leverage will lower the cost of capital.^9
27chase and Mingo, p. 287.
28Heggestad, for example, found that certain non-bank activities 
such as real estate and leasing activities were negatively correlated 
with returns from banking activities of holding companies. In years 
when banking activities were unprofitable, the returns from leasing 
and real estate would "cross-subsidize" the banking returns, thus 
reducing total risk exposure. Some non-bank activities showed less 
risk than commercial banking as a whole. See Arnold A Heggestad, 
"Diversification, Risk, and the Bank Holding Company," The Banker's 
Magazine, (Winter, 1976), 110-112.
^ S i l v e r b e r g  developed a regression model to test the effects 
of leverage on the cost of capital and bank stock prices for large 
bank holding companies in 1973, 1974, and 1975. In theory a highly 
levered bank (levered beyond some optimal level) should be penalized 
through stock price changes and through increased capital costs. No 
statistically significant results were obtained. See Stanley C. 
Silverberg, "Bank Holding Companies and Capital Adequacy," Journal of 
Bank Research, (Autumn, 1975), 205-206.
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Improved Management
The ability to attract superior managers is an advantage
30claimed by holding companies. In addition to better management,
this management is more mobile. While it is difficult to transfer
managers from independent banks to correspondent banks, it is
relatively easy to effect intra holding company transfers between 
31subsidiary banks. At times, approval of holding company applica­
tions has hinged on the ability of acquisitions to solve management
32succession problems or provide management depth. Little empirical 
work has been done in this area. The effects of superior management 
may be evidenced in better investment management, reduced costs and 
greater profitability. The portion of any increased performance 
variable uniquely attributable to better management is difficult 
to isolate.
If managerial benefits are difficult to measure, so too is the 
effect of holding company affiliation on the convenience and needs 
of the banking public.
30This point is recognized by Chase and Mingo, 285, and Lawrence,
The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, p. 6. In particular,
Chase and Mingo cite a survey by the American Sociological Association 
which indicated that commercial banking attracted a larger percentage 
of MBA's from prestigious business schools (Chicago, Harvard, 
Pennsylvania and Stanford) than any other industry in 1973. They 
inferred that because of greater opportunities available, bank hold­
ing companies will attract a disproportionate share of this talent.
31Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, p. 6.
32Jessee and Seelig, 157, indicate that the issue involved in
the approval of Depositors Corporation(71 FRB 36) and Northwest
Bancorporation (73 FRB 701) was one of management sucession. In 
First Banc Group of Ohio (71 FRB 418) the issue was management depth.
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Community Benefits
Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act (as amended) requires
the Board of Governors to deny a proposed acquisition if its
...effect in any section of the country may be substantially 
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or 
which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, 
unless the Board finds that the anticompetitive effects 
of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the 
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction 
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to 
be served.33
The convenience and needs of the community is therefore of critical 
importance in those cases where possible anticompetitive efforts 
exist. In cases of adverse competitive effects the Board has in 
general required substantial net public benefits. The previous 
advantages of efficiency and improved management, of course, yield 
benefits to the public. The convenience and needs criterion has been
met frequently by the extension of new services and the expansion of
. , . 3 4existing services.
In addition to new services and extended services, holding
companies argue that they can provide specialized services unavailable
33Ibid., p. 151 
34In analyzing Board decisions since 1971, Jessee and Seelig 
found the following new services proposed in bank holding company 
acquisitions: trust services, electronic data processing, increased
commercial lending, bond portfolio management, new physical facilities, 
leasing, internal auditing, international services, venture capital, 
internal marketing, urban and business development, Federal Housing 
Administration and Veterans Administration loans, overdraft checking and 
deposit services, accounts receivable financing, investment management 
services for small investors, municipal bond financing, new branches, 
credit cards, wholesale banking services, and international trade 
financing. Ibid., 154.
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35through independent banks and their correspondents. These specialized 
services depend on the specialized management discussed earlier. These 
may include specialized loans or accounts.
The approval of an acquisition may be denied, regardless of the 
public's convenience and needs, if the effect is sufficiently anti­
competitive. Nevertheless, the enhancement of competition is 
frequently argued as an advantage in holding company acquisitions.
Increased Competition
Holding companies maintain that the acquisition of affiliate 
banks increases competition with existing banks in the market, leading 
to lower prices for bank services, and to new or improved services.
Where competition is absent or substantially reduced, the Board of 
Governors has reacted by withholding approval of the proposed 
acquisition. In their study of Board decisions, Jessee and Seelig 
conclude "the Board appears never to have found, as far as we can 
tell, proposed public benefits sufficient to outweigh the adverse 
effects of a substantial reduction of competition, unsound banking 
practices, or undue concentration of resources.
35Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, p. 7.
36Jessee and Seelig, 152. In their study Jessee and Seelig 
observe that the principal adverse effects cited by the Board 
comprised: (1) significantly reduced existing competition within a
well-defined geographic market for a particular product(s), (2) probable 
elimination of significant amounts of future or potential competition 
in a particular market where alternative forms of entry (i.e., de novo 
or foothold entry) were feasible, (3) the accumulation of financial 
resources to such an extent as to lead to possible abuse of economic 
power, (4) a possible weakening of the holding company's ability to 
support the growth of its banking subsidiaries, and (5) covenants 
restricting competition.
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In a 1974 study for the Board of Governors, Talley examined
changes in aggregate concentration at both the national and state
37level attributable to holding company acquisitions. During the 1968-
1973 period aggregate nationwide concentration fell two percentage
points from 49 percent to 47 percent (measured in terms of total
domestic deposits held by the 100 largest banking organizations).
During the same time period statewide concentration (as measured by the
percentage of total domestic deposits held by the five largest
banking organizations in the State) increased in 28 states, declined
in 22 and remained constant in one. (The study includes the District 
38of Columbia.) It should be noted that this study is at the aggregate 
level and does not deny the possibility that within a particular 
market competition may be enhanced.
37Samuel H. Talley, The Impact of Holding Company Acquisitions 
on Aggregate Concentration in Banking, Staff Economic Study, No. 80, 
(Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1974), 
pp. 1-24.
38Talley observed that the effects of holding company acquisitions 
on aggregate concentration depends on the type of branching permitted.
In unit and limited branching states, holding company acquisitions 
increased aggregate concentration. However, these increases came in 
states with low or moderate concentration initially. In states with 
high initial degrees of concentration, there was no effect. Further­
more, in statewide branching states, increased multibank holding 




The economic advantages of multibank holding company expansion 
combined with the legal incentive created by passage of amendments in 
1970 to the Bank Holding Company Act precipitated substantial growth 
in the number of multibank holding company organizations both 
nationwide and in Texas.
Multibank holding companies increased their control of total 
deposits within Texas from 3.1 percent in 1970 to 51.0 percent at 
the end of 1975, at which time Texas ranked second nationally in 
total assets, total deposits, and total subsidiary banks controlled 
by multibank holding companies.
In Chapter III a number of studies devoted to analyzing multi­
bank holding company performance will be examined as a prelude to 
the development of the research methodology of this study.
CHAPTER III
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON BANK HOLDING COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
This chapter examines a representative group of studies 
relating to multibank holding company performance that have been 
done within the last ten years. To simplify the coverage of these 
studies, two categories will be used: 1) univariate studies and
2) multivariate studies. In this manner the reader can hopefully 
trace the development of the literature as new techniques have 
been applied. Careful review of the empirical work should lead to 
the conclusion that this study is not only a logical extension of 
of the current state of the literature but also represents a 
potentially important contribution to that body of literature.
Univariate Studies 
The study of bank holding company activity by economists 
has been concentrated in the post-1965 period. The traditional 
approach in these studies tended to examine performance by bank 
holding company affiliate banks by pairing each affiliate with an 
"independent" bank in the same market area. Financial performance 
ratios were then calculated and compared on a pairwise basis using 
a univariate statistical test of significance (generally a t-test). 
If the researcher, for example, found significant differences in
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the results for six out of ten variables tested, he might be tempted 
to conclude that there were apparent differences in performance 
between affiliated banks and independent banks. In reality, most 
of those studies concluded significant differences did not exist.
But the questions remains whether these results might be altered 
if a number of variables were allowed to interact on each other, 
instead of examining each variable in isolation.
1. Lawrence (1967)
One of the earliest and most notable studies of bank
1
holding company performance was done by Robert J. Lawrence in 1967.
In that study Lawrence compared the operating performance of forty- 
three holding company subsidiary banks and fifty-five independent 
banks. These banks covered a broad spectrum of circumstances with 
different size banks from different size towns representing large and 
small holding companies, lead and non-lead banks in unit and limited 
branch states.
Using thirty-two variables for each bank the study attempted 
to analyze performance differences associated with asset structure, 
operating policy, prices charged, services offered, earnings and 
expenses. Although the study was concerned with registered bank 
holding company performance during the time period from 1954-1963, 
Lawrence examined three points in time for each bank: (1) the base
^■Robert J. Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, 
(Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1967), 
pp. 1-30.
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year (1952), (2) the year before acquisition, and (3) the final year. 
He then used a "t-test" of significance to test for differences in 
the mean values of performance variables for holding company sub­
sidiary banks and independent banks. This univariate approach 
typifies the measurement of bank performance in early holding 
company studies.
Lawrence found that acquired banks were "typical" banks in 
almost every respect; that is, there was no tendency for holding 
companies to acquire only banks possessing a particular set of 
characteristics. The only exception was the "due to banks/total 
deposits" variable which indicated that banks which subsequently 
became affiliated with holding companies had smaller correspondent 
balances than non-acquired banks.
In examining the post-acquisition performance of holding 
company subsidiary banks vis *a vis independent banks, Lawrence found 
most of the statistically significant differences occurred in the 
asset portfolio. Holding company banks tended to hold less cash 
and U.S. government securities while increasing their holdings of 
loans, particularly installment loans, and state and local government 
securities.
Holding company subsidiary banks were found to charge higher 
service charges on demand deposit accounts. There was no significant 
difference, however, in the interest paid to bank customers on 
time and savings deposits.
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In general, Lawrence found no significant differences in 
operating expenses, profitability measures, or capital ratios. The 
effects of holding company affiliation were confined almost 
exclusively to the asset portfolio.
2. McLeary (1968)
Following the lead of Lawrence, McLeary's study compared the 
performance of holding company banks with independent banks with 
respect to capital adequacy, lending and investment policies,
oresponse to business, pricing policy and operating efficiency.
A sample of eighty-two sixth district holding company subsidiary 
banks was paired with a like number of independent banks in the 
same county or metropolitan area with each bank being of approximately 
the same size as its paired mate. Data from 1966 were used to 
develop univariate t-tests of significance. Individual operating 
ratios for holding company banks were then tested against the 
corresponding ratios for independent banks.
McLeary found most variables were not statistically signi­
ficant. He did find the following results to be statistically 
significant:
1. Subsidiary banks generally charged lower interest rates 
on loans.
2Joe W. McLeary, "Bank Holding Companies: Their Growth and 
Performance," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
(October, 1968), reprinted in Bank Structure and Economic Change in 
the Southeast, Readings in Southern Finance, (Atlanta: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, October, 1973), pp. 35-42.
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2. Subsidiary banks carried fewer U.S. government 
securities and more state and local obligations relative 
to assets.
3. Demand deposits were a higher percentage of total deposits 
for subsidiary banks than for independent banks.
The primary difference between the Lawrence and McLeary 
studies lies in the sample. The McLeary sample is more homogeneous 
but unlike Lawrence does not look at "before-after" results. The 
conclusions are consistent. Neither study, however, allows for 
interaction of performance variables as would occur with a multi­
variate approach.
3. Ware (1971)
Ware, using univariate techniques similar to those used by
Lawrence and McLeary, examined multibank holding company performance 
3in Ohio. The study covered a sample of thirty acquired banks and 
thirty non-acquired banks from 1965 to 1970. These banks were 
similar in size and were located in the same geographic market.
The univariate t-test was used to test for statistical significance.
In general the performance of banks acquired by registered 
bank holding companies from 1965-1970 differed little from the 
sample of non-acquired banks. Ware did find that earnings, as 
measured by total operating income/total assets, were significantly
3Robert F. Ware, "Characteristics of Banks Acquired by 
Multiple Bank Holding Companies in Ohio," Economic Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, (August, 1971), 19-27.
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greater for acquired banks. In addition, the growth rate for assets,
deposits, and loans for the five years prior to acquisition were
lower for acquired banks than for non-acquired banks. Ware argued
this lack of aggressiveness may be neither a cause nor a symptom
of the reason that the bank was subsequently acquired. This is in
contrast to Piper's conclusion that acquired banks demonstrated a
tendency toward more rapid deposit growth during the five years
4prior to acquisition.
4. Talley (1971)
Talley examined the impact of holding company acquisitions 
on the performance of eighty-two acquired banks from 1966 to 1969.^
As in earlier studies, performance measures were used to study 
portfolio composition, bank capital adequacy, the pricing of bank 
services, bank expenses, and bank profitability.
The conclusions were in general agreement with earlier studies. 
Significant differences in asset composition were noted as the result of 
affiliation. Again, this resulted from switching out of cash and 
U.S. government securities and into state and local government
4Thomas R. Piper, The Economics of Bank Acquisitions by 
Registered Bank Holding Companies, Research Report No. 48, (Boston: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1971), p. 245.
^Samuel H. Talley, The Effect of Holding Company Acquisitions 
on Bank Performance, Staff Economic Study, (Washington: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1972) and "Bank Holding 
Company Operations and Performance," The Magazine of Bank Administra­
tion, (October, 1973), 26-29.
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securities and loans. In general this resulted in greater amounts of 
credit available for local communities. Talley explained this in 
terms of greater diversification by the holding company which permits 
the assumption of greater risk by holding company affiliates.
Talley concluded that little difference existed between holding 
company affiliates and non-affiliated banks with respect to pricing, 
expenses, capital adequacy and profitability. This conclusion is 
in general agreement with Lawrence, McLeary and Ware.
5. Jessup (1974)
Jessup found that many studies of bank holding company
performance (including the studies of Lawrence, Piper, and Talley)
failed to detect strong evidence of changes in the performance of
banks acquired by a multibank holding company.^ He noted
If multibank holding companies acquire atypically 
large banks that already approach efficient plant 
and firm size, then comparing them to "similar" 
efficient banks is likely to produce inconclusive 
research results.7
Using median deposit figures for 1971-1972 for acquired banks 
and "available" banks in eight holding company states, Jessup found 
that multibank holding companies generally avoided acquiring
g
banks with less than $10 million in deposits. Jessup reached this
^Paul F. Jessup, "Analyzing Acquisitions by Bank Holding Companies," 
Journal of Bank Research, (Spring, 1974), 55-63.
7Ibid., 58.
g
Ibid., 59-60. "Available banks" consisted of the total number 
of insured banks in the eight holding company states as of December 31,
1970 less banks already affiliated with multibank holding companies.
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conclusion by using an F-test to test the proportion of small acquired 
banks (less than $10 million in deposits) to total acquired banks 
against the proportion of small "available" to total "available" 
banks. He concluded that when holding companies are permitted to 
expand in a state, the first banks to be acquired are typically 
larger banks in prime locations. Jessup suggested that some 
research effort should be devoted to the performance characteristics 
of small holding company affiliates.
In the case of Texas, Jessup found that only six percent of 
total acquired banks in 1971-1972 were small banks. By contrast 
sixty percent of "available banks" were small banks. In terms of 
actual numbers, only one small bank was acquired out of seventeen 
total acquired banks. Obviously, the lack of a sufficient number 
of small acquired banks in Texas makes it extremely difficult to 
accomplish the type of analysis that Jessup recommends.
6. Piper and Weiss (1971, 1971, and 1974)
Piper's original lengthy work, The Economics of Bank Acquisitions 
by Registered Bank Holding Companies has resulted in two additional
Qbut closely related articles coauthored with Steven Weiss. The 
studies were based on data covering 102 bank acquisitions by thirty 
different bank holding companies from 1947-1967.
^(l) Thomas R. Piper, The Economics of Bank Acquisitions by 
Registered Bank Holding Companies; (2) Thomas R. Piper and Steven J. 
Weiss, "The Profitability of Bank Acquisitions by Multibank Holding 
Companies," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
(September/October, 1971), 2-12, and (3) Thomas R. Piper and Steven J. 
Weiss, "The Profitability of Multibank Holding Company Acquisitions," 
Journal of Finance, (March, 1974), 163-174.
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These articles all reach the conclusion that acquisitions of 
banks by multibank holding companies were only break-even investments 
for the acquiring holding companies. The evidence pointed to 
excessive purchase premiums paid to acquire the banks and to limited 
opportunities to increase bank profitability as explanations for this 
occurrence.
Using a profitability index that incorporates the earnings of 
the holding company and acquired banks, dividends paid, the debt 
capacity of banks and possible tax consequences, Piper and Weiss 
found that the 102 bank acquisitions did not result in higher earnings 
per share for the holding companies in 1967 than would have been 
attained without the acquisitions. The mean profitability index was 
1.01 (breakeven was 1.00). Fifty-three per cent of the acquisitions 
were unprofitable (values less than 1.0). Of the forty-seven percent 
of profitable acquisitions,most occurred because acquisition prices 
were reasonable.
These articles present a possible explanation for the con­
clusion that bank holding company acquisitions, on balance, are not 
significantly different with respect to profitability than are their 
independent bank counterparts.
7. Hoffman (1975)
Hoffman examined two large multibank holding companies in 
Florida to determine if (1) there were performance differences between
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the two holding companies and (2) there were differences in the 
performance of affiliates of these holding companies when compared 
to independent banks of approximate size and banking market.^
To test these hypotheses Hoffman selected thirteen affiliate 
banks of each holding company and paired each of these with a 
comparable independent bank. Using twenty-nine selected variables 
measuring bank performance, he examined the banks over the 1965 to 
1973 period. For each bank the year before acquisition and the final 
year, 1974, were analyzed. As a measure of statistical significance, 
the t-test was employed.
Hoffman concluded overall that "the results of this analysis
support the general findings of the previous holding company
performance studies and do not contradict their applicability to
11individual acquisitions." Differences between the two holding 
companies were not significant with one exception— Holding Company 1 
had significantly greater operating efficiency and correspondingly 
greater before-tax profitabilty than affiliates acquired by
Stuart G. Hoffman, "A Florida Case Study: Performance of 
Holding Company Banks," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, (December, 1975), 202-205, and The Impact of Holding 
Company Affiliation on Bank Performance: A Case Study of Two Florida 
Multibank Holding Companies, Working Paper Series, (Atlanta:
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1974), pp. 1-28.
■^Hoffman, " Florida Case Study 203.
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Holding Company 2. Comparisions between holding company affiliates 
and independent banks paralleled other studies in most respects.
The principal conclusions were that affiliation resulted in: (1) 
a shift in asset portfolios away from cash, due from balances and 
U.S. government securities and toward increased loans and holdings 
of state and local government securities, (2) no significant change 
in the prices acquired banks charged for their services, (3) off­
setting increases in total operating revenues and expenses, and (4) 
no improvement in the capital position of either holding company.
The analysis of individual holding companies confirmed the 
performance pattern found by Lawrence, Ware, Talley, and others for 
holding company affiliates in general. This prompted Hoffman to 
note
...the results of this analysis support the general 
findings of the interholding company performance 
studies and do not argue against their applicability 
to individual casework analyses.^
Hoffman concluded the Board of Governors is justified in applying
the results of these earlier studies to individual holding company
acquisition decisions. A slightly different approach to this issue
by Fraas will be subsequently discussed.
12Hoffman, The Impact of Holding Company Affiliation on 
Bank Performance, p. 16.
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Multivariate Studies 
Multivariate analysis has been applied to multibank holding 
company performance in several forms. These include multiple regression, 
multivariate probit analysis and multivariate discriminant analysis.
The application of these techniques is illustrated with the following 
studies.
8. Fraas (1974)
Fraas applied multiple regression analysis to a cross-sectional
13sample of banks in Ohio and Colorado in 1971. Banks between $10 
million and $75 million in deposits were included in the sample. The 
study was concerned with whether specific bank holding companies 
performed differently from independent banks.
The general categories of dependent variables were utilized to 
measure alternately bank prices, portfolio composition, earnings 
and capital adequacy. The independent variables in general measured 
bank size, market concentration, per capita income, and market 
population growth.
Bank holding company affiliation was measured with a dummy 
variable. (The variable assumed a value of one if the bank was a 
multibank holding company affiliate and a value of zero otherwise.)
The dummy variable approach was used in two ways. The first approach
13Arthur G. Fraas, The Performance of Individual Bank Holding 
Companies, Staff Economic Study No. 84, (Washington: Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 1974), pp. 1-27.
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was to include in the dummy variable all banks affiliated with multi­
bank holding companies. The results were generally consistent with 
earlier studies. Most measures of performance showed no statistically 
significant difference between holding company affiliates and 
independent banks in both the Ohio and Colorado samples.
The second approach examined the effect of affiliation with 
specific holding companies by using a set of dummy variables. Each 
dummy variable represented affiliation with a particular holding 
company. Statistically significant differences existed for some of 
the variables associated with individual holding companies. This 
suggested to Fraas that all affiliated banks cannot be treated as 
elements of a single group, a finding contrary to Hoffman's study.
The Fraas study suffers from a lack of explanatory significance. 
The largest coefficient of determination (R ) reported for a single 
equation is less than 50 percent (47.7%). The average R is less 
than 25 percent, which is low even for cross sectional studies and 
may indicate that significant explanatory variables have been omitted.
9. Boczar (1975)
Boczar applied multivariate probit analysis in developing a 
model for predicting lead-bank status in multibank holding companies.^ 
Although, as indicated in Chapter I, lead banks are excluded from
"^Gregory E. Boczar, "The Determinants of Multibank Holding 
Company Formations," Southern Economic Journal, (July, 1975) 
120-129.
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the current study, probit analysis nevertheless deserves some 
consideration.
Probit analysis is particularly useful when a dichotomous 
dependent variable is required or when the dependent variable is 
interpreted as a probability with values covering the interval from 
zero to one. Multiple regression techniques are inappropriate under 
such circumstances.*
Lead banks are typically the largest banks in the holding 
company organization, supplying most of the top officers and estab­
lishing the operating procedures and policies of the company. The 
seventy-five largest banks in Florida (a unit banking state) were 
selected for study based on data for year end 1971. These represented 
the most likely lead bank candidates. Of these, seventeen were 
excluded for various reasons. Of the remaining fifty-eight, twenty- 
one subsequently became lead banks.
Boczar1s model of lead bank status used a dichotomous dependent 
variable with a value of one if a sample bank became a lead bank 
prior to 1972 and zero otherwise. Independent variables were used to 
measure the effects of size, correspondent business, asset composition, 
market share, holding company encroachment, and the importance of the 
market as a financial center.
Testing each independent variable separately, the size, 
correspondent business and encroachment variables were statistically 
significant. However, the size variable was not significant in
*For a discussion of probit analysis the interested reader is 
referred to D.J. Finney, Probit Analysis (Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1961).
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equations that also contained the correspondent business variable.
The final estimating equation included size, correspondent business, 
encroachment, and market importance variables. This equation was 
also reestimated using logarithmic transformation of these variables.
Using a decision value of 0.5, banks were assigned to a lead 
bank classification if the corresponding value was greater than 0.5 
and to the non-lead bank classification if the value was less than 
0.5. The log transformed equation correctly classified fifty of 
fifty-eight lead banks while the unadjusted model correctly classified 
forty-eight of fifty-eight banks.
The probit results are similar to the classification matrix in 
discriminant analysis. However, the principal objective of discrimin­
ant analysis is not prediction but testing for group differences in 
aggregate performance. To this extent probit analysis would not 
significantly contribute to the present study.
10. Johnson and Meinster (1975)
Johnson and Meinster applied multivariate discriminant analysis
in considering the performance of affiliates of multibank holding
15companies relative to paired independent banks. Their rationale 
for using a multivariate approach was that univariate analysis cannot 
separate the interaction of performance variables on each other 
and therefore alters conclusions with respect to overall performance.
"^Rodney D. Johnson and David R. Meinster, "The Performance of Bank 
Holding Company Acquisitions: A Multivariate Analysis," Journal of Business, 
(April, 1975), 204-212.
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Using a univariate t-test, twenty different measures of bank 
performance were tested with a sample of thirty-six pairs of acquired 
and non-acquired banks. Although the time period and geographic 
representation of the sample were not reported, Johnson and Meinster 
did note that their sample was based on the results of questionnaires and 
was designed to represent a subsample of Lawrence's 1967 study. The 
multivariate analysis consisted of two steps: (1) stepwise multiple
discriminant analysis was applied to reduce the number of performance 
variables and (2) principal components analysis was alternately 
employed to reduce the number of variables which were subsequently 
introduced into a standard multiple discriminant model. (A detailed 
discussion of multiple discriminant analysis is presented in Chapter V.)
Of the twenty performance measures introduced into the step­
wise multiple discriminant model, only five were retained. These 
were loans/assets, other securities/assets, interest on governments/ 
governments, interest/loans, and service charges/deposits. The 
discriminant model using these variables correctly assigned nineteen 
of twenty-seven acquired banks and twenty-eight of thirty-six 
non-acquired banks.
Principal component analysis was used as an alternative method 
of reducing the number of performance variables for future analysis. 
(Chapter V also discusses this procedure in some detail.) Although 
principal component analysis is a theoretically sound procedure 
for data reduction, care must be exercised in carrying out its use.
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Johnson and Meinster extracted five principal components from the 
twenty performance variables. However, only two components, a 
measure of bank profitability and a measure of operating efficiency 
could be identified. In their words, "There were no apparent 
interpretations that could be given to the remaining principal 
components.Nevertheless, subsequent multiple discriminant analysis 
was conducted using first four and then all five of those components 
as inputs, even though only two could be considered to have any 
meaning. It is contended in Chapter V that this deficiency was 
attributable to the failure to rotate the original factor loading 
matrix to a new position.
The study did find statistically significant differences between 
acquired and non-acquired banks. This finding is in contrast to most 
univariate studies. Although the Johnson and Meinster study suffers 
from methodological problems, it nevertheless represents an attempt 
to apply multivariate analysis to the issue of holding company 
affiliation which in itself is a valuable contribution. The current 
study is in substantial agreement with this philosophy. The intent 
of this study is to expand further the application of these techniques 




Much of the research on bank holding company performance 
has employed univariate statistical techniques which permit only 
pairwise comparisons of bank financial ratios. These univariate 
studies, with only a few exceptions, have found no significant 
differences in the performance of holding company subsidiary 
banks versus independent banks.
Attempts at multivariate analysis have been much less fre­
quent. With the exception of the discriminant study of Johnson 
and Meinster, these studies have not specifically recognized the 
interdependent nature of bank performance measures. This study 
is intended to correct the methodological faults of the Johnson 
and Meinster study and to extend the application of factor and 
discriminant analysis.
Chapter IV will discuss the design of the sample used in this 
study and will contain the preliminary univariate tests on the 
sample. This will permit the reader to compare this study with 
other univariate studies before we proceed to the more complicated 
multivariate analysis.
CHAPTER TV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This chapter contains discussion of two principal topics:
(1) sample design and (2) univariate analysis of selected performance 
variables. The univariate techniques from other studies of bank 
holding company performance were discussed in Chapter III. These 
techniques are applied in this chapter to a sample of multibank 
holding company subsidiary banks and paired independent banks in 
Texas using data from December 31, 1975. The results presented here 
are, in general, consistent with the research conclusions of the 
previous univariate studies. This analysis provides a point of 
departure for subsequent application of multivariate techniques to 
the same sample of Texas banks.
Sample Design
As noted in Chapter I this study focuses on the performance 
of multibank holding company subsidiaries in Texas for three reasons:
(1) Texas is a unit banking state, thus eliminating the problems 
associated with branch banking, (2) the state contains a large number 
of banks for analysis, and (3) the state is entirely within the 




Holding Company Subsidiary Banks
On July 1, 1976 the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas listed 
thirty-nine multibank holding companies operating in Texas with 234 
subsidiary banks. These subsidiary banks comprise the population 
universe for this study. An intermediate objective of this study is 
to pair subsidiary banks with comparable independent banks in order 
to test the performance of these two groups. In order to accomplish 
this pairing process, two criteria must be established: (1) a time
criterion and (2) a size criterion.
Time Criterion
The time criterion is necessary because banks are not assumed 
to react immediately to bank holding company affiliation. Data 
used in this study have been collected from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation's "Consolidated Report of Condition" (Call 
Report) and "Consolidated Report of Income" (Income Statement) for 
December 31, 1975, the latest data available at this time. In 
using the December 1975 data, more banks are available for analysis, 
thus increasing the possible sample size. Because discriminant 
analysis is employed in subsequent chapters, a second "validation" 
or "hold-out" sample is required. This requires as large a sample 
as possible. For this reason, a study of holding company performance 
in Texas was not possible prior to the present time period because 
of the lack of an adequate sample.
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To allow subsidiary banks sufficient time to adjust to holding 
company affiliation a status date was set as of January 1, 1974; 
banks with an official holding company status date (as determined by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) after January 1, 1974 were 
excluded from the study.-*- The "post-acquisition interval" was 
therefore at: least two years. For holding company subsidiaries 
that began operations earlier, this interval was even longer. Ideally 
a study would test the effects of the lag between acquisition and 
changes in performance. Since most holding company expansion in Texas 
came between 1970 and 1975, the time period was not sufficiently long 
to undertake such a test.
In short, there is a trade-off between sample size and length 
of the post-acquisition interval. Increasing either variable entails 
a reduction of the other.
Size Criterion
Pairing of independent and holding company subsidiary banks 
requires that the banks in both groups be similar in size. As 
explained in Chapter I, this may be a difficult task with banks in
■*The necessity for a larger sample required that two banks 
with status dates after January 1, 1974 be included in the sample. 
There were First National Bank of Grand Prairie (January 18, 1974) 
and First State Bank of El Paso (January 30, 1974). Since the 
status dates were both less than one month from the original 
deadline date, the inclusion of the banks, it was felt, would not 
bias the test results.
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Texas because of the "lead bank" problem. Lead banks are generally
the largest banks in a holding company and are typically the first
banks acquired. In a large metropolitan area, it is possible that
all or most of the largest banks are controlled by either multibank
or one bank holding companies, leaving few, if any, large independent
banks. As of April 1, 1976 only four of the twenty-five largest
banking organizations in Texas were "independent" banks; sixteen
of the top forty-two banking organizations (those with deposits
2of $100 million or over) were "independent" banks.
In addition to being unable to find sufficiently large indepen­
dent banks to pair with holding company subsidiaries, it was also 
difficult to find small (less than $5 million in deposits) holding 
company subsidiaries to pair with the large number of small indepen­
dent banks in Texas. As the review of Jessup's article in Chapter III 
indicated, holding companies acquire larger banks first. In a state 
newly opened to the holding company movement, such as Texas, few
small holding company subsidiaries can be expected to exist in
the first few years.
As a result of the bank size problems, only banks with deposits
of $5 million to $100 million on December 31, 1975 were included in
the sample. After eliminating holding company subsidiaries that 
did not meet the time and size criteria, a sample of eighty banks
2Data provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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remained. These were randomly divided into two samples with forty 
banks each. One was termed the "original sample"; the other was 
called the "validation" or "hold-out" sample. The original sample 
will be used for univariate tests, for factor analysis, and for 
discriminant analysis. The validation sample will be used to test 
the classificatory accuracy of the discriminant analysis.
A validation sample is desirable to eliminate sampling and 
search bias. Although it is not absolutely essential that the 
original and validation samples be of equal size, or even that the 
holding company proportion of each sample equal the independent bank 
proportion, it facilitates later tests and makes comparisons easier. 
These subjects will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, 
particularly in relation to the work of Morrison on these issues.
Independent Banks
After the samples of holding company banks were determined, 
it was necessary to pair these banks to comparable independent banks. 
Prior to pairing the banks the independent banks were screened to 
eliminate the possible inclusion of multibank and one-bank holding 
company subsidiaries. This was done using official listings of 
holding company banks provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas.
Independent banks were paired on the basis of (1) geographic 
proximity and (2) approximate size. Banks were paired by geographic 
location to eliminate performance differences attributable to 
operating in different banking markets. In large metropolitan areas 
banks were paired, to the extent possible, by street addresses using
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city maps. The relevant banking market in a metropolitan area tends 
to be smaller than for a rural area. In a few cases banks were 
paired with mates located in another town. This was necessary because 
either no other bank existed in the town, or because the other bank 
was already a holding company affiliate. In some instances banks 
in suburban areas were paired with metropolitan banks if the pairing 
could be justified on the basis of the same or similar relevant 
banking market.
The second criterion was bank size. Within the same geographic 
market, banks were paired on the basis of similar size. In this 
manner the effects of size on bank performance can be minimized.
The resulting pairings are presented in Appendices B and C. A summary 
of size data is presented in Table IV.1 below. (Data are for 
December 31, 1975).
TABLE IV.1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION— PAIRED BANKS ($ MILLIONS)
Independent Holding Company
Initial Sample Mean 25.0 Mean 35.5
Median 17.6 Median 23.3
Validation Sample Mean 26.7 Mean 33.2
Median 19.3 Median 29.0
Univariate Analysis 
This study examines the performance of bank holding company 
subsidiaries and paired independent banks using thirty financial 
ratios. The data were collected from income and call reports for
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3December 31, 1975. For convenience these ratios were grouped into
seven general categories of bank performance: (1) asset structure,
(2) earnings, (3) expenses, (4) profitability, (5) capital, (6) pricing
and (7) "other measures." These categories, as well as the variables
contained within them, represent the measures of bank performance
most frequently utilized in studies of bank holding companies.
As in many other studies, the t-test was used as the univariate
4measure of statistical significance. In testing each performance 
variable the null hypothesis asserted no difference in the mean 
value of the variable for holding company subsidiaries compared with 
independent banks. The results, in general, were consistent with 
other univariate studies, although there were a few sur­
prises. These results are discussed by categories below.
Asset Structure
Some holding company studies have concluded that most of the 
differences in performance between holding company and independent banks
3In a few instances in which averages were required, the mid­
year (June 30, 1975) data were combined with the year-end data in 
calculating the average.
4 xr x2The formula for calculating the t-statistic is t = "~IZIZZZIZZII
J 2 2(SE1) +(SE2)
where and x2 are respectively the means of the two groups and SE^ and
SE„ are the standard errors of groups 1 and 2, respectively. As a 
reference see Janet T. Spence, Benton J. Underwood, Carl P. Duncan, 
and John W. Cotton, Elementary Statistics, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 99-112.
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occur in the composition of bank assets. These studies have found 
that holding company banks tend to reduce their holdings of cash and 
U.S. government securities and increase the proportion of total assets 
in the form of loans. The reasoning for this customarily follows the 
portfolio diversification argument that holding companies can extend 
loans that provide higher returns than government or municipal 
securities because the concomitant risk associated with the loan 
can be spread among all loans held by subsidiaries within the 
holding company. The results of this study yield some interesting 
findings with respect to asset structure. These results are 
summarized in Table IV.2.
TABLE IV.2













































*Slgnifleant at 10% level. 
**SigniI'icanL at 5% level.
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The asset structures of holding company subsidiary and independent 
banks were found to be comparable with respect to their holdings of 
cash and correspondent balances as well as loans to individuals, 
commercial loans, real estate loans, and farm loans. Any differences 
in performance as measured by these variables could have resulted from 
chance alone, i.e., they were not statistically significant.
Three variables were statistically significant at the 10% 
confidence level (one of these, total loans to total assets was 
significant at the 5% level). One of these variables, obligations 
of state and political subdivisions to total assets, confirms the 
findings of earlier studies by Lawrence, Talley and McLeary that 
holding company subsidiaries hold more state and local government 
securities than do comparable independent banks.
The other two variables, U.S. government securities to total 
assets and total loans to total assets, are statistically significant 
but do not behave in a manner consistent with other studies.
Subsidiary banks of holding companies in Texas were found to have 
fewer loans as a percentage of total assets than their independent 
counterparts while holding a larger amount of U.S. government 
securities. These results are in contrast to Lawrence and Talley 
who reached opposite conclusions for both variables. McLeary found 
that while holding company subsidiaries held significantly smaller 
proportions of U.S. government securities than independent banks, 
there was no statistically significant difference in the proportion
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of loans to total assets held. Ware found no significant differences 
between the two groups using either variable.
The evidence in this study contradicts the frequent claim that 
bank holding company subsidiaries can offer more credit to their 
customers in local communities than can independent banks. To the 
contrary, it is possible that independent banks, confronted with a rapid 
increase in holding company acquisitions have increased their loans in 
relation to total assets. The Lawrence and Talley studies covered a 
different time period. (Lawrence examined banks acquired from 1954 to 
1963 while Talley studied acquired banks from 1966 to 1969.) By con­
trast, this study considers banks acquired from 1970 to the beginning 
of 1974. This study is confined to the Texas market while Lawrence 
and Talley considered a national sample with differences in the size and 
types of bank and with different existing banking laws. It is 
therefore not surprising that these results should be different.
An analysis of the individual loan to asset categories in 
Table IV.2 reveals that independent banks provide a larger proportion 
of consumer and real estate loans while holding companies provided a 
slightly greater proportion of commercial and farm loans. None of 
these results was statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Bank Earnings
Bank earnings are measured in this study by four variables:
(1) total operating income to total assets, (2) interest on U.S. 
government securities to U.S. government securities, (3) interest on 
obligations of state and political subdivision securities to total 
obligations of states and political subdivisions, and (4) trust
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department income to total operating income. The conclusions of 
other studies are not totally consistent with respect to bank earn­
ings. Lawrence, for example, found that the ratio for total operating 
income to total assets was significantly higher for subsidiary 
banks than for independent banks, a fact that he attributes to a 
higher loan to total assets ratio for subsidiary banks. Ware, 
however, found that the operating income to asset ratio was higher for 
subsidiaries, but found the loan to asset ratio was not statistically 
significant. McLeary found the operating income to total asset 
ratio was not statistically significant, a conclusion shared by this 
study.
TABLE IV.3
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF EARNINGS VARIABLES
Mean Value Mean Value
Variable________________ Holding Company Sub. Independent Bank t-value
Total Operating Income 
Total Assets
Interest on U.S. Government
Securities_________________
U.S. Government Securities
Interest on Obligations of 
States and Political
Subdivisions______________
States and Political 
Subdivision Securities
Trust Department Income 
Total Operating Income






Of the four measures of earnings, only one variable, trust 
department income to total operating income was statistically 
significant, and then only at the 10% level of significance. Trust 
department income for Texas banks represented less than one percent 
of total operating income. Quantitatively, therefore, the variable 
cannot be considered to have a great impact on overall operating 
earnings.
Bank Expenses
This study found no statistically significant differences 
between holding company subsidiaries and independent banks on the 
basis of four commonly used measures of bank expenses: (1) total
operating expenses to total assets, (2) total wages and salaries to 
total assets, (3) interest on time and savings deposits to total 
assets, and (4) other operating expenses to total operating income. 
Those results are summarized in Table IV.4.
Variable
TABLE IV.4
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF OPERATING EXPENSES
Mean Value Mean Value
Holding Company Sub. Independent Bank
Total Operating Expenses
Total Assets .06264
Total Salaries and Wages
Total Assets .01571















In contrast to the findings of this study, Lawrence found that 
the ratio of total operating expenses to total assets was higher for 
subsidiary banks than for independent banks. He attributed this 
difference in expenses to higher costs of servicing loans and to 
higher charges for services rendered to subsidiary banks by the parent 
holding company. The latter reason is also used to explain the higher 
ratio for "other operating expenses" to total operating income.
Lawrence found no significant differences between the two 
groups in either the total salaries and wages to total assets ratio 
or the ratio of interest on time and savings deposits to total assets. 
This conclusion is also reached by Ware, who found no statistically 
significant differences in any of the four expense variables. The 
present study confirms Ware's conclusions.
Failure to detect significant differences in expenses is not 
completely surprising. Following the reasoning of Lawrence, holding 
company affiliation leads to additional "special" charges for holding 
company services, a factor that would increase the subsidiaries' 
operating expenses. However, as discussed in the asset structure 
section, independent banks in Texas made a higher proportion of loans 
to total assets than did subsidiary banks. Therefore the carrying 
cost of additional loans increased the ratio of total operating expenses 
to total assets for independent banks. The net effect was to 
cancel any significant differences in total operating expenses.
The conclusions with respect to both salaries and wages 
and interest on time and savings deposits are clearly consistent
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in all of the studies. As noted by Bell and Murphy the banking 
industry is
...relatively ununionized and must operate in competitive 
labor markets. The spatial distribution of the industry 
produces distinctive local labor markets and wage levels 
which affect the banking firm.-*
Because banks are paired within the same banking market the ratio of
salaries and wages to total assets would be expected to be very
similar. Likewise, the interest expense for time and savings deposits
is determined competitively within a banking market and is furthermore
constrained at the upper limits by the regulatory authorities. The
results for bank expenses are therefore quite reasonable.
Profitability
Since only one of the four earnings variables was significant 
and none of the expense variables were significant, it is reason­
able to expect no profitability differences between subsidiary and 
independent banks. The data for Texas banks confirm this expectation. 
Table IV.5 summarizes the profitability data.
TABLE IV.5 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF PROFITABILITY
Mean Value Mean Value
Variable  Holding Company Sub. Independent Bank t-Value
Net Operating Earnings
Total Assets .00959 .00731
Net Income_____
Total Assets .00866 .00653
Net Income___________
Total Equity Capital .10692 .08979
and Reserves
^Frederick W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy, Costs in Commercial Banking, 





The studies of Lawrence, Ware, Talley, Piper, and McLeary are 
in general agreement with the findings in this study that independent 
and subsidiary banks demonstrate no significant differences in 
profitability regardless of whether profitability is measured in 
terms of the return on assets before or after taxes or as a return 
on invested capital.^
One of the key arguments advanced by holding company proponents 
is that holding companies provide their affiliates with infusions 
of new capital. This argument and others related to capital adequacy 
were discussed in Chapter II. The evidence from this study is 
presented in Table IV,6. The results corroborate the earlier 
conclusions of Lawrence, Ware, McLeary and Talley that the capital 




UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL RATIOS
Mean Value Mean Value
Variable Holding Company Sub. Independent Bank t-Value
Total Capital Accounts 
And Reserves
Total Assets 








^The term "net operating earnings" refers to the income report 
item "income before income taxes and securities gains or losses."
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Using three commonly accepted measures of capital adequacy, 
the results indicate no statistically significant differences. These 
results do not deny that holding companies might be in a better 
position to transfer capital to affiliates if the need should arise. 
The data only confirm that holding companies have not exercised that 
ability.
Pricing
The potential benefits that are directly tangible to the public 
arising from affiliation with bank holding companies can be approxi­
mated by the pricing of bank services. Holding companies are alleged 
to provide lower cost services through their affiliates to bank customers. 
The impact of these benefits is approximated in this study using the 
ratios of interest and fees on loans to average total loans, service 
charges on demand deposits to average total demand deposits and 
interest on time and savings deposits to total time and savings 
deposits. The results are presented in Table IV.7.
TABLE IV.7 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF PRICING RATIOS
Mean Value Mean Value
Variable Holding Company Sub. Independent Bank t-value
Interest and Fees on
Loans________________
Total Loans 
Service Charges on 
Deposit Accounts
Total Demand Deposits 
Interest on Time and
Savings Deposits_____












Although subsidiary banks in this study charge slightly less 
interest on loans, charge less in service charges, and pay slightly high­
er interest on time and savings deposits, the difference between 
subsidiary and independent banks is not statistically significant.
In general, with the exception of McLeary, studies have found no 
substantial differences in interest charged on loans. McLeary found 
that holding company subsidiaries charged slightly less for loans 
than did independent banks.
Lawrence alone found that holding company subsidiaries levied 
higher service charges on demand deposit accounts. Ware and Talley 
both found no differences in service charges. All the studies are 
in agreement that no significant differences exist in interest paid 
on time and savings deposits. Overall, the studies agree that the 
public benefits little through lower service charges and loan costs 
or higher interest paid on savings by banking with a holding 
company affiliate. The consumer can receive substantially the same 
benefits from an independent banker.
Other Measures
Several performance measures are important but do not fit 
neatly into the previous six categories. These include (1) the 
loan to deposit ratio, (2) the ratio of time and savings deposits 
to total deposits, (3) the ratio of cash dividends paid to net income,
(4) the ratio of loan losses to average total loans, and (5) the 
ratio of loan losses less recoveries to average total loans. Only 
two variables of the five were statistically significant. As
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might be expected having already examined the loan to asset ratio, the 
loan to deposit ratio for Texas banks is higher for independent banks 
than for subsidiary banks. Although this finding is not in keeping 
with other studies, it is consistent with the loan to asset result.
The other significant variable is the ratio of total time and savings 
deposits to total deposits. Independent banks in Texas held a higher 
proportion of time and savings deposits to total deposits than did 
comparable subsidiary banks. This conclusion is consistent with 
McLeary's study; Ware found no differences using this variable.
The results for all five variables contained in this section are 
presented in Table IV.8.
TABLE IV.8 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF "OTHER MEASURES"
Mean Value Mean Value
Variable Holding Company Sub. Independent Bank t-Value
Total Loans
Total Deposits .58153 .63444 2.1286**
Total Time and
Savings Deposits
Total Deposits .53920 .56560 1.7092*
Cash Dividends Paid
Net Income .46842 .20482 -1.5280
Loan Losses
To tal Loans .00968 .01293 1.0320
Loan Losses Less
Recoveries
Total Loans .00763 .01022 0.8929
*Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
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The ratio of cash dividends to net income is expected to be 
higher for subsidiary banks than for independent banks because of the 
pressure from holding companies to have dividends "passed upward" 
from the affiliate to the parent. Although the subsidiary bank group 
in Texas paid a substantially higher percentage of net income as 
dividends, the result was not statistically significant because of 
the considerable variablity of payments as indicated by the standard 
deviations.
Two measures of loan losses were included: loan losses to
total loans and loan losses less recoveries to total loans. These 
were included to test whether the alleged expansion of loans by 
aggressive subsidiary banks led to greater risk through loan default. 
The evidence from Texas found that while independent banks, which made 
a higher proportion of loans to total assets than subsidiary banks, 
did have higher loan loss ratios than subsidiary banks, the differ­
ence was not sufficient to be statistically significant. Ware, who 
found no differences between subsidiary and independent banks as far 
as the loan to asset or loan to deposit ratio, did find that 
independent banks had a greater proportion of loan losses to loans 
than did subsidiary banks. Lawrence found that neither of the loan 
loss variables was statistically significant.
Implications of Findings
The univariate results in this study suggest that no statis­
tically significant differences exist between holding company
i
subsidiary banks and independent banks using 24 of the 30 measures
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of bank performance. Where statistically significant differences 
exist, the "typical" holding company subsidiary bank could be 
expected to provide fewer loans per dollar of either assets or 
deposits than comparable independent banks; subsidiary banks would 
likewise hold a lower proportion of time and savings deposits to 
total deposits than its independent counterpart. Conversely, the 
subsidiary bank would hold a higher proportion of U.S. government 
securities and municipal securities than would independent banks. 
Finally, the subsidiary would provide more of its operating income 
from trust department activities than would the independent bank.
What explanation can be offered to explain these results, 
particularly the extension by independents of a higher percentage of 
loans to assets or deposits and a higher proportion of time and 
savings deposits to total deposits? Several points are relevant. 
First, the experience in Texas, unlike the case in earlier research 
studies, saw the rapid emergence and development of holding company 
subsidiaries in large numbers, i.e., most Texas subsidiaries are 
"new." Therefore the events captured in this study may or may not 
be typical of "mature" holding companies. Future research may shed 
light on this question.
Second, earlier studies have assumed that holding companies 
would be aggressive as they used their increased resources to 
advantage. The fact that these studies found higher loan ratios 
for subsidiaries was taken as evidence of this aggressiveness. In 
this study, however, the aggressor appears to be the independent
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bank, reacting to encroachment by the holding company. This should 
not be particularly surprising. The increase in competition is 
anticipated both by the regulatory authorities who approved the 
acquisision and by the economic theorist.
If the encroachment assumption is accepted as a possible 
explanation for the observed behavior of banks in this study, then 
the reaction of independent banks to encroachment may have been to 
increase the proportion of time and savings deposits to total 
deposits. (It is recognized, however, that there may be other 
factors which affect the deposit structure of these banks.) Table 
IV.8 shows a ratio of 53.9 percent for subsidiaries to 56.6 percent 
for independent banks. Since the ratio of interest paid on time 
and savings deposits is virtually identical (5.7% to 5.6%), the 
difference may be attributable to a more active advertising campaign. 
Although advertising expense data are not directly available, the 
other operating expense to total operating income variable in 
Table IV.4 is higher for independent banks than for subsidiary banks.
The higher ratio of time and savings deposits to total 
deposits, with lower reserve requirements permitted independent 
banks to support a greater volume of assets. With higher returns 
available on loans than on government or municipal securities, 
independent banks shifted the composition of their portfolios 
toward more loans. Table IV.2 reflects that not only did independent 
banks have a higher proportion of total loans to assets, but these 
loans represented more consumer and real estate loans as well.
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The other statistically significant result contained in the 
study involves trust department income. Here it is possible that 
economies of affiliation with large "lead bank" trust departments 
could generate enough advantage to explain the small absolute 
difference in this ratio.
Although not statistically significant, the reader may desire 
an intuitive reconciliation of why the profitability measures 
favor the subsidiary banks despite the fact that the independent 
banks had a larger proportion of higher yielding loans. Two factors 
are important. First, salaries and wages for independent banks 
were slightly higher. Second, the other expense category, including 
advertising expense, was higher for the independent bank. Again, 
this is consistent with the encroachment explanation.
CHAPTER V
MULTIVARIATE METHODOLOGY: FACTOR AND DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the methodology 
to be used in testing the performance of multibank holding company 
banks versus independent banks. The multivariate analysis consists of
two parts: (1) the application of principal components analysis
and (2) the use of multivariate discriminant analysis. The subsequent
discussion will expand on those subjects.
Principal Components Analysis 
Principal components analysis is an outgrowth of the more 
general field of factor analysis. The origins of factor analysis 
date to the beginning of this century and are embodied in the works 
of Charles Spearman and Karl Pearson. Spearman is generally con­
sidered to be the "father of factor analysis," having devoted over 
forty years to developing the field.^ Pearson's important contribution
was the development of the method of principal axes, a forerunner
oof principal components analysis. Although Spearman and Pearson
^Harry H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 3.
^Pearson's work, "On Lines and Planes of Closest Fit to 
Systems of Points in Space," Philosophy Magazine, (1901), 559-572, 
ranks as a major work.
Among Spearman's important early work was "General Intelligence, 




were the pioneers of factor analysis, it was not until the mid-1930's 
that Harold Hotelling developed the principal-factor method as we 
currently know it.^ L.L. Thurstone during this same time period 
was actively engaged in research on factor analytic methods.
(Thurstone's theory of "simple structure" will be discussed later 
in this paper.)
Much of the early work in factor analysis in general and 
principal components analysis in particular was concentrated in 
psychology and later in biology and medicine. Applications in 
economics and finance have begun to proliferate, however, in recent 
years. For example Herbst used principal components analysis in 
examining the relative endogeneity of trade credit in the lumber and 
wood products industry.^ Forty-eight industry variables were reduced 
to five principal components accounting for 90.9 percent of total 
variance. Similarly, twenty macro-economic variables were reduced 
to five factors accounting for 91.6 percent of total variance.
^Harman, p. 156. Among Hotelling's seminal works on principal 
components analysis are: "Analysis of a Complex of Statistical Variables
into Principal Components," Journal of Educational Psychology, (1933), 
417-441, 498-529; and "Simplified Calculation of Principal Components," 
Psychometrika,(1936), 27-35.
^Anthony F. Herbst, "A Factor Analysis Approach to Determining 
the Relative Endogeniety of Trade Credit," Journal of Finance,
(September, 1974), 1087-1103.
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Saunders attempted "to isolate and identify primary sets of 
systematic cross section variation in economic and operating character­
istics among b a n k s . T h r o u g h  principal components analysis,
Saunders reduced twenty-one variables measuring bank structure and 
operations to four components accounting for 56 percent of total 
variance. As Chiattello subsequently noted, Saunders neglected to 
"rotate" the principal components axes, therefore "he did not adequately 
distinguish between theoretically meaningful clusters of variables."** 
Johnson and Meinster applied principal components analysis to the 
performance of bank holding companies.^ This procedure was prelimin­
ary to a multivariate discriminant analysis. Like Saunders, Johnson 
and Meinster failed to properly handle the rotation problem, thus 
casting doubt of the validity of their conclusions. The importance 
of factor rotation, methods of rotation, and criteria for rotation 
will be subsequently discussed.
As indicated in Chapter I, principal components analysis is 
a data reduction technique designed to reduce the number of variables
Robert J. Saunders, "On the Interpretation of Models Explain­
ing Cross Sectional Differences Among Commercial Banks," Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (March, 1969), 26.
£
Marion L. Chiattello, "Comment: 'On the Use of Principal 
Components Analysis to Interpret Cross-Sectional Differences Among 
Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
(December, 1974), 1047.
^Rodney D. Johnson and David R. Meinster, "The Performance of 
Bank Company Acquisitions: A Multivariate Analysis," Journal of 
Business, (April, 1975), 204-212.
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with virtually no loss of information. Since this study employs the 
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) factor procedure, the discussion of 
the application of principal components analysis to the performance of 
bank holding companies will be centered on the SAS procedure.
The data input in this study would comprise an 80 x 30 matrix 
since there are eighty banks and thirty variables for each bank in 
the original sample. The thirty financial ratios will be converted 
into standardized scores.
Normalization of Variables
The SAS User's Manual notes that "If the original values were 
standard scores, these transformed responses would be considered 
principal components scores. A SAS variable would be comprised of 
standard scores if the mean of its values were zero and the variance 
of its values were one."® Standardization allows more commensurable 
comparisons to be made since data are converted to a uniform system
Jolayne Service, A User's Guide to the Statistical Analysis 
System, (Raleigh, North Carolina: Student Supply Stores, North
Carolina State University, 1972), p. 201. A revised version of the 
SAS '72 program is used in this study. For an explanation of SAS 
’76 see Anthony J. Barr, James H. Goodnight, John P. Sail, and 
Jane T. Helwig, A User’s Guide to SAS * 76 (Raleigh, North Carolina: 
SAS Institute, Inc., July, 1976).
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of measurement. The standardization of variables for principal
Qcomponents has been well documented in the literature.
Intercorrelation Matrix
After the data are inputed in standardized form, the next 
step is the calculation of an intercorrelation matrix (a matrix of 
correlation coefficients between variables). In this study the 
correlation matrix is a square, symmetric 30 x 30 matrix. The diagonal 
elements contain unities while the off-diagonal elements measure 
the intercorrelation between given variables.
The a priori expectation is that some variables would be 
highly correlated with each other, while others would have little or 
no correlation. If the latter type variables could be found, the 
redundant variables could be removed with little or no loss of 
information. It is the purpose of factor analytic techniques to 
identify such variables.
Matrix of Factor Loadings
As a first step toward this end a matrix of factor loadings 
is created. There are numerous procedures that have been developed 
over the years to factor a correlation matrix. The particular
^For examples see (1) M. Dutta, Econometric Methods, (Cincinnati: 
South-Western Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 237-238; (2) Jeremy D. Finn,
A General Model for Multivariate Analysis, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, Inc., 1974), pp. 59-61; and (3) A.S.C. Ehrenberg, Data 
Reduction, (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 264-265.
^For a discussion of the calculation of correlation coefficients 
along with computational formulae, see Irving Allen Dodes, Introduction 
to Statistical Analysis, (Rochelle Park, N.J.: Hayden Book Company,
Inc., 1974), pp. 77-78.
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procedure used in SAS is to multiply the square roots of the calculated
eigenvalues by the eigenvectors of the intercorrelation matrix. The
result is a new matrix of factor loadings."^ The maximum number of
possible factors is thirty. In reality the extraction of thirty
factors would be self defeating because the original purpose in
using principal components analysis is to reduce the number of factors.
As a first step in reducing the number of factors retained for
analysis a value of one is established as the minimum acceptable value
12of the eigenvalue. This presents little difficulty, however, because
Eigenvalues represent the characteristic roots of an equation 
or matrix while eigenvectors represent the characteristic vectors.
To illustrate this point consider a matrix with dimensions n x n.
There exists a nonzero eigenvector x if a scalar X also exists such 
that Mjj = Xx . This may be written so that (M - XI ) x = 0. This is 
rewritten in matrix notation as
.
au -i a12 • • • aln
a21 a22_A • • •
• • • 
• • • 
• • •
a2n
anl • • • • a -X nn xn
The eigenvalues are calculated by solving for the values of X. This 
point is developed in Brice Carnahan, H.A. Luther, and James 0. Wilkes, 
Applied Numerical Methods, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969), 
pp. 219-220 and in Gareth Williams, Computational Linear Algebra with 
Models, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1975), pp. 291-292. Without 
the aid of a computer the calculation of eigenvalues becomes a 
complicated and laborious task as the matrix dimensions increase.
12Wilson H. Guertin and John P. Bailey, Jr., Introduction to 
Modern Factor Analysis, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Bros., Inc., 
1970), p. 115, note that factors with eigenvalues of less than 1.0 
should be disregarded when principal components analysis is used.
"Since total variance for each test variable included in R is unity, 
any latent root as small as 1.0 is accounting for no more than the 
variance of a single variable."
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the eigenvalue "can be interpreted as the sample variance of the
corresponding principal component of the complex of standard scores
of the variables in the analysis," an eigenvalue divided by the number
of variables being analyzed gives the percentage of total variance
1 ̂accounted for by each factor. With thirty variables in the correla­
tion matrix an eigenvalue of one would account for less than 4 percent 
of total variation [(^2.)]. The constraint imposed by the eigenvalue 
criterion allows the researcher to consider only a few factors. In 
practice when the number of original variables approaches twenty or 
more, from three to five components are normally extracted.^
It is possible, however, that more than four or five factors 
will be extracted from thirty variables. If this should occur, it is 
important that these factors are in a form that can be interpreted.
If, for example, the eigenvalue one criterion leads to the extraction 
of ten factors, of which only five can be interpreted, then only the 
five interpretable factors should be retained. Fortunately, tests 
are available that permit us to eliminate the spurious factors.
■^A User* s Guide to the Statistical Analysis System, p. 202.
It should also be noted that the eigenvalue of a factor is equivalent 
to the sum of the squared factor loadings of that factor. Therefore, 
by dividing the sum of the squared factor loadings of a factor by the 
number of variables in the intercorrelation matrix, the variance 
accounted for by that individual.can be found. The cumulative variation 




Having explained the process of reducing the number of 
variables under consideration, it is now appropriate to ask how the 
factor loading matrix is to be interpreted and why the matrix should 
undergo further transformation through rotation. In the process of 
answering these questions, the related issues of methods of rotation 
and rotational criteria will also be explored.
Unrotated Factor Matrix
In its initial unrotated form a factor loading matrix is normally 
highly loaded on the first factor with a large number of positive 
coefficients. The second and succeeding factors tend to have smaller 
coefficients with mixed signs. The reason for this is that the first 
factor accounts for as much variance as is possible by one f a c t o r . ^  
Consequently the residual factors tend to be smaller with a mixture 
of positive and negative loadings. In the current unrotated state 
it is difficult to attach any meaningful interpretation to these 
factors. If, however, the matrix of factor loadings were rotated to 
a new position, interpretation of the new factors would be facilitated.
Orthogonal Factor Rotation
In an unrotated form the factors define general patterns of 
relationship while rotated factors delineate distinct clusters of 
relationship.-^ Prior to rotation we are, as Cattell describes
R.J. Hummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, (December, 1967), 466.
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Like a man in a hall of many mirrors. We see seemingly 
countless images of the same object, all behaving in 
the same way, and for the moment we are perplexed about 
deciding which are merely reflections and which is the 
object.
The search for clearly distinguishable factors has led researchers 
to develop a number of rotational techniques. The two general cate­
gories of techniques are the orthogonal rotation and the oblique 
rotation. As a first approximation this study uses a "rigid 
(orthogonal) rotation determined by Kaiser's varimax criterion.
An orthogonal rotation differs from an oblique rotation with respect 
to the correlation of factors. Orthogonal factors are at right 
angles to one another in vector space, hence they are uncorrelated.
By contrast, oblique rotation allows both uncorrelated and correlated
groups of interrelated variables.*^ This study will experiment with
20both orthogonal and oblique factor techniques. Since the varimax
"^Raymond B. Cattell, Factor Analysis, (New York: Harper and
Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 66.
18A User* s Guide to the Statistical Analysis System, p. 201.
19Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," 467.
20This study experiments with the varimax, quartimax and equa- 
max forms of orthogonal rotation and the promax (procrustean maximiza­
tion) oblique technique. For a detailed explanation of these methods 
see, R.J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), pp. 368-422.
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method is the simplest and most easily interpreted of the techniques 
it will be used unless one of the other techniques produces better 
results. The subsequent discussion therefore proceeds on the 
assumption that the varimax technique will be used.
Thurstone1s Principle of Simple Structure
Statistical researchers have recognized that numerous rotations
may be undertaken with a particular set of data. The key question
that emerges is when one should stop such rotations in order to be
assured that a truly meaningful position has been reached. Thurstone
developed the principle of "simple structure" to cope with this problem.
As Guertin and Bailey have pointed out simple structure "has been
elaborated, discussed, described, and criticized in textbooks and
21journals and at last universally accepted." Cattell observed that 
"simple structure, as propounded by Thurstone, is indeed the most
widely used and widely practicable criterion for finding a uniquely
22meaningful position."
Thurstone based his simple structure analysis on the principle 
of parsimony which is related in some ways to the Newtonian notion 
that "Natura est simplex."23 Given several alternatives which fit 
the given facts, the simplest method requiring the fewest conditions 
should be chosen. In Thurstone's words, "The recognition of the lack




of uniqueness in scientific concepts does not imply that some sets 
are not more useful and fruitful than others. Those parameters are
r\ fpreferred which reveal the phenomena as of a simple underlying order."
Simple structure postulates that variables affect only some
factors and that factors affect only some variables. Consequently
a table of factor loadings will have one or more zeroes in each row
25and one or more zeroes in each column. These conditions allow a 
reduction in the number of variables and make the factors easier to 
interpret. This dual function has led researchers to conclude that 
analytic factor rotation to simple structure results in a double 
application of the principle of parsimony. °
Kaiserfs Varimax Criterion
In order to approach the goal of simple structure as advanced
by Thurstone, statistical criteria for analytical factor rotation
have been developed. This study utilizes the varimax criterion
27developed by Kaiser.
As Rummel has observed "Varimax is now generally accepted as 
the best analytic orthogonal rotation technique. Almost all published
^L.L. Thurstone, Multiple Factor Analysis, (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 332.
25Karl Schuessler, Analyzing Social Data, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1971), pp. 122-123.
9 f%This same point is recognized on both Cattell, p. 67, and in 
Joseph E. Hill and August Kerber, Models, Methods and Analytical 
Procedures in Education Research, (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1967), p. 494.
^Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytic Rotation 
in Factor Analysis," Psychometrika, (September, 1958), 187.
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factor analysis studies doing analytic orthogonal simple structure
rotation now employ varimax and the criterion is the basis of all the
28orthogonal rotation computer programs of which I am aware."
The name varimax is derived from the fact that the sum of the
variances of squared factor loadings within columns is maximized
subject to the requirement that the sum of squared loadings by rows
29(communalities) must be maintained in rotation. Harman has pointed
out that "when variance is at a maximum, the factor has the greatest
interpretability or simplicity in the sense that its components tend
30toward unity or zero."
Factorial Invariance
In addition to approximating a simple structure solution,
Kaiser's varimax criterion possesses what is perhaps an even more
important property— factorial invariance. Rummel defines factorial
invariance as a state in which factors "will delineate the same cluster
of variables as long as some variables defining the cluster are
included in the analysis, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion
31of variables unrelated to the cluster." In this manner the results
28Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, p. 392.
^See Schuessler, p. 126 and Kaiser, p. 190.
■^Harman, p. 301.
31Rummell, Applied Factor Analysis, p. 381.
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are not totally dependent on the initial mix of the variables- This 
property also allows researchers to make comparisons between studies 
by using variables common to those studies (i.e., "marker variables"). 
The use of such variables should result in the same factors in all of 
these studies if the invariance property holds.
Kaiser himself recognized that factorial invariance, not simple
32structure, was the "ultimate criterion" of a rotational procedure. 
Furthermore he observed that although Thurstone developed the principle 
of simple structure, his reasoning was directed toward factorial 
invariance. In short the varimax criterion developed by Kaiser allows 
the reduction of many variables to a few primary factors that meet 
the conditions of simple structure and factorial invariance.
Use of Factors as Data Inputs
The importance of using an elaborate complicated factor analytic 
technique is to scientifically select variables for inclusion in the 
multivariate discriminant analysis. It allows the researcher to 
determine significant factors affecting bank holding company perform­
ance from the large number of variables that are related to such 
performance. The question arises "In what form will the factor 
results be introduced into the discriminant model?".
Rummel has suggested three possible forms: (1) exact factor
scores, (2) regression estimated factor scores, and (3) basic
32Kaiser, p. 195.
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99variables. This study examines all three alternatives before 
determining the best form for the purposes at hand. In determining 
the optimal form to use, consideration will be given to ease of 
interpretation of the factor scores, replication in future research 
and ability of the scores to be used directly as discriminant inputs. 
The use of different factor score inputs and their corresponding 
results will be examined in greater detail in Chapter VI.
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 
Multivariate discriminant analysis is a statistical technique 
which permits a researcher to assign a particular observation to one 
of two or more groups based on composite scores computed from a 
number of independent variables. Discriminant analysis is used in 
this study for two purposes: (1) as a multivariate technique for
testing differences in group centroids (means) and (2) as a method of 
classifying banks into either holding company or independent bank 
categories.
Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, pp. 433-445.
Exact factor scores are computed from the formula:
A F (F' F ) = S Where is the data matrix, F_„_nxm mxp pxm mxp nxp uxm ’ mxp
is the rotated factor loading matrix and Snxp is the factor score
matrix.
Regression factor scores are estimated directly from the SAS 
factor routine; exact factor scores require a separate program using 
the SAS matrix subroutine.
Basic variables represent the highest loading variables on 
each factor in the analysis.
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Development of Discriminant Analysis
The first applications of discriminant analysis occurred in 
the early 1920's. M.M. Bernard in 1935 used discriminant analysis 
in dating a series of Egyptian skulls. In 1936, R.A. Fisher used 
discriminant techniques to distinguish between two forms of the
O /Black Locust tree.
The multivariate discriminant technique has gained popularity 
with researchers in economics and finance in the last ten years. One
of the first and most widely acknowledged articles was Altman's
(1968) study of corporate bankruptcy. Discriminant analysis was 
used to predict bankrupt from non-bankrupt corporations using a set 
of financial and economic ratios. Sibley (1974) applied discriminant 
analysis to predicting the pre-maturity redemption or call risk of 
corporate bonds.^
A number of multivariate discriminant studies have explored 
various areas related to commercial banking. Dince and Fortson (1972) 
used a stepwise discriminant procedure on a stratified sample of
fifty-nine national banks in Florida in an attempt to predict whether
3 4These applications and many others are discussed in David V. 
Tiedeman, "The Utility of the Discriminant Function in Psychological 
and Guidance Investigations," Harvard Educational Review, (Spring, 
1951), 76-77.
3 SEdward I. Altman, "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Anaysis and 
the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, 
(September, 1968), 589-609.
36A.M. Sibley, "The Reduction of Call Risk on Corporate Bond 
Investments: An Application of Discriminant Analysis," Mississippi 
Valley Journal of Business and Economics, (Spring, 1974), 17-29.
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37or not commercial banks were adequately capitalized. Sinkey (1975) 
used a discriminant model to identify "problem" banks based upon an 
a priori knowledge of a bank's asset composition, loan characteristics, 
capital adequacy, sources and uses of revenue, efficiency and 
profitability.®® Awh and Waters (1972) employed discriminant analysis 
to examine the factors that cause an individual to be an active or 
inactive user of bank charge c a r d s .
Fraser and Alvis (1975) applied the discriminant technique in 
an examination of the question of the effects of market structure on 
bank performance. The discriminant function obtained in the study 
maximally distinguished between banks in high and low concentration 
markets.^® Johnson and Meinster (1975) applied the discriminant 
procedure to multibank holding company subsidiary banks.^ The
"^Robert R. Dince and James C. Fortson, "The Use of Discriminant 
Analysis to Predict the Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks," Journal 
of Bank Research (Spring, 1972), 54-62.
38Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr., "A Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
of the Characteristics of Problem Banks," Journal of Finance, (March, 
1975), 21-36.
®®R.Y. Awh and D. Waters, "A Discriminant Analysis of Economic, 
Demographic, and Attitudinal Characteristics of Bank Charge-Card 
Holders: A Case Study," Journal of Finance, (June, 1974), 973-980.
^°Donald R. Fraser and Joel B. Alvis, "The Structure-Performance 
Relationship in Banking: A Dichotomous Analysis," Review of Business and 
Economic Research, (Fall, 1975), 35-57.
^Johnson and Meinster, Journal of Business, 204-212.
95
analysis attempted to classify banks into either holding company or 
non-holding company categories based on a number of bank performance 
variables. As noted earlier, that study failed to rotate the factor 
matrix used as an input for the discriminant analysis and therefore 
jeopardized the validity of the test results.
The studies described above represent a sample of applications 
of multivariate discriminant analysis to topics in economics and 
finance. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to understanding 
the mechanics of the discriminant technique.
The Linear Discriminant Function
A linear discriminant function is employed to maximally 
discriminate between multibank holding company and independent banks. 
The two group linear discriminant function is of the form
Z = b + b^x. + b9x0 + ... + b x i o 1 1   ̂ z n n
where:
Z^ is the critical value for classification of banks into 
one of the two groups
b. are discriminant coefficients 1
x^ are performance factors
b is a constant o
The x^’s are inputs into the discriminant function that have 
been analytically determined through the factor procedures outlined 
previously. The number of independent variables (factors) in the 
discriminant function determines the classification boundary. Morrison
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has observed that "the classification boundary is generally an n-1
/ 7dimensional hyperplane in n space." Once the classification boundary 
is established, a given observation then will fall to one side or the 
other of that boundary. In this study a bank could be classified 
as either a holding company or an independent bank based on its 
discriminant score in relation to the critical value of the discrimi­
nant function. (A later section will discuss the precision or 
accuracy of these classifications.)
Assumptions of the Linear Discriminant Model
Discriminant analysis is based on four primary assumptions:
(1) the distribution of variables is multivariate normal, (2) the 
covariance matrices of the selected samples are equal, (3) the a. priori 
probabilities of group membership are known, and (4) the means and 
covariance matrix are known.^ The fulfillment of these assumptions 
leads to optimal discriminant results. The first assumption is typically 
guaranteed by the central limit theorem. As Marriott has written:
It is this theorem that gives the multivariate 
normal distribution its importance in multivariate 
statistics. It ensures that many of the statistical 
techniques and tests based on the multivariate normal 
distribution are robust, and will not give seriously
^For example, if n=2, as in the two group case, the classifica­
tion boundary is a straight line; if n=3, the boundary is a two 
dimensional plane in three dimensional space. See Donald G. Morrison, 
"On the Interpretation of Discriminant Analysis," Journal of Marketing 
Research, (May, 1969), 156.
^-*Peter a . Lachenbruch, Discriminant Analysis, (New York: Hafner 
Press, 1975), p. 40.
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misleading results even though the original data are 
not derived from a multivariate normal distribution.^
The second assumption, equality of covariances, is analogous
to the univariate assumption that variance within groups is the same.
If covariance matrices are not equal then quadratic discrimination,
not linear discrimination may be appropriate.^-* Should unequal
covariance matrices occur, quadratic discrimination may be avoided
by using appropriate transformations.^
The third and fourth assumptions relating to prior probabilities 
and knowledge of the means and covariances are satisfied in this study.
Testing for Group Differences
A major attempt in this study is to test whether affiliation 
with a multibank holding company can lead to superior performance 
as compared with independent banks. In Chapter IV univariate tests 
were undertaken for a number of individual bank performance measures 
that have been considered important in the literature. Subsequently, 
factor analysis was discussed as a means of reducing the number of 
primary factors to a small number. The discriminant analysis can 
then be used to test for differences in the means for the two groups.
^F.H.C. Marriott, The Interpretation of Multiple Observations, 
(London: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 14-15.
^-*This study uses a test of homogeneity of covariances to test 
the hypothesis that the two covariance matrices are equal. The exact 
form of the Chi square test is given in A User's Guide to SAS 76, p. 102 
and is further explained in Maurice G. Kendall and Alan Stuart, The 
Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 3, 2nd ed., (London: Charles Griffin 
and Company Limited, 1968), p. 226.
^Marriott, p. 17, has suggested that logarithmic transformations 
of the data will eliminate the problem of non-homogeneous covariances.
The null hypothesis in this study is that the group means 
for both multibank holding company affiliates and for independent 
banks are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the group mean 
for holding company banks is not equal to the mean for independent 
banks. The group means or centroids represent composite scores of 
the analytically determined bank performance measures. Whereas 
univariate analysis considers only differences in group means on 
individual performance measures, multivariate discriminant analysis 
considers the composite performance simultaneously and collectively.
Multivariate Significant Tests
The significance test employed to measure group differences
is the multivariate F test which is based on and may be derived from
2 Li 2the Mahalanobis D statistic? The Mahalanobis D is a measure of the
48 2generalized distance between two populations. The D statistic max­
imizes the squared difference between two groups relative to the
49variance within the groups, while correcting for correlation between
50 2the variates. It can also be demonstrated that the D statistic may
ill 2The F test can be derived from the Mahalanobis D through the
following formula: . , , ...
F = nl P2 (nl + ”2 ~ k ~ 1} E?
0^  + 1̂ ) 0^  + r»2 - 2)k
where n^ and n2 are the sample sizes, respectively, and k is the number 
of variables. The expression has an F distribution with k and n^+ k 





be converted into other significance tests.^
If the calculated F value exeeds the critical F value then the
null hypothesis of equality of group means between holding company
and independent banks will be rejected in favor of the alternative
hypothesis. Rejection of the null hypothesis is a necessary though
not sufficient condition for concluding that bank holding company
52affiliates perform differently from independent banks. Additional 
insight will be gained by examining the classificatory accuracy of 
the discriminant function.
Classification with a Discriminant Function
After the discriminant function has been calculated, it may be 
used for classification purposes. One would expect a_ priori that a 
function would be able to correctly classify members of a sample con­
taining both holding company and independent banks with a high degree 
of accuracy. To measure the accuracy of these classifications two
51Kendall and Stuart, p. 260.
Kendall and Stuart note that Hotelling's T^, a multivariate 
significance test for the two-sample case,is related to the Mahalanobis 
1)2 by the expression , .
Marriott, p. 36 observes that Hotelling's T test is "a generalization 
to the p-variate case of the ordinary t-test." Morrison, "On the Inter­
pretation of Discriminant Analysis," 157, likewise recognizes that when 
the D-2 is transformed into an F statistic, it is "the multidimensional 
analog of the familiar t test for̂  the statistical significance of the dif­
ference between one sample mean and another sample mean X 2*"
52Some researchers argue that further investigation should be under­
taken even if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. For example, Ronald 
K. Frank, William F. Massy, and Donald G. Morrison, "Bias in Multiple Dis­
criminant Analysis," Journal of Marketing Research, (August, 1965), 252,
note "Bayesian statisticians would argue that the predictive efficiency of 
the discriminant function should be investigated regardless of the outcome 
of the hypothesis test on the means."
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samples are used, the initial sample and a validation or holdout 
sample. Because the initial sample is used to calculate the discrimi-
COnant function, a degree of bias may be introduced into the function. 
Therefore, a second sample will be drawn from among holding company 
and independent banks in Texas during the time period under investi­
gation. In this manner the sources of bias can be minimized. As Joy 
and Tollefson have found "Valid inference about the ability of an LDF 
to 'explain' the difference between two groups depends upon the use of 
a separate validation sample.
At this point a distinction should be made between "prediction" 
and "ex post discrimination." Many financial studies claim predictive 
ability for discriminant functions. This implicitly assumes, however, 
that the underlying population characteristics do not change over time. 
Stationarity of population characteristics is possible, which would 
allow for discriminant prediction, but this is an empirical research 
issue and should not be an assumption. Ex post discrimination by 
contrast "implies that the inference about the importance of the inde-
c cpendent variables in the discriminant function is warranted." J This
^"*Bias may occur in the initial sample because of (1) sampling 
errors or (2) search bias. Sampling errors occur when the sample 
drawn does not accurately reflect the underlying population. Search 
bias occurs when the researcher attempts to fit the "best" set of 
data and consequently adds, deletes, or otherwise alters a portion 
of that data. For a more detailed discussion of these problems, the 
reader is referred to Frank, Massy, and Morrison, 252-254.
560. Maurice Joy and John 0. Tollefson, "On the Financial 
Applications of Discriminant Analysis," Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, (December, 1975), 727.
55Ibid., 728.
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study makes no claim for predictive ability. It seeks instead to 
determine how well the calculated discriminant function classifies 
the initial sample and to what extent the function is capable of 
correctly classifying the members of a second sample from the same 
population.
Graphical Analysis of Misclassification
The problem of misclassification of banks can be illustrated by 
a highly simplified graphical example. Figure IV.1 shows the hypo­
thetical probability distributions of discriminant scores for two 
groups— holding company banks and independent banks. ^
Group 1 Group 2
ZZ z 21 c
FIGURE IV.1
Hypothetical Probability Distribution of Discriminant Scores 
for Multibank Holding Company Affiliates 
and Independent Banks
56This example is an extension of the analysis found in John 
E. Overall and C. James Klett, Applied Multivariate Analysis, (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 247. Similar illustrations may be 
found in William W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariate Procedures 
for the Behavioral Sciences, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), 
pp. 116-117, and in Frank, Massy and Morrison, 252.
102
Group 1 represents holding company affiliates while Group 2 
represents independent banks. When the cutting point or critical Z 
value is given by Z , the area under curve 2 to the left of ZC
represents the probability that an independent bank will be erroneously 
classified as a holding company bank.^ Conversely, the portion of 
curve 1 to the right of Z£ represents the probability that a holding 
company bank will be misclassified as an independent bank.
The results of the classification process are normally tabulated 




Group 1 2 Total
1 47 3 50
2 5 45 50
Total % 100%
In the example above a sample of 100 banks was classified 
according to holding company status (Group 1) versus independent status 
(Group 2). Ninety-two percent of the banks were correctly classified. 
Of the remaining 8 percent, 3 percent were holding company banks, 
misclassified by the discriminant model as independent banks, while 
5 percent were independent banks classified as holding company banks.
"^For a discussion of the problems associated with determining 
an optimal cutting point, see Overall and Klett, 246-248, 252-253, 
and 260-267.
103
Analogy to Multiple Regression Anal3rsis
The accuracy of the classification matrix is roughly analogous 
2to the R term in multiple regression analysis. In regression analysis,
R accounts for explained variance as a percentage of total variance, 
while the classification model accounts for the percentage of correct 
classification as a percentage of the total observations to be c l a s s i f i e d . ^ 8  
Unlike multiple regression analysis, however, discriminant coefficients 
cannot be interpreted as easily as regression coefficients. While 
precise interpretation is difficult, it is possible to ordinally rank 
discriminant coefficients according to the relative contribution of 
each factor to the discriminant model. A ranking of the relative 
importance of each variable will be included in the study.
A Summing Up
This chapter has attempted to outline the methodology to be 
followed in this study. More subtle mechanical details are intentionally 
left for discussion in Chapter VI when the results of statistical 
tests are evaluated.
The major facets of factor analysis have been discussed with the 
intention of demonstrating the ability of the technique to reduce the 
dimensionality of a set of data while simultaneously retaining an 
analytical basis for selection of the variables that are retained. The 
framework for the multivariate discriminant model was developed in 
this chapter with the actual application of the model to the test 
sample left for Chapter VI.
58Morrison, "On the Interpretation of Discriminant Analysis," 158.
CHAPTER VI 
APPLICATION OF MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES 
TO BANK HOLDING COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
The multivariate techniques discussed in Chapter V were applied 
in this chapter to data for multibank holding company subsidiaries 
and independent banks in Texas at the end of 1975. Factor analysis 
was employed to reduce the dimensionality of the set of data measuring 
bank performance. The reduced-form data were then introduced into a 
linear discriminant model where they were used to test for group differ­
ences in performance between subsidiary and independent banks. These 
results were subjected to multivariate tests of statistical significance.




The initial sample of forty holding company subsidiary banks and 
forty independent banks was used for analysis. The thirty performance 
variables that were analyzed in Chapter IV were introduced into a princi­
pal components factor procedure. As a first step, an intercorrelation 
matrix was calculated. This matrix, with dimensions of 30 x 30, contained 
the correlation coefficient of each of the thirty variables with each of the 
remaining variables. (The intercorrelation matrix used in this study is 
presented in Appendix E.) A correlation coefficient approaching one
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indicates a close relationship between variables; a value approaching 
zero denotes a weak relationship. An inverse relationship is indicated 
by a negative sign preceding the coefficient. The principal diagonal 
of the intercorrelation matrix used for principal components analysis 
contains unities. (This implies that the variable is perfectly correlated 
with itself.) The unities represent the prior estimates of communality, 
which is "the variation of a variable in common with all the others 
together."^ These communality estimates must be specified before the 
correlation matrix can be factored.
Matrix Factoring
The principal axes method is a generally accepted technique for 
factoring a matrix. The primary objective of factor analysis is to 
reduce an original set of data to a much smaller number of factors 
that retain the essential characteristics of the initial set. The 
maximum number of factors that could be extracted in this study is 
thirty, which is equal to the number of variables. If the task of 
data reduction is to be accomplished, a smaller number of factors must 
be found.
Number of Factors
In Chapter V the eigenvalue equal one criterion was explained.
When this criterion was applied to the data, nine factors were retained. 
The data for all thirty factors are presented in Table VI.1. These 
include the eigenvalues, portion of variance attributable to each factor, 
and the cumulative portion of variance attributable to successive factors.
■̂ R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict 
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23 0.043819 0.001 0.996
24 0.037657 0.001 0.998
25 0.027122 0.001 0.999
26 0.018544 0.001 0.999
27 0.015041 0.001 1.000
28 0.009014 0.000 1.000
29 0.000376 0.000 1.000
30 0.000000 0.000 1.000
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These nine factors accounted for 81.1% of total variance in
the data. When the nine factors were examined, however, it was difficult
to interpret several of these factors. The problem is that factors
accounting for the largest proportion of variance are extracted first;
each successive factor therefore accounts for a smaller proportion of
variance than the preceding factor. At some point additional factors
become trivial, measuring only random error. In this study, inter-
pretability of factors is important, for unless a factor can be identified,
it is difficult to use the factor results as inputs for discriminant
analysis. Only four factors were clearly interpretable by examining
factor loadings. The selection of four factors was supported by
2
using a "scree test" developed by Cattell. The scree test is a graphical 
technique for determining the number of factors to be retained. The 
number of factors was plotted against the proportion of variance 
extracted by each factor. The results are presented in Figure VI.1.
FIGURE VI.1 





2r . J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970), pp. 361-362.
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The additional variance explained with each additional factor 
diminished quickly and began to stabilize after the fourth factor 
was extracted. The increment between the fourth and fifth factors,
1.6%,was the same as the increment between the fifth and sixth factor. 
The process of identifying and interpreting the factors will be 
discussed in detail shortly. First, however, it is useful to examine 
the unrotated factor matrix.
The Unrotated Factor Matrix
The unrotated factor matrix is customarily presented without 
additional comment because the rotated factor matrix is generally the 
object of interpretation.^ This unrotated matrix is presented in 
Table VI.2 on the next page.
Our goal is to have these four factors represent general measures 
of bank performance. When this is accomplished, the thirty original 
variables can be approximated by these four factors. This is possible 
because many variables are generally highly correlated with each other 
so that only one of these variables is needed to represent the general 
"factor." Examination of Table VI.2 reveals the problem of an unrotated 
factor matrix. As an example, consider Column 1 which denotes Factor 1. 
Each of the thirty coefficients indicates the correlation between Factor 
1 and the corresponding variable. The square of each factor loading 
coefficient when multiplied by 100 indicates the "percent variation that 
a variable has in common with an unrotated common factor."^ Inspection
^1bid . p. 137.




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
R1 0.04590 0.21420 -0.33137 -0.05714
R2 -0.11108 -0.07073 -0.48773 -0.51965
R3 -0.37915 0.00207 -0.03747 0.47093
R4 0.08544 -0.31582 0.29097 0.32971
R5 0.31211 0.37125 0.43060 -0.35913
R6 0.15554 -0.33498 0.37013 -0.01779
R7 -0.38721 -0.05133 -0.17297 0.42089
R8 0.33442 -0.06448 0.85335 0.11112
R9 0.44035 0.51210 0.22378 -0.32521
RIO 0.19495 -0.19585 -0.15794 0.03458
Rll -0.02449 -0.63864 0.09068 0.44980
R12 0.54264 0.23381 0.57095 -0.08986
R13 -0.07916 0.06149 0.07855 0.10556
R14 0.05969 -0.13662 0.11713 -0.17319
R15 0.95671 -0.12588 0.06458 0.01008
R16 0.16659 -0.75503 0.21739 0.26957
R17 0.60623 0.53574 0.06289 -0.37819
R18 0.80572 0.23827 -0.16307 -0.11976
R19 -0.83878 0.24146 0.33617 -0.05255
R20 -0.80918 0.35352 0.37783 -0.08594
R21 -0.81628 0.14108 0.36525 -0.14499
R22 0.14856 0.71557 -0.03757 0.59780
Ill
TABLE VI.2 (Continued)
R23 0.15090 0.71852 -0.03175 0.58091
R24 0.23600 -0.57608 0.19430 0.05542
R25 0.33870 0.04390 0.81448 0.16839
R26 -0.16118 -0.09818 0.18824 -0.18075
R27 0.10987 0.71525 -0.09162 0.57861
R28 0.71293 -0.16989 -0.24019 0.18388
R29 0.70396 -0.19356 -0.23650 0.17347
R30 -0.21543 -0.15656 0.23477 0.01101
112
of Factor 1 shows that seven variables (R15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, and 29) 
have factor loadings of .70 or greater. These variables are,respectively,
(1) total operating expenses to total assets, (2) other operating 
expenses to total operating income, (3) net income to total assets,
(4) net operating earnings to total assets, (5) net income to total 
equity capital and reserves, (6) loan losses to total loans and (7) 
loan losses less recoveries to total loans.
The problem of labelling Factor 1 would be considerable at 
this point since in Chapter IV three of these measures were included 
in the "Profitability" category and two each were included in the 
"Operating Expense" and "Other Measures" categories. With the second 
and each successive factor thereafter the difficulty in identifying 
factory increases, because each factor is contributing less explana­
tion of variation than the preceding factor. Consequently the highest 
factor loadings for successive factors tend to become smaller and the 
meaning of factors less disginguishable.
However, as will be shown later, factor rotation permits 
greater assurance of clearly distinguishing the first factor—  
which we can then label "Profitability"— as well as each successive 
factor. Rotation is necessary to more clearly distinguish the 
relationship between variables and factors and thus make identifica­
tion easier and more exact. The process of rotation realigns 
variables so that some variables have high loadings on a factor while 
others have smaller loadings.
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Rotational Techniques
As discussed in Chapter V, there are two general classes of 
rotational techniques: orthogonal and oblique. There are numerous
methods of achieving either orthogonal or oblique rotation. This study 
utilized three orthogonal procedures: (1) Varimax, (2) Equamax, and
(3) Quartimax and one oblique method, Procrustean maximization or Promax. 
(The results of the latter three techniques are presented in Appendices 
F-H.) The orthogonal Varimax procedure yielded the most clearly 
interpretable results. Because the results were as good as with any 
other procedure, and the technical difficulties of the process were 
less involved, the Varimax procedure was chosen for further analysis.
The statistical properties and advantages of the Varimax techniques 
were examined in more detail in Chapter V. The results of the Varimax 
rotated factor matrix are given in Table VI.3.
Analyzing Factor 1 after rotation reveals that three variables 
(R19, 20 and 21) have loadings of .90 or above on Factor 1. These 
represent net income to total assets, income before income taxes and 
securities gains or losses to total assets and net income to total 
equity capital plus reserves, respectively. Recall in Table VI.2 that 
only one variable, total operating expenses to total assets (R 15), 
had a loading as high as .90. Factor 1 can therefore be labeled 
"Profitability" since the highest loading factors are all measures 
of profitability.
The highest loadings on Factor 2 are variables R8, total loans 
to total assets, and R25, total loans to total deposits. Their 
loadings are .826 and .777, respectively. While in Chapter IV these
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TABLE VI.3 
VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
R1 -0.11096 0.36293 -0.03744 0.12500
R2 -0.04397 0.59869 0.00954 -0.40596
R3 0.22023 -0.08231 0.45750 0.31992
R4 -0.09322 -0.50525 0.19068 0.00945
R5 0.08926 -0.12461 -0.72535 -0.00278
R6 -0.06225 -0.45059 -0.05329 -0.25291
R7 0.16279 0.02858 0.51811 0.25274
R8 0.04743 -0.82583 -0.41481 0.01496
R9 -0.07401 0.05655 0.76479 0.13571
RIO -0.29242 -0.00020 0.09165 -0.09272
Rll -0.19797 -0.49262 0.56703 -0.12497
R12 -0.13017 -0.44518 -0.67652 0.10181
R13 0.09880 -0.06661 0.03140 0.11034
R14 -0.00749 -0.08885 -0.09586 -0.22092
R15 -0.81358 -0.29681 -0.42959 -0.02935
R16 -0.30493 -0.60514 0.38688 -0.33001
R17 -0.26659 0.18342 -0.82445 0.13066
R18 -0.65984 0.10838 -0.53146 0.13158
R19 0.92612 0.01052 0.12365 0.06726
R20 0.95626 0.02702 0.01296 0.12066
R21 0.90799 -0.01847 0.10558 -0.06867
R22 -0.04686 0.03199 -0.12674 0.93467
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TABLE VI.3 (Continued)
R23 -0.04254 0.03474 -0.14098 0.92446
R24 -0.28552 -0.44607 0.14826 -0.35483
R25 0.04728 -0.77712 -0.42953 0.13313
R26 0.22079 -0.08413 -0.03919 -0.21532
R27 -0.03423 0.09104 -0.09588 0.92097
R28 -0.78232 -0.08835 -0.06752 0.06515
R29 -0.77796 -0.09434 -0.05723 0.04061
R30 0.23626 -0.21025 0.10458 -0.12327
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these variables were placed in the "Asset Structure" and "Other Measures" 
categories, for our present purposes Factor 2 can be labelled simply 
"Loans."
Factor 3 is highly correlated with: (1) R17, salaries and
wages of employees to total assets, (2) R9, service charges on demand 
deposits to total demand deposits, (3) R5, consumer loans to indivi­
duals to total assets and (4) R12, total operating income to total 
assets. The reader will notice that these variables are substantially 
controllable by bank management and could therefore be considered as 
a measure of "Operating Efficiency."
Variables R22, R23, and R27, which measure total capital and 
reserves to total assets, total capital and reserves to average total 
deposits and equity capital to total assets, are all measures of a 
general factor that can be called "Capital Adequacy,"
Having identified the four principal factors measuring bank 
performance, it is now instructive to use these factors as inputs into 
a multiple discriminant model. The precise form in which these inputs 
will be introduced into the discriminant analysis is the next topic 
for consideration.
Factor Inputs for Discriminant Analysis
As suggested in Chapter V, there are three forms in which factor 
inputs could be used for further analysis: (1) exact factor scores,
(2) regression estimated factor scores, and (3) basic variables.
Although all three methods were used, only the latter method using
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basic variables proved to be productive.^ (Data for regression 
estimated factor scores and exact factor scores are included in 
Appendixes I and J.) Basic variables, as explained in the preceding 
chapter, represent the highest loading variables on a factor.
Basic variables have the advantages of being readily observable 
and easily interpreted and replicated. Factor scores, by contrast, are 
composite scores that are not directly observable from financial 
data. Moreover, they are difficult to explain conceptually and even 
more difficult to reproduce between research studies.
Two sets of basic variables were analyzed using discriminant 
analysis. Set 1 included the highest loading variables (R20, R8,
R17 and R22) from the Varimax rotated factor matrix in Table VI.3. The 
second highest loading factor set, Set 2, contained R19, R25, R9 
and R23. These variables are proxies for profitability, loans, 
operating efficiency and capital adequacy, respectively. These 
variables are summarized in Table VI.4.
^Exact factor scores and regression estimated factor scores violated 
the equal covariance assumption required for linear discrimination 
Attempts at transforming the factor scores to a usable form proved 
unproductive. Several different types of transformations were tried.
These included: (1) standardization of variables with mean zero and
variance one, (2) log 10(x), (3) log(x), (4) log (1+x), and (5) log (x+c) 
where c is a constant equal to the absolute value of the largest negative 
factor score. None of these transformations was successful in eliminat­
ing the covariance problem. Therefore a linear discriminant model is 
unjustified using factor scores.
Although the basic variable approach initially suffered from un­
equal variances, the data yielded to logarithmic transformation and 
was subsequently used for further analysis. The log transformed 
basic variables were later discarded because of difficulty in 
interpreting the results.
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TABLE VI.4 
SUMMARY OF BASIC VARIABLES
Variable Number Variable Name Set Number Factor
R20 Net Operating Earnings Total Assets
1 Profitability
RS Total Loans Total Assets
1 Loans
E17 Salaries and WagesTotal Assets
1 Operating Efficiency
R22 Total Capital Accounts and Reserves Total Assets
1 Capital Adequacy
E19 Net Income Total Assets
2 Profitability
E25 Total Loans Total Assets
2 Loans
R9 Service Charges on Deposit Accounts Total Demand Deposits
2 Operating Efficiency
E23 Total Capital Accounts and Reserves Total Deposits
2 Capital Adequacy
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Test of Homogeneity of Covariances
All data inputs were screened using a Chi square test for 
equality of the covariance matrices.^ At the .005 confidence level the 
null hypothesis of equality of the covariance matrices was rejected 
using exact factor scores, regression estimated factor scores and 
basic variable Set 2. Only basic variable Set 1 did not permit 
rejection of the null hypothesis. A number of data transformations 
were attempted.^ None of the several techniques were successful in 
solving the covariance problems when exact factor scores or regression 
estimated factors were used. Consequently, these inputs were dropped 
from further consideration.
The natural log transformation of the basic variables did, 
however, permit the researcher not to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of the dispersion matrices. The log transformed basic variable 
data were therefore used for subsequent analysis. The transformed 
data were eventually dropped when serious problems of interpretation 
arose. The original, non-transformed data in basic variable Set 1, 
therefore, constituted the "best" data set of the many sets tested 
and, therefore, was used for the remaining analysis. The Chi square test 
data used for analyzing the covariance problem is presented in Table VI.5.
^For further explanation of the homogeneity test see (1) Anthony J. 
Barr, James H. Goodnight, James P. Sail and Jane T. Helwig, A User's Guide 
to SAS 76, (Raleigh, North Carolina: SAS Institute, Inc., 1976), p. 103 
and (2) Maurice G. Kendall and Alan Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, 
Vol. 3, 2nd ed., (London: Charles Griffin and Company Limited, 1968),p. 266.
7Cf. Fn. 5, above. These distributional transformations are further 
described in Rummell, Applied Factor Analysis, pp. 280-286. The specific 
suggestion of transforming data to eliminate unequal dispersion matrices 
is found in F.iI.C. Marriott, The Interpretation of MuLtiple Observa- 
lions, (London: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 16—17.
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TABLE VI. 5
CHI SQUARE TEST OF HOMOGENEITY OF COVARIANCE
Data Set Value
Basic Variable Set 1 
Original Data 
Log (x)
Log (1 + x)
Basic Variable Set 2 
Original Data 
Log (x)
Log (x + 1)
Exact Factor Scores 
Regression Factor Scores
Critical at .005 is, and 10 d.f. is 25.2.
*Not significant at .005 level.











The Linear Discriminant Function
A linear discriminant function using basic variable data was 
calculated. In general notation a linear discriminant function is 
of the form
2^ = b-̂ x-̂  + >̂2*2 + • • • + t^Xjj 
where 2^ is the discriminant score; b^, b2» . • • bn are discriminant 
weighting coefficients; and X2> X2> • • • xn are inputs from the factor
Oanalysis.
As Overall and Klett have noted:
The problem is to determine optimal values for 
the weighting coefficients such that the difference 
between mean scores for the two groups will be maxi­
mized relative to the variation within groups. This 
is equivalent to saying that weighting coefficients 
are to be derived such that the F ratio between 
groups will be maximum.9
The linear discriminant functions used for detailed analysis 
in this study are presented in Table VI.6.
®In terms of generalized distances 2 = (Xi - Xj) S!- x is_a linear
discriminant function, assuming equal covariances, where and Xj are 
the mean values for groups i and j on n basic variables measuring bank 
performance. S represents a pooled covariance matrix. Let (X^ - Xj) = dj_, 
a vector of mean differences between the two group means. The problem 











B dn -’nl n2 • ‘
So that B = S-^d
Therefore 2^ = B^x^ + B2X2 + . . . + BnXjj
For further explanation see Donald F. Morrison, Multivariate 
Statistical Methods, 2nd Ed., (New York: MeGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976),
p. 232. John E. Overall and C. James Klett, Applied Multivariate Analysis, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 245.




(1) Z0 = 95.865R20 + 62.893R8 + 773.348R17 + 291.196R22
(2) Zx - 115.562R20 + 57.858Rg + 722.274R17 + 288.200R22
(3) ZF = 105.714R20 + 60.376Rg + 747.811R17 + 289.698R22
-68.228
R = Net Operating Earnings 
^  Total Assets
Rg = Total Loans 
Total Assets
r17 = Salaries and Wages of Employees 
Total Assets
R = Total Capital Accounts and Reserves 
Total Assets
Equations Zq and Z^ represent the discriminant functions for 
independent banks and holding company subsidiaries respectively. For 
classification purposes these two functions are combined into a single 
linear discriminant function Zp,. The function lies midway between the 
two groups. The group means for independent and holding company banks 
are respectively 71.777 and 64.679. These values are found by evaluating 
Zq and Z^ at the mean values of the variables as given in Table VI.7.
TABLE VI.7
MEAN VALUES OF BANK PERFORMANCE VARIABLES
Variable
Mean Value _  
Independent Banks (Xo)
Mean Value _ 






The cutting point or critical value for the discriminant function 
is equidistant between the two group means with a value of 68.228."^
When this value is subtracted from the discriminant function Z , ar
classification boundary is established such that an observation with 
a discriminant score less than zero is classified as a holding company 
bank while a value greater than zero would be classified as an inde­
pendent bank. The classification procedure is discussed in detail later 
in this chapter.
Significance Tests of Group Differences
At this point it is appropriate to test for differences in group 
means (centroids). The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are 
stated as:
Ho = *0 - *1
Ha : X0 *
where the null hypothesis is equality of group means for Group 0, 
independent banks and Group 1, bank holding company subsidiaries. The 
alternative hypothesis postulates that the group means for these two 
groups are not equal.
The multivariate F test is used to determine whether a statis­
tically significant difference exists between the group means. The
2F test used in this study is calculated from the Mahalanobis D statistic,
This cutting point is standard in discriminant analysis when 
the groups are of approximately equal in size. A good discussion of 
this point can be found in Overall and Klett, pp. 252-253.
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a measure of generalized distance between groups. The results of the
F tests for both sets of data are presented below.
TABLE VI.8 
F TEST OF GROUP DIFFERENCES





Basic Variable Set 1 3.549 17.07 (4,75) =4.14
F values from Morrison, Multivariate Statistical Methods, 2nd Ed.
pp. 368-369.
Based on the results of Table VI.8, the null hypothesis of 
equality of group means between independent and holding company sub­
sidiary banks can be rejected at the .005 level of significance.
The finding of statistically significant differences in group performance 
raises two questions of importance: (1) How successful is the discrim­
inant model in classifying banks into holding company or independent 
categories? and (2) What importance should be attached to individual 
discriminant coefficients?
2 2 The Mahalanobis D can be calculated as D = £, B.d. where thei=l x l
B. are discriminant coefficients and d^ are the mean differences for each 
variable i = 1, . . . n. A discussion of this point can be found in
C. Radhakrishna Rao, Linear Statistical Inference and Its Applications, 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 481
As discussed in Chapter V, the statistic is converted to an F 
test by the formula
F _ nl n 2 n1 + n 2 - k - l
  --- ’ t v----- ^ —  • D where ni and n9 are theni + n 2 + ri2 ~ 2)k 1 2
sample sizes of the two groups and k is the number of variables. The F
statistic has k and (ni + n 2 " k - 1) degrees of freedom.
See Peter A. Lachenbruch, Discriminant Analysis, (New York: Hafner
Press, 1975), p. 25 and Rao, p. 480.
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Classification with the Discriminant Function
The linear discriminant function derived above was used to
classify banks into either holding company subsidiary or independent
bank categories based on discriminant scores calculated for each
individual sample. For classification purposes two samples were
examined, an initial sample and a validation sample. This was done
12to eliminate possible sampling bias. The classification matrix for 
the initial sample is presented in Table VI.9.
TABLE VI.9 
CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY— INITIAL SAMPLE
From Classified Into Group:
0 1 Total
0 25 15 40
(62.5%) (37.5%) (100%)
1 17 23 40
(42.5%) (57.5%) (100%)
Total 42 38 80
(52.5%) (47.5%) (100%)
Prior Probability 50.0% 50.0%
________ 0 = Independent Banks_____ 1 = Bank Holding Company Subsidiaries
The discriminant function successfully classified 48 of 80, 
or 60 percent of the banks in the initial sample. This is compared
12Ronald E. Frank, William F. Massy and Donald G. Morrison,
"Bias in Multiple Discriminant Analysis," Journal of Marketing Research, 
(August, 1965), 253, and 0. Maurice Joy and John 0. Tollefson,
"On the Financial Applications of Discriminant Analysis," Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (December, 1975), 7 27-728. Both 
these articles have discussions on the use of separate validation or 
hold-out samples to minimize the effects of sampling bias.
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to the 50 percent classification expected by chance. Although the
percentage is not particularly high, it does suggest that the model
possesses discriminating ability and that the results of the model
are statistically significant. Morrison has proposed tests of the
statistical significance of the proportion of correct classifications
versus both a "proportional chance criterion" and a "maximum chance 
13criterion." Although the tests are most useful when the prior 
probabilities are unequal, the tests were used here with equal prior 
probabilities. In the cases of equal probabilities, both models give 
equivalent results. The difference between the actual correct 
classifications, 60 percent, and proportion expected to be classified 
correctly by chance, 50 percent, was statistically significant at 
the .05 level.
When the same discriminant function was used to classify a 
separate validation sample, the classificatory accuracy of the model 
diminished. This is not unexpected, however. As pointed out by
13Morrison, "On the Interpretation of Discriminant Analysis," 
158. A test of significance of the difference in sample proportions 
can be developed. The appropriate test is a t-test of the form
t = Q —  -P and p = y.P- a ^ - P-)—  where Q is the proportion 
P
of sample observations correctly classified, P is the proportion 
that can be expected to be correctly classified by chance and n is the 
sample size.
For the initial sample a value of 1.79 was found to be 
significant at the .05 level.
i 79 = -60 - .50
V(.5)(i - .5)
80
See Frank, Massy and Morrison, 253, for a discussion of this point.
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Frank, Massy and Morrison,
The expected proportion of observations classified 
correctly in the (split approach) sample will be less 
than that for the analysis sample due to the systematic 
bias associated with intensive search and with sampling 
errors. -*-4
The classification results for the validation sample are presented 
in Table VI.10.
TABLE.IV.10
CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY— VALIDATION SAMPLE
From Classified Into Group:
0 1 Total
0 16 24 40
(40.0%) (60.0%) (100%)
1 12 28 40
(30.0%) (70.0%) (100%)
Total 28 52 80
(35.0%) (65.0%) (100%)
Prior Probability 50.0% 50.0%
0 = Independent Banks 1 = Bank Holding Company !Subsidiaries
The validation sample was correctly classified 44 of 80 times, 
for a 55 percent accuracy, compared to 50 percent for the chance models. 
However, this did not prove to be significantly different from chance. ^  
Although the discriminant model correctly classified 70 percent of hold­
ing company subsidiaries, it misclassified 60 percent of independent 
banks as holding company subsidiaries.
l4Ibid., 254.
-^The t-test of sample proportions was 55 _
' S 9 U ~\/5a .'.sf
80
which was not significant at the .05 level and did not become signi­
ficant except at the .25 level.
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Previous tests of significance indicated that differences existed 
between the group means for independent banks compared with bank hold­
ing company subsidiaries. Although these differences are both real and 
statistically significant, the two groups of banks are nevertheless 
closely enough aligned with respect to aggregate performance measures 
to result in considerable overlapping through discriminant classification.
Therefore, when applied to the separate validation sample, 
the model was unable to achieve significantly better results than a 
chance model. While this result is disappointing, classification was 
only an incidental concern of the model; rather the testing of group 
differences was considered primary. Another area of concern is the 
importance of individual discriminant coefficients.
Relative Importance of Discriminant Coefficients
Although "there are no absolute tests for the importance of 
specific variables in discriminant functions," it is possible to
1 f iobtain measures of relative contribution of these variables. These 
are grouped into "variance" measures and "distance" measures.
The "variance" measure is computed by multiplying the discrim­
inant coefficient of each variable by its respective standard 
deviation.^ This procedure, popularized by Altman's 1968 study, 
effectively scales the coefficients to eliminate problems created by
• ^ J o s e p h  F. Sinkey, Jr., "A Multivariate Statistical Analysis 
of the Characteristics of Problem Banks," Journal of Finance,
(March, 1975), 30.
^This may be obtained by taking the sc|uare root of the principal 
diagonal elements of the pooled covariance matrix. (Appendix K.)
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•I Qdissimilar units of measurement- The results of these variance- 
normalized measures are presented in Table VI.11. Using this analysis 
the loan to asset ratio is the most important discriminator while the 
profitability measure is least important.
TABLE VI.11 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIABLES 
VARIANCE NORMALIZED MEASURES
Variable B.X a.X B.c.X X Rank
R20 105.714 .00998 1.0550 4
R8 60.376 .09043 5.4598 1
R17 747.811 .00370 2.7669 3
R22 289.698 .01570 4.5454 2
R20 =
Net Operating Earnings 
Total Assets
ii00
bs Total Loans Total Assets
R17 =
Salaries and Wages of Employees
Total Assets
R = Total Capital Accounts and Reserves22 Total Assets
The popularity of "distance" measures in discriminant analysis 
as indications of relative importance of variables may be traced to a
18Edward I. Altman, "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis 
and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, 
(September, 1968), 596-597. This discussion appears in a slightly 
different form in Morrison, "On the Interpretation of Discriminant 
Analysis," 159-160.
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191963 article by Mosteller and Wallace. These measures are based on a
weighting system in which the distance between mean values for each
group on each variable is multiplied by the corresponding discriminant
20coefficient for that variable. The resulting coefficients are, there­
fore, dependent on the relative contribution of each variable set in 
explaining the overall distance between group means. The rankings of 
variables obtained using this procedure are shown in Table IV.12.
As with the variance normalized measures, the distance measure 
produced the loan to asset ratio as the most important variable and 
the profitability measure as the least important discriminator. The 
two intermediate measures did, however, switch in position.
Having applied factor analytic and discriminant techniques to the
19Frederick Mosteller and David L. Wallace, "Inference in An 
Authorship Problem," Journal of the American Statistical Association,
LVIII, (June, 1963), 282-283.
20 —  —Symbolically this may be written as w^ = where
w^ is the normalized coefficient, is the discriminant coefficient and 
and X±1 are the mean values for the ith variables i=l,...,4 for 
groups 0 and 1.
21Joy and Tollefson, 728-730, criticized Altman's variance tech­
nique and suggested the distance technique above. Moreover, they attempted 
to use the technique to assign a precentage contribution to each variable. 
This was inappropriate in a case in which the total distance between 
groups is attributable to both positive and negative effects by individual 
variables. (In addition, an arithmetic error in their paper obscured 
this rather obvious conclusion.) The procedure does, however, permit a 
ranking of variables by importance.
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TABLE VI.12
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIABLES 
DISTANCE NORMALIZED MEASURES
Variable B± (XQ - V xo " xi> Rank
R20 105.714 -.00227 -0.2399 4
R8 60.376 .04325 2.61126 1




Net Operating Earnings 
Total Assets
.30418 3
pa 00 II Total Loans Total Assets
iir'-
or* Salaries and Wages of Employees
Total Assets
HCMCM
pci Total Capital Accounts and Reserves 
Total Assets
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performance of multibank holding company and independent banks in 
Texas, it is time to reflect on the research findings and consider 
the implications.
Implications of Findings
In Chapter IV six univariate bank performance variables were 
found to have statistically significant differences in values for 
multibank holding company subsidiaries versus independent banks. These 
included: (1) U.S. government securities to total assets, (2)
obligations of states and political subdivisions to total assets,
(3) total loans to total assets, (4) trust department income to 
total operating income, (5) total loans to total deposits, and (6) total 
time and savings deposits to total deposits. The explanation and 
reconciliation of these results was also summarized in Chapter IV.
In this chapter, however, multivariate factor and discriminant 
analyses were undertaken on the same sample used for the univariate 
tests. The thirty original performance variables were systematically 
reduced to four factors: 1) Loans, measured by the loan to total
asset ratio, 2) Profitability, measured by net operating earnings to 
total assets, 3) Operating Efficiency, proxied by salaries and wages 
to total assets, and 4) Capital Adequacy, measured by total capital 
and reserves to total assets.
In the case of the loan to total asset ratio, this measure 
was highly significant as a univariate discriminator and was also 
the highest ranking multivariate factor (serving as a surrogate 
variable for the Loan factor). Likewise, the loan to deposit ratio
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was also significant in both univariate and multivariate tests. (The 
reader will recall that the loan to deposit ratio was the second 
highest loading variable on the Loan factor.) It is obvious, how­
ever, that significant univariate variables are not always significant 
in multivariate analysis: conversely, insignificant univariate
variables may take on significance in a multivariate context.^2 Such 
was the case in this study.
The question may arise why four important univariate ratios 
(U.S. government securities to total assets, obligations of states 
and political subdivisions to total assets, trust department 
income to total operating income and total time and savings deposits 
to total deposits) do not appear in the multivariate analysis. To 
answer that question it is important to recall that only four 
factors were extracted using principal components analysis (additional 
factors would have introduced spurious results) and that only one 
variable, U.S. governments to total assets, had a loading on any 
of the four factors of .50 or above. In that exceptional case, the 
loading of .59869 (Table VI.3) for U.S. government securities to total 
assets on Factor 2 (Loans) represented only the fourth highest 
loading variable on the Loan factor.
The underlying pattern of relationships between the thirty 
nerformance measures is conformable to the four factors that were 
identified; the significant univariate measures, with the exception 
of the loan ratios, simply are not strongly associated with these
^This general question is illustrated in Altman, 597 and dis­
cussed in William w. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariate Procedures for 
Jjlfi behavioral Sciences, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 121.
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factors. It should also be noted, in keeping with earlier research, 
statistical significance for the univariate measures was defined at 
the .10 level; only the two loan measures were significant both at the 
.05 level in univariate tests and in the multivariate tests.
Do the four factors selected through principal components 
analysis reasonably reflect aggregate bank performance? Although 
that question is open to debate, the factors do appear to encompass 
major facets of bank operations. In addition, as seen in Appendix L, 
the correlation coefficients between the four factors indicate that 
these are rather distinct factors, with little correlation between 
them (i.e., correlation coefficients of .25 or less).
The measures of relative importance in Tables VI.11 and VI.12 
clearly agree that the loan to total asset ratio is the most important 
variable in the study while the Profitability factor, net operating 
earnings to total assets, is the least important measure. The Capital 
Adequacy and Operating Efficiency factors fall between Loans and 
Profitability in terms of relative importance.
The multivariate tests of group differences support the 
general conclusion that independent banks outperform subsidiary 
banks in the aggregate. This conclusion stems, in large part, 
from the higher ratio of loans to total assets for independent 
banks. Again the reaction of independent banks to the entry of 
multibank holding company subsidiaries appears to be responsible 
not only for the higher ratios of loans to total assets and salaries 
and wages to total assets, but also the relative difference in
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profitability, as measured by net operating earnings to total assets. 
Higher operating expenses, including promotional and advertising 
expense, may be responsible for the relatively lower independent 
bank profitability despite the presence of higher proportions of 
higher return loan assets in their portfolios.
These multivariate conclusions are in contrast to the con­
clusions reached by Johnson and Meinster (J-M) in their study which
23also employed principal components and discriminant analysis. They 
used two different procedures in their study. One procedure utilized 
principal components analysis to select inputs for the discriminant 
analysis; the second procedure employed a stepwise discriminant 
technique which does not require a separate data reduction routine.
In applying the principal components analysis to twenty 
measures of bank performance, J-M would identify only two factors, 
a measure of profitability and a measure of operating efficiency.
This author maintains that factor rotation would likely have resulted 
in additional factors being identified. However, J-M introduced 
successively four and then five factors into the discriminant 
function, despite the fact that only two factors could be identified. 
(It is interesting to note that the cumulative proportion of total 
variation explained by the first four factors was close, 64 percent 
for J-M, 56 percent for this study.) No explanation was given as to 
how the actual inputs were determined (i.e., basic variables, factor
9  '5 Rodney D. Johnson and David R. Meinster, "The Performance 
of Hank Holding Company Acquisitions: A Multivariate Analysis,"
Journal of Business, (April, 1975), 204-212.
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scores, etc.). They conclude "... the use of the first four principal 
components in a MDA does show significant differences (at the .05 
level) between the two groups of banks.
Although, prior to the current study, J-M provided the first 
evidence of differences between subsidiary and independent banks at 
the multivariate level, their conclusions must be questioned because 
of the inability to identify the "unknown" factors, even though their 
discriminant model using principal components did correctly classify 
68 percent of all banks in the sample (compared with 60 percent for 
this study).
Johnson and Meinster subsequently experimented with a stepwise
discriminant routine to extract the most important discriminating
variables in order of their importance. The variables selected
included: 1) loans to assets, 2) other securities to assets, 3)
interest on governments to total governments, 4) interest to loans, and
255) service charges to deposits. The loan to asset ratio was the 
most important variable in both the J-M study and in this study.
Service charges to deposits, the least important variable in the J-M 
stepwise discriminant model, appeared indirectly in the present 
study as a high loading variable on the Operating Efficiency factor, 
presumably because service charges are within the control of bank 





With regard to the J-M use of stepwise discriminant analysis 
three comments are appropriate. First, of the two factors they 
were able to identify with principil components analysis, profit­
ability and efficiency, neither appeared explicitly in the step­
wise discriminant function. Second, the variables selected do 
not appear to represent banking factors as such, but rather just 
random variables. Finally, Lachenbruch has pointed out in a 
technical criticism that stepwise discrimination "frequently leads
o z:to a great deal of 'noise' in the discriminant function." "Noise," 
in this sense, means extraneous or meaningless variables which lead 
to spurious results. (Stepwise discrimination was not performed 
in this study for lack of available computer programs.)
The present study differs from the J-M study by (1) consider­
ing a somewhat larger, more recent sample with a separate validation,
(2) using a larger number of bank performance variables (30 instead 
of 20), (3) clearly delineating banking factors through the use of 
Varimax factor rotation (after experimentation with other rotational 
techniques), (4) experimenting with various methods of introducing 
data into the discriminant model (basic variables, exact and 
regression estimated factor scores), (5) testing explicitly the 
assumption of equal covariances necessary for linear discrimination 





Chapter VI has examined the application of multivariate 
factor and discriminant techniques to the sample of Texas banks. 
Significant differences were found to exist between subsidiary and 
independent banks with the latter found to possess an advantage.
In the following chapter the study will be summarized and an attempt 




Academicians and regulators have become increasingly concerned 
during the last decade with the emergence and development of the mult 
bank holding company form of organization. This interest has been 
stimulated by the recent and rapid increase nationwide in the number 
of multibank holding company subsidiary banks prompted by the passage 
of amendments in 1970 to the Bank Holding Company Act. One area 
receiving considerable attention in the literature has been the 
comparative performance of acquired subsidiary or affiliate banks of 
multibank holding companies versus non-acquired or "independent" 
banks.
Typically, researchers have undertaken univariate analysis, 
comparing various performance ratios for subsidiary banks with those 
of similarly situated independent banks with the result that usually 
no significant differences were found to exist between the two 
groups. Although a number of authors have suggested that multivar­
iate analysis should also be undertaken, few researchers have heeded 
the suggestion. Those studies which have used multivariate analysis 
have often been deficient in one or more respects.
This study, in addition to performing the customary univariate 
analysis, has also employed the multivariate techniques of principal
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components factor analysis and multivariate discriminant analysis in 
attempting to analyze the performance question. These multivariate 
techniques were applied to a sample of banks in Texas using year 
end data for 1975.
While the impact of multibank holding company acquisitions 
was felt nationwide after the 1970 amendments, the effect in Texas, 
where unit banking still prevails, was particularly pronounced.
Prompted by legal and economic incentives, multibank holding company 
organizations within the state gained control of 53.5 percent of 
total state deposits by year end 1975 compared with only 7 percent at 
the beginning of 1970. The absence of branch banking laws, the 
presence of a large sample of banks, and the temporal brevity of the 
holding company movement, prompted the selection of Texas as a 
suitable banking market for analyzing bank performance.
In Chapter II the growth of multibank holding companies 
nationwide and in Texas was traced from the passage of the Bank 
Holding Company Act in 1956 through the end of 1975. Federal 
regulations governing holding company operations were summarized and 
compared with the recent growth trends. The "banking factors" and 
"convenience and needs" factors which comprise the economic rationale 
supporting multibank holding companies were discussed. This discussion 
included the arguments of improved operational efficiency including 
the "economies of scale" issue, the expansion of financial resources, 
the improvement of management, the increase in community benefits 
and the increase in competition.
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Chapter III analyzed the development of the literature on 
multibank holding company performance. In general these studies were 
categorized as either univariate or multivariate. The approach in 
univariate studies has typically consisted of pairing acquired sub­
sidiary banks with non-acquired banks of approximately the same size 
operating in the same market area. To measure performance differences, 
each financial ratio was compared individually between subsidiary and 
independent banks. The univariate t-test was used to detect statis­
tically significant differences between the two groups of banks. Most 
univariate studies have concluded that there were few differences 
between the multi-bank holding company banks and independent banks 
for most variables tested. Where differences were observed, the 
results were generally in the structure or composition of bank 
assets. Bank holding company subsidiaries were found to have a 
higher ratio of loans to total assets than independent banks and 
correspondingly a higher ratio of loans to total deposits.
This assumed that holding company banks were better able to diversify 
their holdings of loans, consequently reducing the risk for any 
given loan held by a member of the holding company group.
Furthermore, the ratio of U.S. government securities to total 
assets was lower for subsidiary banks than for independent banks 
while conversely the ratio of state and political subdivision 
securities to total assets was higher for subsidiary banks than 
for independents.
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Multivariate applications to holding company performance have 
been limited and the approaches have been varied, including the use 
of multiple regression, probit and discriminant analysis. The 
desirability of a multivariate approach has been acknowledged in the 
literature. Because the performance of banks is multi-faceted with 
- management decisions, economic and legal forces all affecting perform­
ance variables simultaneously, it is difficult for a univariate 
measure to capture all of these effects. The desirability of the 
particular approaches used in this study are summarized later in 
this chapter.
Chapter IV contained a discussion of the selection of the sample 
to be tested along with the univariate significance tests. A sample 
of eighty multibank holding company subsidiary banks was selected 
and paired with eighty independent banks of the same approximate 
size and geographic banking market. Each of these groups was randomly 
divided into two equal subsamples. The result was an "initial" 
sample with forty pairs of independent and holding company subsidiaries 
and an equal sized "validation" or "hold-out" sample to be used in 
the discriminant tests. These banks were uniformly between five 
million dollars and one hundred million dollars in deposit size.
Data were collected as of December 31, 1975 subject to the 
proviso that holding company subsidiaries must have had official 
approval on or before January 1, 1974. This guaranteed a minimum 
two year post-acquisition period in which banks could adjust to the 
entry of holding company banks into a geographic market.
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To duplicate the research methods of several earlier studies 
univariate analysis was performed using the t-test to examine the 
hypothesis of no difference between subsidiary banks and independent 
banks using thirty separate performance variables. These variables 
had been suggested by prior empirical studies as having relevance 
in evaluating bank performance.
Univariate analysis of the test sample of Texas banks at the 
end of 1975 revealed only six of thirty performance variables were 
statistically significant at the .10 level. The conclusion that most 
variables show no difference in performance between holding company 
subsidiaries and independent banks is a finding in common with most 
previous univariate studies. The cases in which there were signi­
ficant differences were not uniformly in agreement with earlier 
research. This study found that holding company subsidiary banks 
held a larger percentage of assets in the form of state and municipal 
securities than did independent banks. This was consistent with 
earlier empirical studies.
Holding company subsidiaries, however, held a larger percentage 
of U.S. government securities to total assets than comparable 
independent banks. Perhaps even more important was the fact that 
independent banks had a higher ratio of loans to total assets than 
did holding company subsidiaries. Most univariate studies concluded 
that subsidiary banks held a smaller percentage of total assets in 
the form of government securities and a larger proportion of
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loans. In addition, this study found that the loan to deposit ratio 
was also significantly higher for subsidiary banks.
These results were somewhat surprising because the case for 
multibank holding companies assumes priori that these banks are 
better able to extend credit to customers by drawing upon the total 
resources of the holding company and through spreading the default 
risk of such loans across all of the members of the holding company 
group. Correspondingly, with a portfolio of higher yielding loans, 
the proportion of U.S. government securities to total assets would 
be expected to be smaller.
Only two other performance measures were statistically 
significant. The ratio of total time and savings deposits to total 
deposits was higher for independent banks than for subsidiary banks 
while subsidiary banks had a higher percentage of trust department 
income to total operating income than did independent banks.
While the results of univariate analysis are different from 
earlier studies with respect to asset and deposit composition, an 
interesting research issue is raised. How do existing independent 
banks react to the entry of a new holding company subsidiary bank?
The data in this study are consistent with a conclusion that 
independent banks may become more aggressive competitors upon 
entry of a holding company subsidiary. In a 1972 study of the effects 
of tie novo entry of independent banks on existing independent 
banks in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District (primarily composed 
of Texas banks), Fraser and Rose found that, among other things,
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existing independent banks: 1) increased their loan to asset ratios,
2) decreased the ratio of U.S. government securities to assets, and
3) increased the ratio of time deposits to total deposits when faced 
with a de novo entrant in the local market.^ These results are 
consistent with the present study. While future research is needed 
to resolve the issue of whether the holding company subsidiary bank 
or the existing independent bank is the more aggressive competitor, 
these tentative results might suggest that the independent bank, 
confronted with the entry of a multibank holding company subsidiary, 
may react in much the same way as it reacts to de novo entry. The 
existence of higher loan to asset and loan to deposit ratios, lower 
profitability ratios (although they make a higher percentage of high 
yielding loans and hold less U.S. government securities) and higher 
"other operating expenses," combined with a higher time and savings 
deposit to total deposit ratio (despite equivalent interest rates 
paid on these accounts) certainly do not reject the "aggressive 
competitor" explanation. In their approval of holding company 
applications, the regulatory agencies tacitly expect increased 
competition. Perhaps the Texas experience is just a bit more 
pronounced than what was anticipated.
The Texas experience is admittedly one in which tremendous 
growth has occurred in a short time span. In this sense, the 
reactions of independent banks early in this growth process may 
be atypical of what occurs over the long run. Again, future research 
should be directed at this question.
^-Donald R. Fraser and Peter S. Rose, "Bank Entry and Bank 
Performance," Journal of Finance, (March, 1972), pp. 65-78.
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Chapter V contained a discussion of some of the methodological 
issues associated with the use of factor and discriminant analysis. 
Included in the discussion of factor analysis was a brief description 
of its historical development and use along with an explanation of 
the process of reducing a large number of variables into a small 
number of factors. Various factor rotation techniques were discussed 
and the necessity for such rotation was explained.
The essentials of multivariate discriminant analysis were 
explained. This discussion included the multivariate distributional 
assumptions and the significance tests for group differences. In 
addition, the classifactory accuracy of the discriminant function 
was discussed. This chapter served as a prelude to understanding 
the multivariate results in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter VI contained the results of both the multivariate 
principal components factor analysis and multivariate discriminant 
analysis. When principal components factor analysis was applied to 
the same thirty performance variables that were examined previously 
with univariate techniques, four factors were extracted for further 
analysis. Because of the collinearity of many performance variables 
with each other, these four factors captured the effects of the thirty 
original variables. Several rotational techniques were employed to 
select the most meaningful set of factors. The varimax rotational 
technique proved to be the most desirable method for this study.
Other tests were used to evaluate the proper number of factors to
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be selected with four factors being chosen as optimal. These factors 
represented (1) profitability, (2) loans, (3) capital adequacy, and 
(4) operating efficiency.
After experimentation with alternative methods of using 
factor scores as inputs (including regression estimated and exact 
factor scores), the basic variable approach (using the highest load­
ing variables on a factor) was chosen for introduction into a linear 
discriminant model. These basic or proxy variables therefore consisted 
of four ratios: (1) net operating earnings (income before taxes and
securities gains or losses) to total assets as a measure of profit­
ability; (2) total loans to total assets as a measure of loans;
(3) total capital accounts plus reserves to total assets as a measure 
of capital adequacy; and (4) salaries and wages of employees to total 
assets as a proxy for operating efficiency. This particular set of 
basic variables was considered optimal in the sense that it fulfilled 
the statistical requirement of discriminant analysis that the 
dispersion or covariance matrices between samples be equal.
With the preceeding factors as inputs, the discriminant function 
was estimated and a classification criterion established. The 
hypothesis of no difference in group performance between holding 
company subsidiary banks and independent banks was rejected at the 
.005 significance level using a multivariate F test derived from the
OIlahalanobis D statistic. This result led to the conclusion that 
there was a statistically significant difference between subsidiary
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banks and independent banks. In general, subsidiary banks were found 
to: 1) be more profitable, 2) make fewer loans per dollar of assets,
3) pay lower salaries and wages to employees, and 4) hold less capital 
and reserves per dollar of assets than comparable independent banks.
The classificatory accuracy was examined by using the original 
sample of forty pairs of banks. The discriminant model correctly 
classified sixty percent of the observations which is significantly 
better than expected by chance. A separate validation or holdout 
sample of forty pairs of banks was correctly classified with fifty- 
five percent accuracy, unfortunately, this is not significantly 
different from chance. The model therefore possesses some dis­
criminating ability. Since the purpose of this study is not prediction, 
the lower degree of accuracy is tolerable.
Two measures were employed to explore the relative contribu­
tion of individual variables in the discriminant model. Both 
"variance" and "distance" measures consistently found that the loan 
to total asset ratio was the most important discriminator in the model. 
This was also found to be the most important univariate variable in 
terms of the statistical significance of the "t-test". The profit­
ability measure was in both multivariate tests the least important 
variable. This is consistent with the univariate findings that 
there was no significant difference between subsidiary and independent 
banks with respect to profitability. The other two variables in 
the multivariate tests, the operating efficiency and capital
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adequacy measures, switched positions in ranking depending on 
whether variance or distance measures were used.
What then are the implications of these findings for future 
research, for policy decisions by regulatory authorities and for 
bankers, both those associated with holding companies and those who 
remain independent?
Before attempting an answer, certain caveats must be issued.
It should be emphasized that the conclusions of this study are 
applicable only for banks in the State of Texas at a particular point 
in time. Moreover, these banks are restricted to a particular size 
range. While these conclusions may be applicable beyond state 
boundaries and for different time periods, that must be subjected to 
additional empirical scrutiny; no claim is made herein for general 
applicability. These results could well be different if large 
banks (over $100 million in deposits) or very small banks (under $5 
million in deposits) were considered. That again necessitates 
further analysis.
This study has shown that although there are no significant 
differences between subsidiary and independent banks in eighty per­
cent of the cases using univariate analysis, there are, nevertheless, 
some important areas of difference, particularly the difference with 
respect to loans. Moreover, when an analytical selection and data 
reduction technique was permitted to determine factors that would 
be used for further analysis, some variables that were not significant
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in univariate analysis were selected. These included salaries and 
wages to total assets as a measure of operating efficiency, net 
operating earnings to total assets as a measure of profitability 
and total capital accounts and reserves to total assets as a measure 
of capital adequacy. Moreover, several significant univariate 
variables, including U.S. government securities to total assets, 
obligations of states and political subdivisions to total assets, 
trust department income to total operating income and total time and 
savings deposits to total deposits, were excluded by the factor 
process from further multivariate analysis. The four factors retained, 
when allowed to interact together, resulted in statistically signi­
ficant group differences— confirming the suspicions of some researchers 
that multivariate analysis might yield some interesting conclusions.
When compared to earlier discriminant analysis of holding 
company performance by Johnson and Meinster, the conclusion that 
there are significant multivariate differences between subsidiary 
and independent banks emerges from both studies. However, the 
application of principal components by Johnson and Meinster results 
in identification of only two factors— operating efficiency and 
profitability— compared to the four factors found in this study.
The J-M study was criticized on a number of technical grounds including 
their use of stepwise discriminate analysis and their misuse of 
factor analysis (arising from failure to carry out rotational 
procedures). A number of advantages of the current study over the 
J-M study were noted.
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It is the task of future research to test other data samples 
with different temporal and size constraints to verify or reject these 
conclusions. As more data become available, the question of the time 
lag between acquisition and optimum performance can be investigated.
As indicated, the question of the reaction of existing banks to the 
entry of a holding company bank deserves additional consideration.
At the heart of future research, however, is the necessity of a general 
model of multibank holding company behavior, which does not exist 
at present.
Assuming for the moment that the conclusions of this study are 
valid in a more general context, what should be the position of 
regulators with respect to approving or denying holding company 
applications? The evidence presented here indicates that independent 
banks compete favorably with holding company affiliate banks and can 
offer the public more credit than can holding company banks for a 
given asset size.
Independent bankers, frequently frightened by the prospects 
of having to compete against holding company subsidiaries, may have 
those fears allayed. Conversely, holding company management will be 
forced to compete more vigorously for customers when faced with the 
competition of independents. These considerations assume competition 
among equals in terms of size. Nothing is claimed about the effects 
of competition between dissimilar sized banks.
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In short, this study has been intended to explore several 
empirical avenues in examining multibank holding company performance. 
As the holding company movement has only recently begun, so too this 
study marks a modest beginning in understanding the complexities 
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Registered Texas Multibank Holding Companies 
July 1, 1976
Number of Deposits
Holding Company Location Subsidiaries (millions)
Allied Bancshares, Inc. Houston 13 $ 895.8
American Corp./Pedernales Blanco Corp. Victoria 2 35.1
American Income Life Insur. Co. Waco 3 28.1
Austin Bancshares Corp. Austin 2 408.7
Briscoe Ranch, Inc. Uvalde 2 80.6
Citizens Bancshares, Inc. Lubbock 2 12.6
^Citizens Bankers, Inc. Baytown 0 0.0
Commerce Financial Corp. Fort Worth 2 48.2
Cullens Bankers, Inc. Houston 2 322.7
Dynamerica Corp. Richardson 2 20.8
Federated Capital Corp. Houston 6 1,033.8
First Abilene Bankshares, Inc. Abilene 3 187.5
First Bancorp., Inc. Corsicana 7 124.8
First City Bancorporation of Texas Houston 24 3,434.5
*First Freeport Corp. Freeport 1 37.6
First International Bancshares, Inc. Dallas 23 3,600.0
First Security Nat'l Corp. Beaumont 10 296.1
iFirst Southwest Bancorporation, Inc. Waco 3 92.8
First Texas Bancorp., Inc. Georgetown 4 68.2
First United Bancorporation/FNB, F.W. Fort Worth 10 925.1
First-Wichita Bancshares, Inc. Wichita Falls 2 231.6
FNB Marshall/First National Company Marshall 2 50.3
*Fort Sam Houston Bankshares, Inc. San Antonio 1 129.2
Frostbank Corporation San Antonio 5 687.3
Galbank/U.S. National Bancshares, Inc. Galveston 2 113.6
*Merchantile Texas Corporation Dallas 1 939.3
National Bancshares Corp. of Texas San Antonio 4 449.0 16o
APPENDIX A (continued)
Registered Texas Multibank Holding Companies 
July 1, 1976
Number of Deposits
Holding Company Location Subsidiaries (millions)
Northeast United Bancorp., Inc. of Texas Fort Worth 2 $ 65.6
Pannational Group, Inc. El Paso 6 590.3
Republic of Texas Corporation Dallas 8 3,050.0
Security Bankshares, Inc. Dallas 2 9.2
Southwest Bancshares, Inc. Houston 15 1,722.5
Texarkana National Bancshares, Inc. Texarkana 2 97.1
Texas American Bancshares, Inc. Fort Worth 11 1,422.0
Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc. Houston 31 3,313.0
The Farmers & Mechanics Trust Co. Childress 3 30.9
Trans Texas Bancorporation, Inc. El Paso 5 457.5
U.S. Bancshares, Inc. Brownwood 4 78.0
Victoria Bankshares, Inc. Victoria 7 215.5
Total 234 $25,304.9
*Proposed Multibank Holding Company.
"̂BHC has terminated its bank holding company status as of 7-1-76. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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' Number Bank Location 12-31-
1 First National Bank (HC) Arlington 74.5
Arlington National Bank (I) Arlington 21.5
2 Arlington Bank of Commerce (HC) Arlington 21.1
Forum Bank (I) Arlington 9.3
3 Citizens State Bank (HC) Malakoff 7.4
First State Bank (I) Athens 16.1
4 Citizens National Bank (HC) Austin 45.9
Bank of Austin (I) Austin 40.2
5 Central Bank (HC) Beaumont 14.1
Citizens National Bank (I) Beaumont 14.4
6 Gateway National Bank (HC) Beaumont 17.2
Lamar State Bank (I) Beaumont 16.0
7 First State Bank (HC) Childress 7.1
Security National Bank (I) Quanah 8.7
8 Commercial State Bank (HC) Sinton 24.5
American National Bank (I) Corpus Christi 19.3
9 Metro Bank of Dallas (HC) Dallas 20.4
Bank of Dallas (I) Dallas 31.3
10 Grove State Bank (HC) Dallas 23.3
Commercial National Bank (I) Dallas 14.7
11 Irving Bank and Trust (HC) Irving 92.1
Lakewood Bank and Trust (I) Dallas 91.1
12 First City Bank of Wallis (HC) 
(formerly Wallis State Bank)
Wallis 6.5
First National Bank (I) Eagle Lake 20.6
APPENDIX B (continued)
Paired Holding Company and Independent Banks
Deposits (millions)
■ Number Bank Location 12-31-'
13 First City National Bank (HC) 
(formerly Southwest National Bank)
El Paso 100.0
American Bank of Commerce (I) El Paso 35.2
14 Bassett National Bank (HC) El Paso 26.4
Valley Bank of El Paso (I) El Paso 10.1
15 Citizens National Bank (HC) Ennis 25.2
Ennis State Bank (I) Ennis 14.0
16 Cleburne National Bank (HC) Cleburne 28.7
Citizens National Bank (I) Waxahachie 27.1
17 Bank of Commerce (HC) Fort Worth 46.4
North Fort Worth Bank (I) Fort Worth 50.4
18 Bank of Fort Worth (HC) Fort Worth 76.0
Ridglea Bank (I) Fort Worth 66.4
19 Security State Bank (HC) Fort Worth 24.2
Union State Bank (I) Fort Worth 33.0
20 Colonial National Bank (HC) Garland 19.7
Southern Bank and Trust (I) Garland 17.6
21 First National Bank (HC) Grand Praire 19.3
Midway National Bank (I) Grand Praire 28.3
22 First National Bank (HC) Harlingen 65.7
Harlingen National Bank (I) Harlingen 51.2
23 Airline Commerce Bank (HC) Houston 40.2
Chemical Bank and Trust (I) Houston 43.8
24 First City Bank of Highland Villiage (HC) 
(formerly Highland Village Bank)
Houston 38.8
Great Southern Bank (I) Houston 27.7
25 Gulf Coast National Bank (HC) Houston 22.4
Guaranty National Bank (I) Houston 26.9
APPENDIX B (continued)
Paired Holding Company and Independent Banks
Deposits (millions)
Pair Number     Bank_________________________ Location_________ 12-31-75______
26 Bank of Woodlake (HC) Houston 10.1
Heritage National Bank (I) Houston 6.0
27 Gulf Freeway National Bank (HC) Houston 11.6
Homestead Bank (I) Houston 11.4
28 Village National Bank (HC) Houston 12.6
Northshore Bank (I) Houston 13.6
29 North Freeway Commerce Bank (HC) Houston 12.8
Spring Woods Bank (I) Houston 12.7
30 Sourlake State Bank (HC) Sourlake 8.6
Hull State Bank (I) Hull 8.4
31 First National Bank (HC) Lampasas 17.8
Peoples National Bank (I) Lampasas 15.7
32 First City Bank of La Porte (HC) 
(formerly La Porte State Bank)
La Porte 12.2
Bayshore National Bank (I) La Porte 19.2
33 First National Bank (HC) Longview 60.3
Longview Bank and Trust (I) Longview 37.6
34 First National Bank (HC) Marshall 48.2
Marshall National Bank (I) Marshall 37.4
35 State National Bank (HC) Odessa 53.8
National Bank of Odessa (I) Odessa 39.1
36 Security State Bank (HC) Pearsall 22.9
Jourdanton State Bank (I) Jourdanton 9.3
37 Temple National Bank (HC) Temple 66.7
Texas Bank and Trust (I) Temple 14.0
38 First State Bank of Uvalde (HC) Uvalde 57.7
Uvalde Bank (I) Uvalde 13.9
39 Randolph Field National Bank (HC) Universal City 14.4
Valley-Hi National Bank (I) San Antonio 14.9
40 First State Bank (HC) El Paso 30.9
Bank of Ysleta (I)
(formerly Citizens State Bank of Ysleta)
El Paso 11.4
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Pair Number Bank_________________________ Location_________ 12-31~75_____
1 First City Bank— Gulfgate (HC) Houston 44.9
Greenway Bank and Trust (I) Houston 43.6
2 Peoples State Bank (HC) Kountze 5.3
First National Bank (I) Silsbee 12.7
3 First City Bank of Humble (HC) Humble 22.5
Crosby State Bank (I) Crosby 13.6
4 Inwood Commerce Bank (HC) Houston 6.9
South Loop National Bank (I) Houston 7.1
5 Bank of Lancaster (HC) Lancaster 9.3
First National Bank (I) Lancaster 26.9
6 First National Bank (HC) Corsicana 64.8
State National Bank (I) Corsicana 20.6
7 Park Cities Bank and Trust (HC) Dallas 42.0
North Dallas Bank and Trust (I) Dallas 65.9
8 Citizens State Bank (HC) Sealy 22.3
First National Bank (I) Bellville 18.9
9 Citizens State Bank (HC) Georgetown 17.9
First National Bank (I) Georgetown 7.9
10 Seminary State Bank (HC) Fort Worth 24.5
Fort Worth Bank and Trust (I) Fort Worth 37.6
11 State National Bank (HC) Denison 44.0
Citizens National Bank (I) Denison 46.2
12 Long Point National Bank (HC) Houston 41.4
Merchantile Bank (I) Houston 44.6
APPENDIX C (continued)
Paired Holding Company and Independent Banks
Deposits (millions)
' Number Bank Location 12-31-;
13 Kingwood Commerce Bank (HC) Humble 6.9
American National Bank (I) Humble 11.6
14 American State Bank (HC) Killeen 29.0
First National Bank (I) Killeen 75.0
15 Bank of El Paso (HC) El Paso 52.2
Coronado State Bank (I) El Paso 19.6
16 First State Bank (HC) Bellaire 86.5
First National Bank (I) Bellaire 20.9
17 Sugarland State Bank (HC) Sugarland 20.9
First National Bank (I) Richmond 14.2
18 United States National Bank (HC) Galveston 92.7
American Bank (I) Galveston 10.5
19 First National Bank (HC) Brownwood 43.8
Citizens National Bank (I) Brownwood 19.3
20 Citizens National Bank (HC) San Antonio 27.0
Jefferson State Bank (I) San Antonio 28.3
21 Riverside State Bank (HC) Fort Worth 52.5
Haltom City State Bank (I) Fort Worth 35.5
22 Allied Merchants Bank (HC) Port Arthur 94.4
Sabine Bank (I) Port Arthur 29.9
23 First National Bank (HC) Richardson 15.7
Promenade National Bank (I) Richardson 13.6
24 First City Bank— Inwood Forest (HC) Houston 9.3
Greensgate Bank (I) Houston 8.9
25 Commercial Bank and Trust (HC) Midland 45.1
Western State Bank (I) Midland 9.2
26 Houston State Bank (HC) Houston 7.7
Pan American National Bank (I) Houston 8.9
27 First City National Bank (HC) Orange 37.5
Orange Bank (I) Orange 32.2 172
APPENDIX C (continued)
Paired Holding Company and Independent Banks
Deposits (millions)
Pair Number B a n k ___________________________Location_________12-31-75______
28 University Bank (HC) Fort Worth 60.7
Central Bank and Trust (I) Fort Worth 53.5
29 Johnson City Bank (HC) Johnson City 10.6
Security State Bank and Trust (I) Fredericksburg 17.2
30 Bank of Commerce (HC) Abilene 25.1
Abilene National Bank (I) Abilene 21.5
31 American Bank and Trust (HC) Dallas 57.0
Guaranty Bank (I) Dallas 53.2
32 Tarrant State Bank (HC) Fort Worth 12.7
Everman National Bank (I) Fort Worth 11.8
33 Dallas County State Bank (HC) Carrollton 35.2
First Security Bank and Trust (I) Carrollton 12.4
34 First National Bank (HC) Port Arthur 94.3
Beaumont State Bank (I) Port Arthur 41.6
35 First Denton County National Bank (HC) Denton 44.1
First State Bank of Denton (I) Denton 73.2
36 First National Bank (HC) Childress 12.8
First National Bank (I) Quanah 15.1
37 First National Bank (HC) Eagle Pass 30.0
Frontier State Bank (I) Eagle Pass 14.5
38 Allied Conroe Bank (HC) Conroe 44.3
First National Bank (I) Conroe 55.3
39 First City Bank— Executive Plaza (HC) Houston 9.1
Hillcroft Bank (I) Houston 9.6
40 Plaza Del Oro Commerce Bank (HC) Houston 8.4
Madison-Southern National Bank (I) Houston 6.2
APPENDIX D
Performance Variables Used in Study 
Variable Code Variable
R1 Cash and Due From Banks
Total Assets
R2 U.S. Government Securities^
Total Assets
R3 Obligations of States and Political Subdivision^
Total Assets
R4 Real Estate Loans
Total Assets
R5 Loans to Individuals
Total Assets
R6 Commercial and Industrial Loans
Total Assets




R9 Service Charges on Deposit Accounts
Total Demand Deposits
RIO Interest and Fees on Loans^
Total Loans
Rll Interest on Time and Savings Deposits^
Total Time and Savings Deposits
R12 Total Operating Income
Total Assets
R13 Interest on U.S. Government Securities1
U.S. Government Securities
APPENDIX D (Continued)
Perfromance Variables Used in Studies 
Variable Code Variable
3R14 Interest on Obligations of States and Political Subdivisions
State and Political Subdivision Securities
R15 Total Operating Expenses
Total Assets
R16 Interest on Time and Savings Deposits
Total Assets
R17 Salaries and Wages
Total Assets




R20 Net Operating Earnings^
Total Assets
R21 Net Income__________________________
Total Equity Capital and Reserves 
R22 Total Capital Accounts and Reserves
Total Assets
R23 Total Capital Accounts and Reserves^
Total Deposits




R26 Cash Dividends Paid
Net Income
APPENDIX D (Continued)
Performance Variables Used in Study
Variable Code Variable




R29 Loan Losses Less Recoveries^
Total Loans
R30 Trust Department Income
Total Operating Income
^Average holdings of U.S. Government Securities for June 30 and December 31, 1975 Call Reports.
^Average holdings of obligations of States and Political Subdivisions for June 30 and December 31 
1975 Call Reports.
^Average of total loans for the 15 calendar days ending with the December 31, 1975 Call Report.
^Average of total time and savings deposits for June 30 and December 31, 1975 Call Reports.
^Net operating earnings are synonymous with Income before Income Taxes and Securities Gains or 
Losses.




R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 RIO
R1 1.00000
R2 -0.07172 1.00000
R3 -0.17205 -0.33681 1.00000
R4 -0.18139 -0.21257 0.03546 1.00000
R5 -0.01644 -0.20819 -0.10530 -0.28392 1.0000
R6 -0.08164 -0.08137 -0.31169 0.13682 -0.30685 1.00000
R7 -0.00380 -0.15337 0.31801 -0.05000 -0.26354 -0.36005 1.00000
R8 -0.28987 -0.50756 -0.18551 0.26747 0.40196 0.42155 -0.08205 1.00000
R9 0.13761 -0.06113 -0.20527 -0.07546 0.50973 -0.10833 -0.40474 0.13837 1.00000
RIO 0.15733 -0.10944 0.13694 -0.00142 0.13237 -0.15306 0.09115 -0.18724 -0.01361 1.00000
Rll 0.03073 -0.22226 0.16007 0.23574 -0.22231 0.15594 0.15539 0.10822 -0.39788 0.21577
R12 -0.11934 -0.25017 -0.11220 0.08367 0.59789 0.08101 -0.29907 0.53124 0.59889 0.28392
R13 -0.00895 0.07786 0.00726 -0.02133 -0.03773 0.12855 0.02498 0.06660 -0.05187 -0.17256
R14 -0.07751 0.03760 0.10707 -0.03099 0.07058 0.00416 -0.08605 0.04284 0.05112 0.08926
R15 -0.01772 -0.10480 -0.28658 0.13996 0.30223 0.15382 -0.35934 0.33329 0.40840 0.28346
R16 -0.22034 -0.08765 0.08993 0.37979 -0.16580 0.25181 -0.02066 0.18889 -0.18223 0.27454
R17 0.15702 0.06977 -0.40133 -0,13007 0.51239 -0.04112 -0.34352 0.18185 0.64385 0.11026
R18 0.16349 0.00197 -0.37330 -0.05300 0.22354 0.05390 -0.37551 0.09906 0.44971 0.06032
R19 -0.09180 -0.07913 0.35096 -0.08133 0.02532 -0.13848 0.22572 -0.05622 -0.12768 -0.12430
R20 -0.07345 -0.06570 0.28315 -0.11488 0.08956 -0.13514 0.22678 -0.00496 -0.04814 -0.13999
R21 -0.07899 -0.07885 0.30605 -0.06636 0.02693 -0.08821 0.19687 -0.03755 -0.13224 -0.06436
R22 0.10489 -0.23035 0.13916 0.00933 0.00350 -0.14426 0.03610 -0.01305 0.24260 -0.10091
R23 0.13711 -0.22713 0.08 001 0.00447 0.01925 -0.14481 0.02897 0.00468 0.23605 -0.15155
R24 -0.31533 0.01051 -0.11759 0.34458 -0.08717 0.21512 -0.13280 0.16005 0.02061 0.17579
R25 -0.23096 -0.50787 -0.21786 0.24991 0.40381 0.37507 -0.08559 0.96251 0.16046 -0.23521
R26 -0.07570 0.05609 -0.09814 0.11549 -0.06029 0.05024 -0.06940 0.10366 0.00948 -0.32656
R27 0.07023 -0.17991 0.15987 -0.06432 -0.02465 -0.18070 0.0 7524 -0.06527 0.22546 -0.14732
R28 0.04374 -0.17315 -0.02865 -0.01822 0.06890 0.00245 -0.04513 0.13475 0.03464 0.25038
R29 0.00624 -0.12667 -0.06167 -0.01373 0.03541 0.04310 -0.04684 0.15393 -0.00965 0.20274
R30 0.15277 -0.15715 0.02287 0.00380 -0.11952 0.37323 -0.06726 0.16090 -0.27041 -0.06874 177
APPENDIX E (continued) 
Intercorrelation Matrix
Initial Sample













R13 0.04486 0.02692 1.00000
R14 -0.03675 0.22255 -0.23623 1.00000
R15 0.11696 0.64283 -0.04690 0.11176 1.00000
R16 0.76697 0.19648 0.00569 0.13748 0.35633 1.00000
R17 -0.53307 0.56792 -0.01062 -0.07089 0.54399 -0.38348 1.00000
R18 -0.25034 0.36113 -0.12041 0.10557 0.70571 -0.16792 0.56334 1.00000
R19 -0.11444 -0.09825 0.08811 0.05281 -0.79371 -0.22382 -0.32484 -0.71457 1.00000
R20 -0.20216 -0.02944 0.08291 0.03430 -0.78460 -0.30598 -0.25013 -0.62858 0.95621 1.00000
R21 -0.09713 -0.07636 0.01875 0.13033 -0.75634 -0.17666 -0.34506 -0.64336 0.94382 0.92517
R22 -0.18256 0.19182 0.07629 -0.15585 0.06794 -0.28745 0.23530 0.22670 -0.01724 0.06659
R23 -0.18423 0.13530 0.04509 -0.16702 0.04304 -0.33126 0.21950 0.24845 -0.02436 0.05332
R24 0.27114 0.11232 -0.10130 0.12481 0.31756 0.71484 -0.21363 0.00199 -0.26783 -0.32333
R25 0.07558 0.47748 0.04219 0.00918 0.29894 0.09633 0.19209 0.15102 -0.05589 -0.00365
R26 0.04981 -0.08913 0.01091 -0.07828 -0.14564 -0.01437 -0.10274 -0.07541 0.06064 0.11786
R27 -0.19615 0.14356 0.11189 -0.15148 0.02835 -0.28931 0.20355 0.21755 0.01463 0.07917
R28 0.06349 0.20862 -0.06924 0.10517 0.64668 0.09272 0.22795 0.48371 -0.62198 -0.67495
R29 0.06287 0.17650 -0.02962 0.11552 0.63902 0.09461 0.22377 0.47846 -0.62174 -0.69095





















































































Equamax Rotated Factor Pattern
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
R1 -0.11057 0.36162 -0.03981 0.12838
R2 -0.04196 0.60287 0.00584 -0.40002
R3 0.21149 -0.08446 0.46225 0.31844
R4 -0.09671 -0.50470 0.19060 0.00327
R5 0.10077 -0.12670 -0.72348 -0.00129
R6 -0.06071 -0.44808 -0.05386 -0.25759
R7 0.15345 0.02732 0.52140 0.25197
R8 0.05333 -0.82715 -0.41165 0.00807
R9 -0.06227 0.05306 -0.76558 0.13850
RIO -0.29346 0.00125 0.08664 -0.09421
Rll -0.20691 -0.48955 0.56474 -0.13268
R12 -0.12011 -0.44801 -0.67694 0.09895
R13 0.09777 -0.06773 0.03353 0.10995
R14 -0.00511 -0.08685 -0.09644 -0.22153
R15 -0.80671 -0.29704 -0.44184 -0.03427
R16 -0.31022 -0.60039 0.38255 -0.33870
R17 -0.25374 0.17996 -0.82869 0.13418
R18 -0.65170 0.10607 -0.54183 0.13176
R19 0.92375 0.00942 0.13866 0.07072
R20 0.95545 0.02504 0.02860 0.12478
R21 0.90644 -0.01821 0.11994 -0.06551
R22 -0.04866 0.02211 -0.12450 0.93516
R23 -0.04406 0.02493 -0.13871 0.92505
R24 -0.28675 -0.44177 0.14374 -0.36103
R25 0.05297 -0.77969 -0.42612 0.12678
R26 0.22221 -0.08221 -0.03612 -0.21514
R27 -0.03642 0.08138 -0.09365 0.92201
R28 -0.78147 -0.08856 -0.07959 0.06129
R29 -0.77718 -0.09428 -0.06930 0.03667
R30 0.23489 -0.20887 0.10853 -0.12480
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APPENDIX G 
Quarttmax Rotated Factor Pattern
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
R1 -0.11146 0.36447 -0.03448 0.12087
R2 -0.04600 0.59359 0.01412 -0.41303
R3 0.22937 -0.08000 0.45223 0,32158
R4 -0.08939 -0.50595 0.19015 0.01664
R5 0.07693 -0.12163 -0.72726 -0.00409
R6 -0.06368 -0.45350 -0.05319 -0.24732
R7 0.17260 0.02975 0.51449 0.25349
R8 0.04121 -0.82386 -0.41898 0.02343
R9 -0.08663 0.06120 -0.76364 0.13269
RIO -0.29117 -0.00200 0.09695 -0.09123
Rll -0.18821 -0.49659 0.56874 -0.11622
R12 -0.14089 -0.44132 -0.67635 0.10545
R13 0.09982 -0.06528 0.02905 0.11086
R14 -0.00990 -0.09117 -0.09532 -0.22011
R15 -0.82063 -0.29626 -0.41670 -0.02394
R16 -0.29893 -0.61099 0.39071 -0.32005
R17 -0.28035 0.18804 -0.81946 0.12666
R18 -0.66844 0.11143 -0.52009 0.13106
R19 0.92835 0.01180 0.10759 0.06386
R20 0.95678 0.02943 -0.00371 0.11656
R21 0.90941 -0.01879 0.09018 -0.07170
R22 -0.04540 0.04388 -0.12899 0.93395
R23 -0.04136 0.04657 -0.14326 0.92364
R24 -0.28387 -0.45127 0.15252 -0.34771
R25 0.04123 -0.77365 -0.43390 0.14095
R26 0.21933 -0.08637 -0.04257 -0.21529
R27 -0.03236 0.10265 -0.09807 0.91958
R28 -0.78301 -0.08808 -0.05470 0.06911
R29 -0.77357 -0.09441 -0.04443 0.04467
R30 0.23775 -0.21191 0.10009 -0.12128
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APPENDIX H
Procrustean Maximization (Promax) Factor Pattern
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
R1 -0.14227 0.36890 -0.02857 0.11947
R2 -0.07457 0.62746 -0.09845 -0.43865
R3 0.17509 -0.10889 0.51864 0.38345
R4 -0.07592 -0.50350 0.24187 0.05648
R5 0.16983 -0.13883 -0.75658 -0.09854
R6 -0.01457 -0.44063 -0.06671 -0.25208
R7 0.10492 0.01091 0.56798 0.32095
R8 0.14948 -0.84346 -0.38083 -0.01418
R9 -0.01264 0.04912 -0.76798 0.04356
RIO -0.30414 0.02510 0.10712 -0.06842
Rll -0.21444 -0.47388 0.61864 -0.02892
R12 -0.03942 -0.45236 -0.64454 0.03936
R13 0.09866 -0.07898 0.04748 0.11573
R14 0.01703 -0.08021 -0.13378 -0.23922
R15 -0.76797 -0.24669 -0.35399 -0.03208
R16 -0.29002 -0.57266 0.41125 -0.25636
R17 -0.21332 0.19050 -0.82032 0.03698
R18 -0.63792 0.14442 -0.47172 0.10039
R19 0.93222 -0.05534 0.04971 0.03475
R20 0.97020 -0.04418 -0.05980 0.07368
R21 0.92303 -0.07739 0.00967 -0.10719
R22 -0.07587 -0.00815 0.04148 0.95813
R23 -0.06989 -0.00533 0.02418 0.94532
R24 -0.25841 -0.41411 0.14610 -0.31969
R25 0.14231 -0.79968 -0.37766 0.10535
R26 0.24459 -0.09095 -0.09640 -0.23874
R27 -0.06978 0.05164 0.06608 0.94527
R28 -0.78991 -0.03888 0.02388 0.10507
R29 -0.78500 -0.04403 0.03006 0.08083
















































Regression Estimated Factor Scores
F4FI F2 F3
0.05246 -0.41408 -0.17658 0.021021
0.04335 -0.40105 -0.11816 0.017145
0.06049 -0.38920 -0.17083 -0.037088
0.02858 -0.30238 -0.09923 0.017431
0.04616 -0.40052 -0.10804 -0.000433
0.02395 -0.45495 -0.18260 0.069947
0.04773 -0.40790 -0.10991 0.034464
0.02900 -0.43720 -0.13750 -0.000121
0.00353 -0.36849 -0.11610 0.070961
0.07346 -0.43645 -0.12279 0.033483
0.05322 -0.44459 -0.17645 0.047047
-0.05033 -0.39714 -0.15240 0.047547
0.05432 -0.34989 -0.16612 0.040468
0.07622 -0.46063 -0.23813 0.055039
0.07680 -0.36975 -0.15768 0.005900
0.07236 -0.39038 -0.12977 0.059546
0.04443 -0.48482 -0.11713 0.034473
0.04342 -0.39066 -0.05794 0.059454
0.04450 -0.37330 -0.09603 0.045546
-0.06011 -0.37933 -0.07840 0.095937
0.03829 -0.40732 -0.11820 0.049006
0.02788 -0.21869 0.00589 0.107665
0.05037 -0.27477 -0.05885 0.136426
-0.19972 -0.31485 0.02715 0.292775
0.05095 -0.46398 -0.09552 0.039604
-0.07174 -0.34862 -0.10799 0.046703
0.05210 -0.39214 -0.14575 0.073827
0.06737 -0.41995 -0.08475 0.035294
0.04600 -0.37352 -0.11620 0.013274
0.06624 -0.37394 -0.09176 0.075342
0.03652 -0.35104 -0.12396 0.013980
0.05605 -0.38691 -0.11135 0.049222
0.08677 -0.40842 -0.20879 0.010017
0.04910 -0.33558 -0.11606 0.028304
0.04795 -0.47121 -0.15110 0.026083
0.05441 -0.48909 -0.14500 0.022338
0.11140 -0.52482 -0.24465 -0.099290
0.04445 -0.45011 -0.16093 0.039884
0.06549 -0.42981 -0.12348 0.045563
0.03919 -0.38854 -0.07905 0.025469
0.04212 -0.37797 -0.07739 0.031607
0.01822 -0.37723 -0.09168 0.031918
0.02962 -0.38783 -0.08581 0.008754



















































FI F2 F3 F4
0.06051 -0.39987 -0.12922 0.047487
0.05316 -0.31720 -0.13166 0.005568
0.06988 -0.34136 -0.12528 -0.002761
0.07274 -0.46870 -0.16380 0.018138
0.01364 -0.40202 -0.14058 0.009784
0.05950 -0.48184 -0.16863 0.034308
0.06493 -0.49166 -0.16764 0.014768
0.03170 -0.49685 -0.19783 0.039591
0.06684 -0.42312 -0.10574 0.024367
0.02548 -0.39953 -0.10557 0.022003
0.16568 -0.48635 -0.20872 -0.10638
0.03733 -0.43756 -0.13061 0.02388
0.03139 -0.39156 -0.09317 0.03023
0.04866 -0.38591 -0.16777 0.04690
0.05331 -0.43053 -0.11846 0.05737
0.04874 -0.46300 -0.10934 0.06928
0.04745 -0.47212 -0.13932 -.02333
0.03068 -0.37422 -0.05979 0.06866
0.05071 -0.41847 -0.08821 0.04422
0.06972 -0.50446 -0.20358 -0.01255
0.03337 -0.41046 -0.11039 0.03488
0.03346 -0.33076 -0.08105 0.09733
0.04218 -0.42077 -0.10666 0.02888
0.06315 -0.45696 -0.13199 0.07872
0.01055 -0.4441 -0.13412 0.03209
-0.06258 -0.34926 -0.05932 0.05054
0.07411 -0.45170 -0.22381 0.01529
0.02730 -0.41005 -0.16161 0.05036
0.07602 -0.43639 -0.11130 0.05552
0.03598 -0.26706 -0.07670 0.04263
0.0^908 -0.50767 -0.17866 0.00374
0.00911 -0.32636 -0.11264 -0.00236
0.04820 -0.43741 -0.14013 0.05429
0.05018 -0.39760 -0.10290 0.04530
0.05661 -0.42378 -0.15860 0.02892
0.07371 -0.43927 -0.15114 0.09018
-0.02697 -0.29700 -0.11850 0.03902
0.04010 -0.42766 -0.11544 0.04307
0.03069 -0.37847 -0.15707 0.08002
0.04639 -0.35542 -0.14724 -0.01239
0.06880 -0.38287 -0.12232 0.02750
0.05226 -0.43010 -0.15910 0.02331
0.02838 -0.39621 -0.13594 0.06334
0.07650 -0.41764 -0.14176 0.04973
0.02312 -0.44126 -0.17864 0.09535
0.00102 -0.27857 -0.10603 0.05605




















































FI F2 F3 F4
-0.04547 -0.39173 -0.10235 0.06236
0.03851 -0.41970 -0.18984 0.02933
-0.11614 -0.40681 -0.16520 0.11988
0.00282 -0.44567 -0.16116 0.03808
0.02857 -0.46774 -0.19622 0.07268
0.05605 -0.42730 -0.11994 0.01408
0.06481 -0.42643 -0.13601 0.03880
0.05569 -0.41567 -0.17411 0.04419
0.13560 -0.46598 -0.29413 0.01805
0.02567 -0.41331 -0.14445 0.03666
-0.06526 -0.46513 -0.18116 0.05555
-0.04963 -0.38489 -0.14763 0.03596
0.04001 -0.44146 -0.18154 0.05656
-0.22411 -0.49302 -0.18476 0.06184
0.01644 -0.38452 -0.16825 0.05873
0.00801 -0.34771 -0.12105 -0.06177
0.02713 -0.38459 -0.09423 0.00201
0.029656 -0.40805 -0.13809 0.01380
0.003207 -0.46876 -0.14877 0.04066
0.015218 -0.45411 -0.15355 0.06321
0.240882 -0.53223 -0.26017 -0.28826
0.085855 -0.35724 -0.07684 0.08292
0.086049 -0.43623 -0.12964 0.10501
0.031393 -0.24303 -0.05259 0.00486
0.033083 -0.31449 -0.05758 0.02844
0.057488 -0.36508 -0.09646 0.07331
0.036634 -0.35388 -0.05332 0.05957
0.034286 -0.35627 -0.11090 0.01018
0.079268 -0.47886 -0.17931 0.01037
0.054687 -0.45655 -0.12178 -0.03093
0.029336 -0.41869 -0.17601 0.06472
-0.015211 -0.39309 -0.14843 0.04192
0.056764 -0.36236 -0.10999 0.00742
0.063371 -0.47382 -0.15696 0.00899
0.064326 -0.41582 -0.11179 0.03655
0.051603 -0.43311 -0.12851 0.02506
0.062890 -0.44678 -0.13602 0.03547
0.052613 -0.42317 -0.13235 0.00839
0.049017 -0.49772 -0.18248 0.04584
0.070340 -0.42915 -0.18117 0.02909
0.098023 -0.42447 -0.17669 0.02034
0.073667 -0.38712 -0.14396 0.05628
0.041651 -0.138101 -0.11052 0.03186
0.066515 -0.35186 -0.05697 0.06302
0.048987 -0.46560 -0.10601 0.02278
0.043912 -0.40315 -0.09268 -0.01679
0.050989 -0.43359 -0.13466 0.06763

























FI F2 F3 F4
0.049582 -0.36892 -0.09367 0.09259
0.045072 -0.32849 -0.10278 0.01095
0.028619 -0.35397 -0.12981 0.05280
0.018741 -0.27593 -0.08458 -0.01906
0.016156 -0.37412 -0.14404 0.04633
0.019357 -0.25637 -0.08563 0.04311
0.021432 -0.28822 -0.12376 0.00310
0.042895 -0.47923 -0.11606 0.07167
0.043163 -0.39728 -0.13919 0.05002
0.126832 -0.46547 -0.18929 -0.10097
0.038223 -0.29102 -0.07812 0.04400
0.042807 -0.39460 -0.13753 0.00705
0.038597 -0.38288 -0.11175 0.07323
0.026293 -0.43120 -0.10140 0.06702
0.011993 -0.39490 -0.11237 0.05755
0.040878 -0.38594 -0.06628 0.06160
0.012305 -0.43609 -0.12671 0.05191
0.039179 -0.37332 -0.09337 0.00328
0.006322 -0.30361 -0.08046 0.01832
0.020059 -0.42736 -0.13809 0.04033

















































SI S2 S3 S4
-2.60633 -5.28413 -3.87672 0.08016
-2.07056 -4.85817 -2.76799 -0.19607
-1.80451 -4.21810 -3.16812 -0.43855
-1.77528 -3.61658 -2.33419 -0.02380
-1.72170 -4.52290 -2.37669 -0.39727
-3.65497 -5.50583 -4.60806 0.68186
-1.80450 -4.72450 -2.62620 -0.00521
-2.86548 -5.24864 -3.25419 -0.37267
-3.19854 -4.66970 -3.40946 0.51500
-1.33530 -5.11025 -2.66157 -0.04446
-2.68099 -5.47308 -4.04483 0.35608
-5.47067 -5.32300 -4.66396 0.32789
-2.08023 -4.42554 -3.61279 0.44084
-2.78272 -5.77399 -5.07878 0.71829
-1.32656 -4.50478 -3.03300 -0.05938
-1.26987 -4.67194 -2.87451 0.40649
-2.47987 -5.87792 -3.00426 -0.20856
-1.32998 -4.57039 -1.78888 0.04543
-1.64297 -4.45168 -2.40819 0.11280
-4.90278 -5.08062 -3.57797 0.56350
-2.67894 -5.16958 -3.15213 0.13620
-0.07421 -2.08899 -0.56085 0.81664
-0.39927 -2.76322 -1.84103 1.37000
-7.62127 -3.97279 -3.94538 2.70309
-1.78245 -5.24378 -2.43700 -0.13559
-5.31950 -4.58235 -3.90559 0.24187
-2.13098 -4.83966 -3.50581 0.64726
-0.99820 -4.84310 -1.96068 -0.17354
-1.75344 -4.36357 -2.58292 -0.15049
-0.77322 -4.01148 -2.18273 0.53197
-2.05447 -4.20931 -2.80900 -0.05955
-1.55033 -4.65690 -2.63538 0.19176
-1.85075 -5.14319 -4.04167 0.13319
-1.33987 -3.60375 -2.49616 0.19194
-2.74959 -5.92182 -3.57827 -0.13314
-2.55620 -6.07924 -3.39957 -0.25064
-1.92106 -6.29803 -4.06120 -1.26228
-2.74355 -5.40155 -3.78854 11.20320
-1.61515 -5.16885 -2.83744 0.09945
-1.69482 -4.65142 -2.06315 -0.26582
-1.51650 -4.46250 -2.01026 -0.15911
-2.21260 -4.07180 -2.46159 0.02055
-1.92491 -4.37815 -2.15281 -0.36748



















































SI S2 S3 S4
-1.67810 -4.82426 -2.95011 0.23167
-1.40985 -3.69753 -2.64151 -0.02100
-0.95873 -3.98573 -2.34577 -0.23054
-2.08540 -5.80699 -3.49262 -0.15098
-3.05008 -4.51857 -3.40264 -0.06897
-2.64370 -6.03489 -3.85676 0.03325
-2.35030 -5.78747 -3.62713 -0.16140
-3.97174 -6.44679 -4.81471 0.19090
-1.24111 -4.86743 -2.31162 -0.19461
-2.33375 -4.52853 -2.67595 -0.12504
0.23825 -5.97182 -2.69737 -1.51505
-2.60434 -5.35721 -3.18651 -0.14700
-1.92156 -4.27946 -2.37721 -0.04460
-2.41021 -4.74488 -3.79726 0.45409
-1.91251 -5.11579 -2.92754 0.23474
-2.16206 -5.58220 -2.95064 0.23267
-2.67413 -5.00733 -3.35778 -0.25027
-1.59236 -4.2332 -1.95159 0.24821
-3.14946 -3.64610 -2.93922 0.16669
-2.76435 -6.23323 -4.19108 -0.39232
-2.32973 -4.92861 -2.82698 -0.03155
-1.53981 -3.73792 -2.40108 0.82020
-2.05185 -4.99906 -2.64064 -0.14639
-1.82010 -5.22017 -3.21938 0.54190
-3.50958 -5.49055 -3.60875 -0.03812
-4.39514 -4.27501 -2.84288 0.07680
-2.64285 -6.71679 -4.59536 0.16729
-3.09632 -4.99373 -3.97041 0.43294
-1.11113 -5.01994 -2.52110 0.17786
-0.70764 -2.17957 -1.70964 0.45939
-2.80012 -6.16625 -3.90618 -0.31132
-2.56388 -3.78723 -2.71830 -0.21406
-2.39207 -5.34046 -3.41964 0.27350
-1.68111 -4.76580 -2.53343 0.07735
-2.33198 -5.36915 -3.54740 0.05548
-1.70076 -5.18874 -3.53179 0.78825
-3.60637 -3.48455 -3.39211 0.41143
-2.28546 -5.15735 -2.93800 0.04329
-2.83632 -4.69532 -3.95971 0.83071
-2.03581 -4.31735 -3.02197 -0.28075
-1.25423 -4.62018 -2.58204 -0.01244
-2.51656 -5.49004 -3.59344 -0.03316
-2.76028 -4.90477 -3.52392 0.46632
-1.40800 -4.99833 -3.06280 0.28122
-3.62082 -5.42819 -4.66893 0.98669
-2.31372 -2.72126 -2.81472 0.69403



















































SI S2 S3 S4
-4.73368 -5.16710 -3.70876 0.25952
-3.10744 -5.13415 -4.29922 0.29658
-7.85404 -5.83798 -6.10494 1.21475
-3.88300 -5.14238 -4.18045 0.26491
-3.74759 -5.70086 -4.86951 0.74656
-1.64235 -4.71116 -2.61357 -0.20047
-1.76245 -5.16345 -3.04599 0.08848
-2.35729 -4.95867 -3.86857 0.41623
-1.51505 -5.64298 -5.28904 0.56851
-3.06583 -5.25366 -3.62887 0.11583
-6.66729 -6.33147 -5.59734 0.38071
-5.14036 -4.74352 -4.39770 0.28305
-3.11728 -5.42415 -4.32756 0.51960
-12.05174 -7.64876 -7.62784 0.30065
-3.49664 -4.98946 -4.25900 0.58000
-2.43054 -3.28474 -2.47096 -0.78380
-1.96570 -4.10218 -2.25409 -0.34236
-2.71048 -4.90065 -3.27438 -0.12582
-3.94794 -5.62040 -4.03823 0.12516
-3.50182 -5.27160 -4.06557 0.49330
1.85429 -6.46621 -1.95475 -3.60098
0.07926 -3.83467 -1.42016 -0.04371
-1.02420 -4.98853 -3.03579 0.88378
-0.86085 -2.86618 -1.20786 -0.27908
-1.26239 -3.75296 -1.57411 -0.15386
-1.06920 -3.97163 -2.34814 0.54762
-1.26200 -4.05612 -1.68220 0.13521
-1.95389 -4.14879 -2.55081 -0.16435
-2.15177 -6.04343 -3.71871 -0.21386
-1.96576 -5.38661 -2.53219 -0.88224
-3.30704 -5.24588 -4.34921 0.63331
-4.22462 -4.98760 -4.12289 0.28565
-1.19054 -3.97165 -2.24712 -0.18007
-2.34250 -5.93306 -3.43285 -0.32146
-1.42592 -4.95230 -2.53728 -0.02873
-2.11963 -5.27752 -2.98682 -0.13658
-1.92314 -5.40633 -3.09119 -0.00261
-2.10014 -5.23336 -2.94871 -0.30981
-3.20398 -6.24324 -4.33497 0.21359
-2.17778 -5.40967 -3.84138 0.16573
-1.18794 -5.16761 -3.36885 0.06748
-1.31855 -4.53036 -3.08901 0.47508
-1.83017 -4.35054 -2.62183 0.05009
-0.38464 -4.00787 -1.44432 0.18835
-1.95386 -5.27054 -2.56975 -0.28673
-1.58511 -4.45432 -2.00320 -0.66625


























SI S2 S3 S4
-0.61218 -2.22684 -1.01139 0.02312
-1.46756 -4.38633 -2.55948 0.68395
-1.45502 -3.94356 -2.24830 -0.16356
-2.31122 -4.05076 -3.19368 0.48555
-0.59077 -0.61215 -1.42220 0.09639
-2.96654 -4.35929 -3.61764 0.42831
-1.33015 -2.24349 -2.07179 0.51233
-1.90339 -2.83373 -2.66141 0.10976
-2.44399 -5.65870 -3.16862 0.28690
-2.27162 -4.74221 -3.32536 0.34696
-0.47567 -5.39499 -2.66715 -1.40902
-1.16925 -3.36505 -1.93073 0.22981
-2.23230 -4.73237 -3.05619 -0.18396
-1.97038 -4.36957 -2.91200 0.55949
-2.62103 -5.28331 -2.97233 0.23928
-2.78556 -4.41516 -3.12791 0.37937
-1.52304 -4.63171 -1.99855 0.10676
-3.37834 -5.46180 -3.55352 0.16725
-1.53365 -3.95958 -2.09093 -0.30917
-2.27461 -3.68592 -2.22934 -0.11777
-3.05279 -4.98516 -3.53967 0.18599
-1.84610 -4.21776 -2.70997 -0.25220
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APPENDIX K 
Pooled Covariance Matrix 
Initial Sample
Variable R20 R8 R17 R22
R20 .00009960 .00002055 -.00000874 .00001112
R8 .00002055 .00817692 .00005048 -.00003076
R17 -.00000874 .00005048 .00001370 .00001353
R22 .00001112 -.00003076 .00001353 .00024618
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APPENDIX L 
Correlation Coefficients Between Factors
Variable R20 R8 R17 R22
R20 1.00000 .02277 - .23658 .07100
R8 .02277 1.00000 .15082 - .02168
R17 - .23658 .15082 1.00000 .23298
R22 .07100 - .02168 .23298 1.00000
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